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Demand for and impacts of performance audits (PA) on public administration in 
Kazakhstan have not been studied. This information gap increases risks of missed 
government opportunities to improve public sector performance. Using new public 
management theory and the principal-agent model as guiding lenses, the purpose of this 
phenomenological study was to explore the demand for and effects of PA on 
Kazakhstan’s public administration. The research question explored the lived experiences 
and perceptions of the key participants and users of PAs, i.e., auditors, managers of 
auditees, and parliamentarians, and included reviews of over 200 official documents 
including audit reports and 14 semistructured interviews. Transcripts underwent inductive 
descriptive and conceptual coding, integrated application of bracketing and constructed 
thematic were used to generate and verify themes and patterns associated with PA 
demand and impact. Research findings illustrated that PAs are frequently requested in 
Kazakhstan due to problems in public administration, impacting positively and negatively 
those involved in PA, audit organizations, auditees, and contributing to improved budget 
process, laws, and regulations. Positive social change implications include providing 
information for parliamentarian decision-making on using responsive PA and for audit 
leaders and auditees on development strategies, fostering new performance auditor 
professional advancement. Additionally, new insights on influential PA triggers may help 
auditors undertake useful PA, while new PA impact information may support public 









ME, Al-Farabi Kazakh State National University, 1998 
BE, Al-Farabi Kazakh State National University, 1996 
 
 
Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirement for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 












I would like to express my sincere appreciation and thanks to Dr. Steven A.  
Matarelli, my committee chairperson, for his professional guidance and mentoring 
throughout my dissertation process. He always provided me with insightful feedbacks 
and suggestions, encouraging me and making possible successful completion of my 
doctoral study. Thank you very much, Dr. Matarelli. 
I am grateful to Dr. Nikolas Roberts for agreeing to serve on my committee as 
methodologist and his helpful advice. Additionally, I appreciate the review work of Dr. 
Ian Cole, university research reviewer, to ensure the overall research quality of this 
manuscript. 
My sincere appreciation goes to Lyudmila Vladimirovna Ekshembeeva, for many 
years of encouragement and support in my learning achievements. 




Table of Contents 
List of Tables.................................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................. viii 
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study ................................................................................ 1 
Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1 
Background ............................................................................................................... 2 
Problem Statement ..................................................................................................... 5 
Purpose Statement ..................................................................................................... 8 
Research Question ..................................................................................................... 9 
Theoretical Framework .............................................................................................. 9 
Nature of the Study .................................................................................................. 11 
The Qualitative Method ..................................................................................... 12 
The Phenomenological Approach ....................................................................... 12 
Definitions ............................................................................................................... 14 
Assumptions ............................................................................................................ 17 
Scope and Delimitation ............................................................................................ 19 
Limitations .............................................................................................................. 21 
Significance ............................................................................................................. 23 
Summary ................................................................................................................. 26 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ......................................................................................... 28 
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 28 
Literature Search Strategy ........................................................................................ 29 
 
ii 
Conceptualizing Performance Audits ....................................................................... 30 
Performance Audit Institutions................................................................................. 34 
Current Triggers for Performance Auditing .............................................................. 38 
Targeting Public Administration through Performance Audits ................................. 41 
Instrumental, Conceptual (Cognitive), Interactive, and Strategic Influences ....... 42 
Impacting the Micro, Meso, and Macro Levels ................................................... 45 
Performance Auditing in Kazakhstan ....................................................................... 46 
Historical Perspectives of Kazakhstani Public Administration ............................ 46 
Implementation of Performance Audits .............................................................. 52 
Literature Review and Gaps ..................................................................................... 54 
Theoretical Foundation ............................................................................................ 57 
New Public Management Theory ....................................................................... 57 
Principal-Agent Model ....................................................................................... 58 
NPM and PAM Integration in the Context of Performance Auditing .................. 59 
Summary ................................................................................................................. 62 
Chapter 3: Research Method .......................................................................................... 64 
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 64 
Rationalizing the Research Design and Methodology ............................................... 65 
Design: Qualitative Study .................................................................................. 65 
Methodology: Phenomenological Approach ....................................................... 66 
Research Participants and Researcher ...................................................................... 68 
Target Population and Selection of Participants .................................................. 68 
 
iii 
Researcher’s Role and Participants’ Values ........................................................ 75 
Data Sources, Collection, and Analysis .................................................................... 77 
Primary and Secondary Sources ......................................................................... 77 
Instrumentation for Data Collection ................................................................... 78 
Strategies and Techniques for Data Analysis ...................................................... 82 
Managing Issues of Trustworthiness ........................................................................ 85 
Credibility and Transferability ........................................................................... 85 
Dependability and Confirmability ...................................................................... 86 
Managing Ethical Issues .......................................................................................... 88 
Researcher’s Biases and Protection of Participants ............................................. 88 
Informed Consent............................................................................................... 90 
Additional Ethical Procedures ............................................................................ 91 
Summary ................................................................................................................. 92 
Chapter 4: Results of the Study ...................................................................................... 94 
Introduction ............................................................................................................. 94 
Setting  ..................................................................................................................... 95 
Demographics .......................................................................................................... 96 
Data Collection ........................................................................................................ 99 
Participants Recruiting ..................................................................................... 100 
Implementing the Interview Matrix .................................................................. 102 
Evidence of Trustworthiness .................................................................................. 105 




Dependability ................................................................................................... 107 
Confirmability.................................................................................................. 108 
Data Analysis ........................................................................................................ 109 
Applied Strategies and Techniques ................................................................... 109 
Consolidated Statistics of Data Analysis Results .............................................. 113 
Results ................................................................................................................... 117 
Perceived Central Concepts .............................................................................. 117 
Perceived Factors of Demand for Performance Audits...................................... 120 
Perceived Impact of Performance Audits .......................................................... 147 
Summary ............................................................................................................... 182 
Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations ........................................ 184 
Introduction ........................................................................................................... 184 
Interpretation of the Findings ................................................................................. 185 
Empirical Context and Evidence ...................................................................... 185 
Theoretical Context and Alignment .................................................................. 215 
Limitations of the Study ......................................................................................... 222 
Recommendations and Implications ....................................................................... 224 
Theoretical Implications ................................................................................... 224 
Public Policy Implication ................................................................................. 228 
Methodological and Practical Recommendations.............................................. 230 
Positive Social Implications ............................................................................. 232 
 
v 
Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 234 
References ................................................................................................................... 236 
Appendix A: Invitation Letter ...................................................................................... 273 
Appendix B: Interview Guide ...................................................................................... 276 
Appendix C: SAI Performance Measurement Framework ............................................ 279 
Appendix D: Research Findings in the Context of SAI Performance Measurement 
Framework ....................................................................................................... 280 
Appendix E: Interview Protocol ................................................................................... 281 




List of Tables 
Table 1. The Models of SAIs ......................................................................................... 36 
Table 2. Interpretations of Predecessors of Performance Auditing in Kazakhstan ........... 53 
Table 3. The General and Target Population .................................................................. 71 
Table 4. The Sample Design and Size ............................................................................ 74 
Table 5. The Interview Organization Matrix .................................................................. 81 
Table 6. Meeting Inclusion Criteria by the Participants .................................................. 97 
Table 7. Completed Interviews Matrix ......................................................................... 102 
Table 8. Examples of Assigned Descriptive and Concept Codes .................................. 112 
Table 9. Aggregated Results of Data Analysis ............................................................. 116 
Table 10. Performance Auditing Statistics in Kazakhstan ............................................ 121 
Table 11. Pattern 1: Matrix of Themes and Frequency of Associated Categories .......... 123 
Table 12. Pattern 2: Matrix of Themes and Frequency of Associated Categories .......... 132 
Table 13. Results of Comparing Performance Auditing Standards ............................... 136 
Table 14. Results of Comparing Performance Audit Reports ....................................... 137 
Table 15. Pattern 3: Matrix of Themes and Frequency of Associated Categories .......... 139 
Table 16. Pattern 1: Matrix of Themes and Frequency of Associated Categories .......... 148 
Table 17. Pattern 2: Matrix of Themes and Frequency of Associated Categories .......... 162 
Table 18. Pattern 3: Matrix of Themes and Frequency of Associated Categories .......... 174 
Table 19. Aggregated Data on Empirical Context and Evidence: Demand for 
Performance Audits ............................................................................................. 199 
 
vii 
Table 20. Aggregated Data on Empirical Context and Evidence: Impact of Performance 





List of Figures 
Figure 1. The principal-agent model .............................................................................. 11 
Figure 2. The chronological map of appearance of SAIs ................................................ 35 
Figure 3. The dynamic of GDP and GDP per capita Kazakhstan in 1991-2019 .............. 47 
Figure 4. Worldwide governance indicators for Kazakhstan in 1996-2018 ..................... 51 
Figure 5. Combining information and goal..................................................................... 59 
Figure 6. Combining information and goal on PAM ...................................................... 61 
Figure 7. Data collection and organization ..................................................................... 82 
Figure 8. Data analysis algorithm................................................................................... 83 
Figure 9. Data Analysis Results ..................................................................................... 85 
Figure 10. The study participants distribution by groups ................................................ 99 
Figure 11. The aggregated results of phenomenological reduction ............................... 114 
Figure 12. Visualization of patterns, themes, and sub-themes ....................................... 115 
Figure 13. Perceived central concepts of auditors ......................................................... 117 
Figure 14. Perceived central concepts of parliamentarians ........................................... 118 
Figure 15. Perceived central concepts of managers of auditees..................................... 119 
Figure 16. Perceived central concepts of all participants .............................................. 120 
Figure 17. Visualization of themes on Pattern 1 by the frequency of categories............ 122 
Figure 18. Visualization of themes on Pattern 3 by the frequency of categories............ 138 
Figure 19. Visualization of themes on Pattern 1 by the frequency of categories............ 147 
Figure 20. Auditors’ perception on impact of performance audits on managers ............ 149 
Figure 21. Managers’ perception on impact of performance audits on them ................. 151 
 
ix 
Figure 22. Auditors’ perception on impact of performance audits on them ................... 155 
Figure 23. Managers’ perception on impact of performance audits on auditors ............ 158 
Figure 24. Visualization of themes on Pattern 2 by the frequency of categories............ 162 
Figure 25. Auditors’ perception on impacting audit organizations ................................ 163 
Figure 26. Auditors’ perception on impacting auditees................................................. 169 
Figure 27. Managers’ perception on impacting auditees ............................................... 170 
Figure 28. Visualization of themes on Pattern 3 by the frequency of categories............ 173 





Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
Beginning in the 1970s, the number of public sector audit organizations around 
the world that have powers to conduct performance audits increased significantly (The 
International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions Development Initiative (IDI), 
2018; The International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), 2004, 
2013a; Torres, Yetano, & Pina, 2019). These performance audits are conducted to (a) 
increase the accountability of governments by providing them and the general public with 
an independent and objective opinion about meeting the principals of economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness by government entities; and (b) improve the public sector 
performance by making recommendations (INTOSAI, 2019). 
While the performance auditing phenomenon has received considerable attention 
from both the academic community and scholars-practitioners, the demand for 
performance audits and their impact on public administration are poorly studied 
(Desmedt, Morin, Pattyn, & Brans, 2017; Hay & Cordery, 2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud & 
Johnsen, 2018). This identified information gap in the literature was critical, especially 
for Kazakhstan where the performance auditing is a novelty. By exploring the 
Kazakhstani case in terms of demand for and impacts of performance audits on public 
administration, I incrementally addressed and attempted to reduce this information gap. 
My study might be helpful to auditors who are mastering a new profession, i.e., 
performance auditors, and their organizations. Additionally, governments and their 
entities that are subject to performance audits to include parliamentarians and legislative 
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bodies who use performance audit report in policymaking may benefit from a detailed 
look at performance auditing processes and outcomes in order to evaluate public policy 
effectiveness. 
Background 
Contemporary public sector audit organizations are empowered with mandates to 
conduct performance audits (IDI, 2018; INTOSAI, 2004, 2013a; Torres et al., 2019). 
Before using the performance audits, public auditors conducted traditional compliance 
and financial audits, i.e., their objectives were an examination of compliance of auditees’ 
operations with the laws and regulations and conduction of audits of financial statements 
of government entities and other auditees, such as government-owned enterprises or 
private companies that deliver public services (Glynn 1995; Pollitt, 2003). Performance 
auditors’ objectives are to determine whether governmental initiatives (programs, 
projects, and other undertakings) or auditees’ activity are in line with the principles of 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (INTOSAI, 2019, p. 8). 
The following two key trends are associated with the development of performance 
auditing. Firstly, performance auditing is a widespread practice used within the public 
sector in many countries; as a rule, performance audits conducted by public sector audit 
organizations called supreme audit institutions (SAIs). Issuance of performance auditing 
standards by the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) 
supports this position statement given that more than 190 countries have national and 
regional organizations that consists of SAIs whose purpose is to undertake performance 
audits (INTOSAI, 2018). Secondly, performance audits replace traditional compliance 
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and financial audits from SAIs’ audit portfolios. This trend means that today’s SAIs 
spend more resources to conduct performance audits. For instance, in the United States, 
Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, and other counties, which are pioneers and leaders in 
performance auditing, SAIs increase their resources allocated for performance audits 
(INTOSAI, 2004, 2013a; IDI, 2018). Hay and Cordery (2018) offered that performance 
audits are in high demand. Despite the widely accepted objective of performance 
auditing, i.e., contribution to accountability, efficiency, and effectiveness of executives’ 
programs and operations, and more than 50 years of historical experience, this question is 
still topical (Hay & Cordery, 2018; INTOSAI, 2013). 
Several studies have illustrated the relation between the performance auditing 
emergence and the 1970s reforms in public administration coined new public 
management (Azuma 2003, 2005; English & Skaerbaek, 2007; Lapsley, 1999; Power, 
1996). Countries’ experiences in adopting the performance audit have also received 
considerable attention from scholars (Flesher, Samson, & Previts, 2003; Grönlund, 
Svärdsten, & Öhman, 2011; Hossain, 2010; Jacobs, 1998; Morin, 2001; Morin & Hazgui, 
2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a; Skaerbaek, 2009; Weihrich, 2018; Yamamoto & 
Waranabe, 1989). For instance, based on experience of Australian SAI, Hossain (2010) 
concluded that the development of performance audit is related to changes within the 
public administration system and the increasing need for accountability and responsibility 
of governments in dealing with the taxpayers’ money. The problems associated with 
performance auditing were also subject to more recent studies. In particular, according to 
Morin and Hazgui (2016) and Hossain (2010), governments resisted to expanding public 
4 
 
auditors’ powers by providing them with mandates to conduct performance audits of 
governmental programs. Funnell, Wade, and Jupe (2016) and Morin (2008) offered 
critiques of performance auditing in terms of ambitiousness of performance audits’ 
objectives and limitations associated with SAIs’ capacity to objectively evaluate the 
effectiveness of auditees’ activity and found them to be reasonable. Critics of 
performance auditing coupled with the isomorphism phenomena, i.e., applying reforms or 
practice because of their popularity rather than their reasonability, strengthens the 
topicality of questions regarding the demand for performance audits. These questions are 
at issue due to the scarce availability of systematic empirical evidence on the impact of 
performance auditing on public administration (Desmedt et al., 2017; Reichborn-
Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018). 
There have been several influential studies that focused on the impact of 
performance audits on public administration systems (Alwardat, Benamraoui, & Rieple, 
2015; Desmedt et al., 2017; Funnell et al., 2016; Morin, 2001, 2008; Reichborn-
Kjennerud, 2013b; 2014a; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud 
& Vabo, 2017; Torres et al., 2019). According to Morin (2001, 2008), performance 
auditors’ work leads to changes for auditees. Interestingly, the extent of performance 
audits’ impacts may depend on the perceived roles of performance auditors, such as 
controllers or watchdogs and assistants or modernizers (Lapsley & Pong, 2000; Morin & 
Hazgui, 2016). However, in all cases, it is difficult or even impossible to objectively 
define and measure the effects of performance audits on improving the public sector 
performance (Funnell & Wade, 2012; Morin, 2008; Pollitt, 2003). The absence of an 
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indicator that is acceptable to all within the public sector (like a profit within the private 
sector) explains this limitation of performance auditing (Lapsley & Pong, 2000). 
However, performance auditors’ work is in demand, and the number of users of 
performance audit reports, including parliamentarians, has been increasing (Torres et al., 
2019). In particular, Funnell et al. (2016) offered that performance audits may also be 
used to legitimize earlier political decisions or to promote democratization by public 
officials. For instance, in some European countries, policymakers used arguments on 
improving the quality of political and democratic processes as the rationale for 
empowering public sector audit organizations with mandates to conduct performance 
audits (Tillema & Bogt, 2010). Approaches and practices of performance audit 
significantly differed depending on country specifics, including the organizational styles 
of their public administration structures (Glynn, 1995; Hossain, 2010; Morin, 2016; 
Torres et al., 2019). As such, Hay and Cordery (2018) urged exploring the causes of 
demand for performance audits, while Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018) 
reasonably called for more empirical studies on impact of performance audits. 
Problem Statement 
The most recent studies on exploring the impact of performance auditing on 
public administration focused on the cases of developed countries, while the developing 
countries’ perspectives were fragmentarily explored within a few studies (Loke, Ismail, 
& Hamid, 2016). Despite legitimization of performance audits, i.e., empowering the 
public sector audit organizations with mandates to conduct performance audits by law, 
and stable increase in the number of performance audits conducted by the Accounts 
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Committee for Control over Execution of the Republican Budget (the Accounts 
Committee), the central public sector audit organization, and Revision Commissions, the 
local public sector audit organizations, there were no empirical studies on demand for and 
impacts of performance auditing on public administration in Kazakhstan. A few applied 
pieces of research on international experience in performance auditing were conducted by 
the Accounts Committee to develop standards and establish the methodological base for 
performance auditing (The Centre for Financial Violations Research (CFVR), 2014, 
2016, 2017). As a consequence, it was unknown why performance audits are in demand 
in Kazakhstan and how they influence the national public administration system. 
This gap was not surprising, since, unlike the Anglo-American countries or 
countries of Continental Europe, the use of performance auditing in Kazakhstan started in 
2002 from two pilot audits conducted by the Accounts Committee and the intensive use 
of performance audits by both the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions 
started only in 2015 (The Information System of Legal Acts of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (ISLARK), 2015). The problem was that a lack of empirical evidence about 
the usefulness or, more precisely, the positive impact of performance audits on public 
administration, challenges the credibility of performance auditors’ works and their 
organizations’ activity in general (Funnell et al., 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 
2018). This problem increased risks of missed opportunities of public sector audit 
organizations in Kazakhstan in the government’s efforts to increase efficiency and 
effectiveness of the public sector performance. 
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A gap, therefore, existed for scholars-practitioners in understanding the factors 
that might explain the demand for performance auditing in Kazakhstan and it was 
unknown the perceived effects of performance audits on Kazakhstani public 
administration. This gap was strengthened by recent scholars who rightly stated that 
performance auditing and its impacts vary depending on the development of a nation and 
styles of public administration (Desmedt et al., 2017; Loke et al., 2016; Torres et al., 
2019). Hay and Cordery (2018) reasonably suggested a more extensive examination of 
the demand for performance audits within different settings and highlighted the 
usefulness of new explanations for performance auditing. In this regard, the case of 
Kazakhstan was unique. 
There are four aspects that separate the Kazakhstani case from well-studied cases 
of developed and some developing countries. Unlike the pioneers and leaders in 
performance auditing, such as the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
Australia that started to use performance audits in the 1970s or even earlier, Kazakhstan 
has been using the performance audits for only a few years. Kazakhstani public sector 
audit organizations including the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions 
referred to the Board Models of SAIs that is significantly different from Westminster or 
Napoleonic models of SAIs (ISLARK, 2015). Unlike developed countries, in 
Kazakhstan, neither central nor local governments resisted the expanding public auditors’ 
mandates from conduction of traditional to performance audits. Finally, Kazakhstan is a 
young nation that started to establish its public administration system after the breakup of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 and, therefore, Kazakhstani public administration system 
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referred to recently emerged styles (Adnan & Fatima, 2015; Knox, 2008; Riboud, 2015). 
These aspects exacerbated the problem of a lack of information regarding the impact of 
performance audits on Kazakhstani public administration. 
Purpose Statement 
The purpose of this qualitative study was to explore the factors that might explain 
the demand for performance auditing in Kazakhstan and the perceived effects of 
performance audits on Kazakhstani public administration. To achieve this purpose, in 
depth understanding of the reasons for conduction more performance audits and these 
audits’ contributions to changes in public administration through the eyes of those 
individuals performing or requesting audits was needed. In this study, I focused on 
exploring the lived experiences and perceptions of performance auditors, managers of 
auditees, and parliamentarians related to (a) the influential factors that may explain 
recently existing demand for performance auditing in Kazakhstan, and (b) impacts of 
performance audits on auditors, managers of auditees, parliamentarians, their 
organizations, and public administration in general. 
Exploring the perceptions of public sector audit organization representatives and 
executive and legislative bodies was critical in my quest for a better understanding of this 
studied phenomena. Furthermore, exploring the causes of performance audit demand and 
audit reporting’s influence on Kazakhstan’s public administration will contribute to 
greater understanding for other newly emerged public administration styles that differ 




The following central research question guided my study: 
Research Question (RQ): What are the lived experiences and perceptions of 
performance auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians, the key participants 
and users of performance audits, regarding the demand for and impacts of these audits on 
Kazakhstan’s public administration? 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework for my study was a combination of Hood’s new public 
management theory (NPM) and Waterman and Meier’s principal-agent model (PAM; 
Hood, 1991; Waterman & Meier, 1998). As previously described, performance auditing 
emerged due to the 1970 reforms called new public management and performance audits 
are used as an instrument to implement these reforms aimed at promoting improvements, 
increasing accountability, and achieving the desired goals and results in the public sector. 
In line with an ideology of new public management, transferring from bureaucratic style 
to customer-oriented and accountable management style grounded in the private sector 
leads to an improved public sector performance (Hood, 1995; Kapucu, 2006). NPM 
implies replacing process-oriented approaches with result-oriented techniques to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness within the public sector (Bao, Wang, Larsen, & Morgan, 
2012; Hood, 1995; Kapucu, 2006). This formula of improvements works in today’s 
realities (Bao et al., 2012; Esposito, Ferlie, & Gaeta, 2018; Reiter & Klenk, 2019; 
Verbeeten & Spekle, 2015). 
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Expression of an independent and objective opinion by performance auditors 
regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of government initiatives is a tool for 
implementing the accountability principle, while performance auditors’ recommendations 
are a means to promote improvements. Logically, introducing the performance auditing, 
i.e., a public auditors’ professional practice used to establish whether the public sector 
organizations operate with due regard to efficiency and effectiveness, directly relates to 
NPM (Azuma 2003, 2005; English, 2003; Funnell, 2015; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a). 
Thus, I used NPM as the theoretical lens for identification and interpretation factors that 
might explain the phenomenon of demand in performance audits in Kazakhstan. 
Further, performance audit is a process of trilateral interaction between auditors, 
managers of auditees, and parliamentarians who use performance audit reports to make 
political decisions (Morin, 2008). The participants of a performance auditing process are 
three parties with a different status, mandates, and responsibilities. This construction of 
interacting between auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians is embeddable 
in the principal-agent model. PAM, in the context of executing the accountability 
principle, implies dividing the participants of a performance auditing process to 
principals or, policy makers, and agents or, policy implementers (Barzelay, 2001; Funnell 
et al., 2016; Morin, 2008; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a). 
With reference to performance auditing, PAM is the construction of three-level 
relations between principals and agents, where, as it is demonstrated in Figure 1,  
performance auditors are principals for managers of auditees and agents for 
parliamentarians, parliamentarians are principals for both performance auditors and 
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managers of auditees, and finally, managers of auditees are agents for both 






Figure 1. The principal-agent model 
Note: Developed based on Barzelay (2001) and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a). 
 
I used PAM as a lens to interpret rules, approaches, and practices of interactions 
between the participants of a performance auditing process. Barzelay (2001) argued that 
PAM in the context of NPM takes on a specific feature; both principals and agents have 
agreements on improving public sector performance. This aspect was the rationale to use 
two frameworks in a combined manner since it provided a foundation for the 
interpretations of perceptions of auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians 
regarding the usefulness of performance audits and their impact on public administration 
in Kazakhstan. 
Nature of the Study 





















managers of auditeesperformance auditors
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The Qualitative Method 
Based on the comparison of application requirements, advantages and limitations 
of qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods in researching, I selected the qualitative 
method as the most suitable to explore causes of demand for performance audits in 
Kazakhstan and their impact on Kazakhstani public administration. Qualitative inquiries 
are used to examine a phenomenon that impacts individuals or groups in a specific setting 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Maxwell, 2013; Patton, 2015). The selected 
method implies communications with study participants and observations to gather rich 
and first-hand data in a particular cultural and social context (Mills & Birks, 2017). 
Patton (2015) stated, through applying the qualitative method, a researcher may interpret 
meaning-making processes. Thus, direct access to the study participants who are 
experienced participants of a performance auditing process, i.e., auditors who conduct 
performance audits as well as managers of auditees and parliamentarians who use 
performance audit reports, contributed to greater information and understanding of the 
recent phenomenon of demand for performance audits in Kazakhstan and to determine 
whether these audits are impacting public administration approach and effectiveness. I 
used a comparative analysis to determine whether the case of Kazakhstan differs from the 
well-studied cases of developed countries. 
The Phenomenological Approach 
According to Moustakas (1994), the phenomenological approach implies the 
obtaining of comprehensive descriptions of study participants’ experience to analyze and 
portray the essence of their experience. Within phenomenological studies, a researcher 
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collects data through in-depth interviews with people who have directly experienced the 
studied phenomenon and then he or she transfers their experiences into consciousness 
(Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2015). These applied aspects of phenomenological inquiries 
and lack of empirical evidence regarding the impact of performance audits (Desmedt et 
al., 2017; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018) were the key arguments to use an 
empirical phenomenological approach in my research. 
To comprehensively explore the performance auditing as a widespread 
phenomenon and a means of influence for policy-makers and policy-implementers, I 
gathered, learned, and analyzed information shared by the study participants selected 
about their experience. Therefore, I used in-depth phenomenological interviews to 
explore opinions, lived experiences, and perceptions of auditors, managers of auditees, 
and parliamentarians associated with performance audit use within Kazakhstani public 
administration. 
O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner (2008) offered that the most challenging aspect of 
a selected research method is finding individuals who have experienced a particular 
phenomenon of interest who are willing to participate in the research inquiry. Thus, I 
used the group characteristics sampling and single-significant-case sampling methods to 
identify my research participants with additional participant encouragement through 
snow ball sampling. I used member checking and data triangulation to verify my primary 
data prior to and as a foundation of thematic analysis (see Koelsch, 2013; Lietz, Langer, 
& Furman, 2006; Patton, 2015; Ravitch & Carl, 2016, for more). 
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Generally, the studied phenomena affect the public and private sectors’ 
organizations that deliver public service, taxpayers, and recipients of public services. I 
focused on the impact of performance audits on public administration to include 
participants of a performance auditing process; hence, the central target population 
consisted of: 
▪ public auditors who served in 18 public sector audit organizations in 
Kazakhstan that empowered with the mandates to conduct performance audits 
including the Accounts Committee and 17 Revision Commissions; 
▪ managers of auditees, i.e., central and local governments’ entities; 
▪ parliamentarians who are members of the Parliament of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan (the central legislative body) and parliamentarians who are 
members of the Maslikhats (the local legislative bodies). 
In order to reach a threshold of data saturation, I interviewed 14 government 
officials whose primary jobs include governmental budgeting and managing public funds, 
auditing, and higher-level parliamentary commissioners responsible for auditing 
outcomes. 
Definitions 
The following key terms were used within the study. 
Auditee: An organization that is subject to audit. According to the Act of the 
Republic of Kazakhstan “On Public Auditing and Financial Control” adopted in 2015 
(the 2015 Public Auditing Act), auditees are government bodies and entities, 
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organizations of the quasi-public sector and the recipients of budget funds (ISLARK, 
2015, para. 1). 
Auditor: An employee of an audit organization who due to his or her official 
duties participates in audits. According to the 2015 Public Auditing Act, a public auditor 
is a public servant who conduct public audit and financial control and has the public 
auditor certificate (ISLARK, 2015, para. 1). 
Demand for performance auditing: Conditions or reasons that cause the need for 
performance audits. 
Economy: A principle of governance and managing the public sources that used 
as an evaluation criterion for performance auditing objectives. “The principle of economy 
means minimising the costs of resources. The resources used should be available in due 
time, in and of appropriate quantity and quality and at the best price” (INTOSAI, 2019, p. 
9). 
Effectiveness: A principle of governance and managing the public sources that 
used as an evaluation criterion for performance auditing objectives. “The principle of 
effectiveness concerns meeting the objectives set and achieving the intended results” 
(INTOSAI, 2019, p. 9). 
Efficiency: A principle of governance and managing the public sources that used 
as an evaluation criterion for performance auditing objectives. “The principle of 
efficiency means getting the most from the available resources. It is concerned with the 
relationship between resources employed and outputs delivered in terms of quantity, 
quality and timing” (INTOSAI, 2019, p. 9). 
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Impact of performance audits: A set of direct and indirect, desired and undesired 
effects that SAIs, local public sector audit organizations, and their performance auditors 
have on auditees, audited areas of public administration, and the public sector in general 
(Lonsdale, 2000; Morin, 2001).  
Local revision commission: A public sector audit organization that is responsible 
for fulfilling external local audit functions established by local laws or by a law-making 
body at local level. According to the 2015 Public Auditing Act, the Revision 
Commissions are external public audit organizations that have the power to conduct 
performance audits at the local government level (ISLARK, 2015, para. 13). 
Performance audit (within the public sector): A legitimate professional activity of 
independent public sector audit organizations on examination of whether an audited area 
of public administration (reforms, programs, policies, and projects) or an auditee (its 
operations, systems, and activities) meet the generally-accepted principles of economy, 
efficiency, effectiveness, and other criteria of good governance. Performance audits are 
carried out to promote improvements in public administration through providing the 
managers of auditees, executives, parliamentarians, and the general public with new 
insights about the audited area and auditee and recommendations on improvements, if 
necessary (Alwardat et al., 2015; Desmedt et al., 2017; Funnell & Wade, 2012; 
INTOSAI, 2013b; Morin, 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018). 
Supreme audit institution: “A supreme audit institution (SAI), or national audit 
institution, fulfils the independent and technical public sector external audit function that 
is typically established within a country’s constitution or by the supreme law-making 
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body” (OECD, 2016, p. 20). According to the 2015 Public Auditing Act, the Accounts 
Committee is SAI of Kazakhstan that has the power to conduct performance audits at the 
central government level (ISLARK, 2015, para. 12). 
Public administration: A scholarly area of enquiry and research and a field of 
practice associated with the formal legal and procedural governance of society (Fenwick 
& McMillan, 2014). 
Assumptions 
There were several assumptions associated with my study. These assumptions 
related to the studied phenomena, selected theoretical framework and methodology, 
research participants, and expected results of my research. 
Despite the examples of resistance to adoption and development of performance 
auditing, conduction of performance audits has been established as a legal mandate of 
public sector organizations in many developed and developing countries (Hossain, 2010; 
INTOSAI, 2018; Torres et al., 2019). Based on this historical experience and long-term 
priorities of Kazakhstani public policy on increasing the effectiveness of public 
administration to join the group of the most 30 developed countries of the world 
(ISLARK, 2018), I assumed that the performance auditing as a legal mandate of the 
Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions in Kazakhstan will not change 
significantly until my research is complete. 
I used the new public management theory, which stimulated the extensive use of 
performance audits in many countries including Kazakhstan, and the principal-agent 
model, that may explain in-depth nature of relations between participants of performance 
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audits, to exhaustively explore the studied phenomena. I applied the phenomenological 
approach to examine the lived experiences of those actors involved in performance audits 
within Kazakhstan to answer my posed research question. 
Further, I used group characteristics sampling and single-significant-case 
sampling methods to select and gain access to the study participants who are in line with 
the selection criteria including being experienced in performance auditing. My intention 
was be able to establish a trusting and inspiring atmosphere during the communications 
with my study participants by application of the selected techniques on gathering data, 
including an informed consent process. All study participants are public servants and, 
thus, they refer to a specific cohort of employees who, due to their job positions and 
official duties, should be committed to principles of good governance (Frederickson, 
1982; Frederickson & David, 1985). Therefore, I assumed that the study participants will 
share honest and valuable information based on their professional experiences. I also 
assumed there will be agreement of my study participants to take part in my research (i.e., 
the study participants’ informed decision) and their willingness to take an active position 
of interest in possible improvements in Kazakhstani public administration will be an 
encouraging element in their affirmative participation decision. I also assumed that 
documents to be reviewed during my research, such as performance audit reports of the 
Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions, are properly prepared and consist of 
accurate data. 
Last but not least, I assumed that the practice of using performance audits by 
public sector audit organizations, auditees, and legislative bodies in Kazakhstan will be 
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positively affected by the results of my proposed study. I expected that, based on my 
research results, I will be able to formulate concrete theoretical and practical implications 
regarding the demand for and impacts of performance auditing on Kazakhstani public 
administration and associated positive socials changes. 
Scope and Delimitation 
In this study, I focused on the demand for performance audits conducted by 
external public sector audit organizations in Kazakhstan. Using the performance audits or 
their certain instrumentations by internal auditors or authorized government bodies within 
the public sector (for instance, the Ministry of National Economy of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan has powers to evaluate the effectiveness of government entities’ activity), 
and organizations of the quasi-public and private sectors was out of the scope of my 
research. 
Generally, the performance auditing influences all areas of human being, directly 
or indirectly affecting the interests of all citizens in Kazakhstan. However, to effectively 
conduct my research, I focused on the impact of performance audits on public 
administration system or, in detail, on public sector audit organizations, auditees, and 
legislative bodies. I explored the perceived effects primarily relying on experience and 
opinion of participants of performance auditing, such as performance auditors, managers 
of auditees, and parliamentarians. Thus, my research confined to specific groups of users 
of performance audits in Kazakhstan. 
The list of my research participants consisted of representatives of the Accounts 
Committee and the Parliament of Kazakhstan, i.e., single organizations of their kind, as 
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well as representatives of one from 17 Revision Commissions and one from 17 local 
legislative bodies. I selected the Revision Commission on Nur-Sultan city and the 
Maslikhat on Nur-Sultan city (the local legislative body) applying the following selection 
criteria: 
▪ performance auditing scope shaped by the size of the economy and allocated 
budget funds within the defined region; 
▪ study participants availability (unlike other regions, there are minimum 
business-trips of employees of entities in Nur-Sultan city due to their location 
and hosting both governmental and parliaments’ events in the capital city).  
The list of the research participants also consisted of representatives of two from 32 
central government organizations and two from more than 400 local executive 
organizations.  
The scope of my research was also delimitated by a specified timeframe. Despite 
the first application of performance audits in Kazakhstan dated back to 2002, I focused 
on performance auditing practice specifically between 2016 and 2019 (i.e., selection of 
the study participants experienced in performance audits conducted during that 
timeframe; reviewing performance audit reports of the Accounts Committee and Revision 
Commissions and other related documents issued in 2016–2020). The rationale for this 
delimitation was that the rules, methodology, and practice associated with performance 




The total number of my research participants was 14, with a distribution across 
five public auditors, five managers of auditees, and four parliamentarians. It was 
anticipated that this sample size and distribution was sufficient to conduct my qualitative 
phenomenological study to the point of content saturation; however, there were some 
limitations associated with the generalizability of research findings because of a small 
sample (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Patton, 2015). Specifically, auditors 
who participated in performance audits before 2015, auditors from 16 Revision 
Commissions, parliamentarians from 16 local legislative bodies, auditees’ managers and 
parliamentarians without experience on being involved in performance audits, and 
managers of more than 400 central and local executive organizations were out of the 
defined sample. Whereas performance audits differ depending on the level of public 
management (central or local) and environmental (organizational and cultural) aspects 
(Glynn, 1995; Hossain, 2010; Lonsdale, 2008; Morin, 2016), experiences of my study 
participants may significantly differ from the other non-selected participants involved in 
their unique performance audits in Kazakhstan. I managed this limitation by applying 
secondary data and proposing related areas for future research extension. 
Given that all study participants were public servants there were risks of the lack 
of availability for interviews or follow up communication for content clarity and member 
checking of transcribed data. To minimize these risks, I prepared a reserve list of the 
study participants and agreed on the intensity of our communications in advance. 
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Phenomenological interviewing is a complex process of the external intervention 
for the study participants (Bevan, 2014; Patton, 2015). Interviewees may experience 
difficulties, especially in situations when they need to share unsuccessful or negative 
experiences. Or, due to personal or political reasons, my study participants may not 
disclose information that is important to the study. Additionally, my study was associated 
with a potential for researcher bias given that I have more than 18 years of experience in 
the public auditing area, including serving as both employee and manager of the 
Accounts Committee, advisor of the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions, 
trainer of Kazakhstani public auditors’ certification program, regional public auditor 
advisor in Central Asian republics, member of working groups and consultative 
committees. As such, my insight into data interpretation may carry an interpretive cloud 
that would not otherwise be found in an external individual researcher. I am no longer an 
employee of any Kazakhstan public audit organization nor any government entities; 
therefore, I no longer have official powers to influence the research participants 
participation. I hoped to use my knowledge of this specific public administration in order 
to gain sufficient understanding that I needed manage and limit any associated power 
distance between myself and my research participants (see Patton, 2015, for more). 
There was one more limitation associated with the research and research 
participants biases. A phenomenological inquiry implies using interpretations 
(Moustakas, 1994). I was dealing with the following four chains of interpretations: (a) the 
research participants’ interpretations associated the studied phenomena; (b) my 
interpretation of the research participants’ vision, experiences, and perceptions; (c) my 
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interpretations associated the studied phenomena (i.e., a researcher’s active and 
prolonged engagement into the study); and (d) my interpretation of documentary data. As 
such, my qualitative phenomenological study may be associated with the subjectivism 
(Mills & Birks, 2017; Moustakas, 1994). 
Significance 
What was not addressed in the literature is why performance auditing is in 
demand in Kazakhstan and what are the perceived effects of performance audits on 
Kazakhstani public administration. Hay and Cordery (2018) argued that, whereas 
performance audits are used by many countries to improve the governance within the 
public sector, extensive studies on demand for performance auditing are needed. Many 
scholarly works conducted beginning in the 1970s evidenced that performance audits 
differ depending on the country where there used (Glynn, 1995; Hossain, 2010; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013b; Morin, 2008, 2016). Thus, available researches relating to 
the impact of performance auditing on auditees and public administration, in general, 
may not be applicable for countries uncovered by these researches (Reichborn-Kjennerud 
& Johnsen, 2018). My study, therefore, was significant in addressing the mentioned gap 
since it was the first-time study aimed at exploring the case of Kazakhstan. As 
performance auditing is one of the widely recognized mechanisms for examining public 
policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation (The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), 2016), my study seeks to capitalize and expand on 
this phenomenon by exploring the impact of performance audits specific to Kazakhstani 
public administration, a unique experience. 
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For today’s Kazakhstani public administration system, the performance auditing 
is a novelty. The intensive use of performance audits stimulated by the adoption of the 
Conception on Introduction of Public Auditing in Kazakhstan, known as the 2013 
Conception (ISLARK, 2013), the 2015 Public Auditing Act, and development of 
methodology. This trend preceded by pilot efforts of the Accounts Committee and 
fragmental practices of the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions on 
incorporation audit questions on efficiency evaluation of auditees’ operations into the 
traditional compliance audit programs. Unlike developed countries with more than 50 
years of performance auditing experience, performance auditing in Kazakhstan has been 
conducted only recently. For countries like Kazakhstan (e.g., other Post-Soviet or newly 
emerged countries) where the performance auditing is an innovative practice, examining 
the impact of performance audits is especially relevant for capacity building in this 
emerging territory of public administration audit organizations. 
It was the first case of exploring the perceptions of (a) auditors as principals and 
sources of influence, (b) auditees as agents and targets of influence, and (c) 
parliamentarians as principals for both auditors and auditees (see Morin, 2001, 2008; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014b, for more) within performance auditing processes in 
Kazakhstan. Understanding the perceived impacts of performance audits in Kazakhstan 
and whether the experience of developed countries in performance auditing, such as the 
performance audits’ contributions to better changes in auditees’ performance or to more 
accountable and efficient governance within the public sector (Desmedt et al., 2017; 
Funnell, 2015; Morin, 2008, 2014, 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018; Torres 
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et al., 2019) are truth or applicable for Kazakhstan’s case may inform national auditors 
about well-tested approaches on performance auditing and help them to identify new 
strategies to achieve positive impacts on public administration through their audits. 
Findings related to factors that might explain the demand for performance audits 
may allow the public sector audit organizations to take them into account in the course of 
their operational activities. Thus, defining new information about the demand for 
performance auditing and its possible impacts on Kazakhstani public administration may 
help both the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions to establish proper 
policies, strategies, and methodologies associated with their audits. The findings of my 
study may also help auditees and legislative bodies to establish policies on the 
incorporation of the performance auditing into their organizations’ strategies stimulating 
the credible performance audits (see Funnell & Wade, 2012, for more); as a result, 
contributing to sustainable national fiscal responsibility and effectiveness.  
My study also may contribute to positive social changes. Firstly, the results of the 
study have the potential to influence national auditors’ perspectives through exploring 
their experiences in mastering a new and challengeable profession, i.e., performance 
auditor. Secondly, performance auditing is a novelty for managers of auditees and 
parliamentarians in Kazakhstan, i.e., the persons who can use the performance auditing as 
an opportunity for learning (Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a). Therefore, my study may also 
influence their perspectives by providing them with new insights relating to usefulness or 




Performance auditing is the most demanded type of public sector audit 
organizations’ activity that have emerged in response to increasing the needs in the more 
accountable and effective management of the public resources and taxpayers’ money. 
Exploring the causes of demand for performance audits and their impact on public 
administration is a topical and perspective objective for both scholars and practitioners. 
This objective is a critical especially for Kazakhstan where today, like in developed 
countries several decades ago, the performance auditing has become a widespread 
practice; however, there were no empirical studies on the demand for and impact of 
performance audits on public administration in Kazakhstan. The lack of knowledge about 
the studied phenomenon increased risks of missed opportunities of the Accounts 
Committee, i.e., SAI of Kazakhstan, and local revision commissions to increase 
accountability of governments and improve the public sector performance through their 
audit works.  
In Chapter 1, I presented the rationale for my study aimed at exploring the causes 
of demand for performance auditing in Kazakhstan and the perceived effects that 
performance audits have on Kazakhstani public administration. I described my vision on 
combined applying the new public management theory and the principal-agent model as 
the theoretical lens to guide an entire research process. I also rationalized applying the 
qualitative method with the phenomenological approach as the most suitable research 
design to do my study. The key term definitions, assumptions, scope and delimitations, 
and limitations associated with the proposed research are provided as well in this chapter.  
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In Chapter 2, based on the literature review results, including the 
conceptualization of performance audits, describing the emergence and development of 
performance auditing practice around the world and in Kazakhstan in particular, I 
formulated the identified gap in the literature associated with the studied phenomena. 
Chapter 2 also includes descriptions of the theoretical framework of my study. In Chapter 
3, I rationalized the selected research design and approach, namely – a qualitative 
phenomenological study. Descriptions regarding the selection of research participants, 
my roles as the researcher, procedures on data collection and analysis, and measures on 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I present the results of reviewing and analyzing the literature about 
the performance auditing phenomenon, and its emergence and impact on public 
administration. I proposed a modified definition of a performance audit consistent with 
recent theoretical and practical developments. Performance audits are carried out by 
public sector audit organizations including SAIs, joined within INTOSAI, and local audit 
organizations. I identified the current triggers for performance auditing based on these 
organizations and INTOSAI’s approaches to contribute to good governance. I also 
described four ways, i.e., instrumental, cognitive (conceptual), interactive, and strategic, 
and three levels, i.e., micro-, meso-, and macrolevels, of targeting public administration 
through performance audits.  
In my research, I focused on the case of Kazakhstan, a young Central Asian state, 
which gained independence after the 1991 collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR). I explored why performance audits are in demand in Kazakhstan and 
how auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians perceive these audits’ impact 
on Kazakhstani historical and present public administration approaches. Despite the short 
historical period, establishing and developing the public administration system in 
Kazakhstan are complicated processes and subjects for separate studies. Therefore, 
instead of detailed descriptions associated with these processes, I focused on the key 
milestones and characteristics of Kazakhstani public administration, which are significant 
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for understanding the studied phenomena, as well as focusing on performance audits 
conducted by SAI and the local audit organizations. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The main literature sources of my study were peer-reviewed articles, theoretical 
texts, dissertations, books, international professional organizations’ research and policy 
papers specific to the topic, performance and audit reports of public sector audit 
organizations. To find the literature on performance auditing, focusing on performance 
audits’ impact on public administration, I used databases, such as SAGE Journals 
(formerly, SAGE Premier), Political Science Complete, Taylor and Francis Online, 
Public Administration Abstracts, ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, ScienceDirect, and 
EBSCO Host. I also referenced the following journals: Critical Perspectives on 
Accounting, Evaluation, Financial Accountability & Management, Government Auditing 
Review, International Journal of Auditing, International Public Auditing Journal, 
Managerial Auditing Journal. 
I used the reference lists of recent publications, Google Scholar, and the 
Find@Walden Tool of the Walden Library to find specific articles, theoretical texts, and 
books. I used official websites of international organizations including INTOSAI, internet 
sources of INTOSAI’s members including SAI of Kazakhstan, and websites of 
Kazakhstani executive bodies to find official papers related to performance auditing. 
In the beginning of my search, I used dates that ranged from 2015 to 2020, to 
examine the literature on recent developments in an area of performance auditing. 
Thereafter I did not limit the literature search by dates of publication, in order to make 
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appropriate historical references and find original theoretical works tied to the topic. I 
limited the search for laws and regulations, audit and performance reports of public sector 
audit organizations in Kazakhstan, and sources about Kazakhstani public administration 
to dates between 2015–2019. Then, I expanded the search for that sources to dates 
between 1991–2020 to analyze the perspectives of public administration in Kazakhstan’s 
contemporary history and introducing the performance audits. 
The keyword search terms included: performance auditing, performance audit, 
value for money audit, public audit, public sector audit organizations, supreme audit 
institutions, public auditors, auditees, public administration, impact of performance 
audits on public administration, public administration in Kazakhstan, and performance 
auditing in Kazakhstan. Referenced sources were in the English, Kazakh, and Russian 
languages. None of the searches revealed empirical studies regarding the demand for and 
impact of performance audits on public administration in Kazakhstan. To describe the 
theoretical framework, I used the key search terms: new public management, principal-
agent model, new public management and performance auditing, and principal-agent 
model in the public sector. I also used SAGE Research Methods Online to find sources 
regarding the selected qualitative phenomenological research method. 
Conceptualizing Performance Audits 
The 1970s reforms of public administration, entitled new public management, 
were aimed at adopting managerial techniques of private companies within the public 
sector and determined new starting points for scholar-practitioner led performance 
auditing (Funnell, 2004a, 2004b, 2015; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a). The extensive use 
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of performance audits, as these audits are interpreted today, started in the 1970s (Glynn, 
1985; Levy, 1996; Pollitt, 2003); however, the new public management initiatives likely 
classify the conceptualization of performance audits as only partially complete. 
Performance auditing is not a new phenomenon (Flesher et al., 2003; Glynn, 
1985). Mandates of auditors expanded from traditional examinations of auditee’s 
operations to efficiency evaluations even before the appearance of managerial trends 
within the public sector. One of the pioneers in using performance audits, or more 
precisely predecessors of performance audits, is the United States (Flesher et al., 2003). 
The predecessors of performance auditing in the United States are operational or 
management audits. Operational auditing is a systematic nonfinancial examination of an 
entity’s operations conducted for improvements (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002), and it is 
interpreted as a synonym of Dittenhofer’s (1971) performance auditing, incorporating an 
improved degree of accuracy. In historical chronicles the concept of operational auditing 
dates from the 12th century and starting from the 1940s operational audits have been used 
by private sector internal audits with advancement into the public sector (Flesher et al., 
2003). 
Another unique feature of the United States’ case is that within the public sector, 
performance audits are firstly legitimated and used by states, i.e. at local levels. For 
instance, beginning in 1963, public auditors of the state of Michigan were impowered to 
conduct performance audits (Dittenhofer, 1971). It required a further 10 years before the 
United States General Accounting Office’s (presently, the United States Government 
Accountability Office [GAO]) the federal level audit organization, was granted the same 
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powers. In line with the 1972 GAO’s standards, public auditing relates to examinations of 
both financial operations and economy and efficiency in achieving the purposes of 
governmental programs (GAO as cited by Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002). 
Along with the United States, Canada contributed to the modern concept of the 
performance audit. Initially, performance audits in Canada were named comprehensive 
audits (Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Glynn, 1985). Unlike the operational auditing in the 
United States, comprehensive auditing emerged within Canada’s public sector and 
specifically aimed to establish whether the public sector organizations have operated with 
due regard to economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (Glynn, 1985).  
The United Kingdom also significantly contributed to making performance 
auditing a self-sufficient concept and discipline. Performance audits in the United 
Kingdom, called value for money audits, first debuted in the 1880s (Glynn, 1985; Lapsley 
& Pong, 2000). Like the United States, but unlike Canada, the United Kingdom’s 
performance audits were aimed specifically to the examination of public fund use with 
due regard to economy and efficiency. According to Glynn (1985), value for money 
audits contribute to realizing the rights of taxpayers to receive efficient public services at 
minimal costs as a part and condition of the country’s social contract. Thus, the key 
feature of value for money audits is its strict focus on the needs and expectations of, and 
by, public services; the National Health Service being an illustrative example. 
Australia, New Zealand, some European and Asian countries also started use of 
performance audits in the 1970–1980s, adding country features into the concept 
(Grönlund et al., 2011; Hossain, 2010; Jacobs, 1998; Yamamoto & Waranabe, 1989). 
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Nevertheless, historical and international perspectives are not the sole determinants of 
performance audits. The methodology drives changes in the interpretation of performance 
audits including objectives, scopes, and methods of these audits (Alwardat et al., 2015; 
Lonsdale, 2000). Kells and Hodge (2011) offered that intellectual and technological 
developments also shape the concept of performance auditing. 
A primary objective of performance audits is to establish whether the executes 
have functioned with due regard to: a) economy, commonly referred by audit 
professionals as 1st E, which means using minimum public funds to produce the required 
volume of outputs with an acceptable level of quality; b) efficiency, referred as 2nd E, 
which means getting the most from the available resources; and c) effectiveness, referred 
as 3rd E, which means which means meeting the objectives set and achieving the 
intended results (INTOSAI, 2019). According to Barrett (2010, 2011a), the scope of 
performance audits can be confined to an audit of one or more selected functions of 
auditees, management of governmental programs and other undertakings. The list of 
methods of performance auditing consists of documentary reviews, questionnaires, 
surveys, site visits, focus groups, expert panels, and international comparisons (Tillema 
& Bogt, 2010). 
Performance auditing means influencing auditees and other users of performance 
audit reports to add value in terms of better governance within the public sector. This 
view is shared by many scholars, including those who stressed that today’s performance 
audits are conducted with both performance improvement and transparency goals 
(Alwardat et al., 2015; Barrett, 2011b, 2012; Funnell, 2016; Hossain, 2010; Morin, 2016; 
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Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a, 2013b). In turn, the adding of value through performance 
audits is possibly subject to both public sector audits organizations and auditors’ 
independence (Funnell et al., 2016; Morin, 2016). Thus, the concept of performance audit 
has significantly evolved. As described in Chapter 1, I used the following definition of 
performance audit developed based on recent interpretations (see Alwardat et al., 2015; 
Desmedt et al., 2017; Funnell & Wade, 2012; Morin, 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud & 
Johnsen, 2018, for more) and INTOSAI’s definition as well. Performance audit is a 
legitimate professional activity on examination of whether an audited area of public 
administration or an auditee’s operations, systems, and activities meet the principles of 
economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and other criteria of good governance. Performance 
audits are carried out by public sector audit organizations to promote improvements in 
public administration (INTOSAI, 2019, p. 8). 
Performance Audit Institutions 
Performance audits are carried out by audit organizations labeled SAIs, such as 
the United States Government Accountability Office, the Office of Auditor General in 
Canada, the National Audit Offices (NAO) in the United Kingdom, other European 
countries, Australia, New Zealand (INTOSAI, 2004, 2013a), and the Accounts 
Committee in Kazakhstan (ISLARK, 2013, 2015). In some countries, including 
Kazakhstan, local public sector audit organizations also have the power to conduct 
performance audits (ISLARK, 2015; Torres et al., 2019). Internal auditors and 
governments’ evaluation agencies may also conduct performance audits or use certain 
techniques of performance auditing to evaluate (Barton, Aibinu, & Oliveros, 2019; 
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Kweun, Wheeler, & Gifford, 2018). In my study, I focused on SAIs and local public 
sector audit organizations’ perspectives since they are today's leaders in the use and 
development of performance audits (see Torres et al., 2019, for more). According to Tara 
and Gherai (2014), the appearance of SAIs or, more precisely, their predecessors, dates 
from 14th century; as demonstrated in Figure 2, modern SAIs were established in 18th–
20th centuries, and today they operate in more than 190 countries. 
 
Figure 2. The chronological map of appearance of SAIs 




































Scholar-practitioners call SAIs watchdogs that oversee public finances (Jantz, 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, & Vrangbaek, 2015; Morin & Hazgui, 2016; Norton & Smith, 
2008). SAIs may operate as external audit bodies at central and local government levels 
or as the only national SAIs with local branches (INTOSAI, n.d.).  
Table 1 illustrates three models of SAIs. 
Table 1 
 
The Models of SAIs 
Court (Napoleonic) Model Westminster Model Collegial (Board) Model 
The key characteristics 
Public sector audit 
organizations granted with 
judicial powers 
Public sector audit 
organizations leaded by 
Auditors General 
Public sector audit 
organizations governed by a 
collegial body which is 
leaded by chairpersons 
Countries 
Brazil, Belgium, El Salvador, 
France, French-speaking 
Africa and Asia, Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey 
Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Mexico, 
Peru, Poland, South Africa, 
United Kingdom 
Argentina, Czech Republic, 
European court of audit, 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Nicaragua, Netherlands, 
Slovak Republic, Indonesia, 
Korea, Japan 
Note: Developed based on Tara & Gherai (2015), INTOSAI (2004, 2013). 
 
SAIs differ by status, mandates, accountability approaches, and resources; their 
distinctive features depend on the state order, public administration structure, and 
separation of powers in nations where they operate. For instance, some SAIs conduct 
audits in all organizations, whereas others’ powers are limited to audits of government 
entities (INTOSAI, 2013). Thus, the classifying of SAIs by Napoleonic, Westminster, 
and Board models may be useful in understanding their place within the public 
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administration, but they are typically symbolic in nature. Most SAIs are independent of 
the executes, accountable for non-executive elected institutions or officials, and conduct 
performance audits (INTOSAI, 2013, 2018). As an independent public institution, SAIs 
play an important role in public administration in democratic societies (OECD, 2016). 
The expectations regarding SAIs’ roles as contributors to democratic 
accountability is strengthened as their power expanded from traditional compliance and 
financial audits to performance audits (Funnell, 2015; Morin, 2016). The 2011 Resolution 
of the 66th United Nations (UN) General Assembly entitled “Promoting the Efficiency, 
Accountability, Effectiveness and Transparency of Public Administration by 
Strengthening Supreme Audit Institutions” supports this argument (UN, 2011). This and 
other global initiatives, such as promoting the principles of good governance, citizen 
participation in government auditing, and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), have 
been implemented by SAIs’ through their performance auditing functions (Baimyrzaeva 
& Kose, 2014; OECD, 2015, 2016). 
Like SAIs, local public sector audit organizations differ by status, powers, 
requirements to their accountability, organizational capacities, and experiences in using 
performance audit formats (English, 2003; Rosa, Morote, & Colomina, 2014; Tillema & 
Bogt, 2016; Torres et al., 2019). Typically, SAI and local audit organizations’ powers on 
performance auditing are distributed depending on the separation of powers between 
central and local governments (Torres et al., 2019). However, there are no significant 
differences in implementing performance audits by SAIs or local audit organizations. 
This similarity is due to the application of common auditing standards and regulations, 
38 
 
sharing information and cooperation between SAIs and local audit organizations. For 
example, in the United States all public sector audit organizations typically follow the 
requirements of the Government Auditing Standards issued by GAO (USGAO, 2018). To 
not follow these industry-expected standards would result in an organization being 
subjected to added scrutiny whether justified or not. 
Current Triggers for Performance Auditing 
Identification of triggers for performance auditing contributes to a better 
understanding of why performance audits are in demand. Current triggers for 
performance auditing, such as exogenous and endogenous circumstances that rationalize 
SAIs’ audit practice, typically yield more performance audits by volume. As outlined in 
previous paragraphs, performance auditing enshrined as SAIs’ statutory power 
consequent to the transformation of public administration, may be an initial trigger for a 
widespread using of performance audits. This trigger has become classical, yet it remains 
a standard rationalization term of performance auditing. Similar to the 1970s, today’s 
performance audits are initiated and carried out in response to community and political 
concerns regarding the effective administration of public affairs and delivering 
anticipated public services (Hossain, 2010). 
But there are also other exogenous circumstances that stimulate the initiation of 
performance audits. Torres et al. (2019) argued that performance audits received more 
attention after the 2008 Global Financial Crises. The crises trigger performance audits 
because of increasing the risks of ineffective implementation of governmental tasks 
including anti-crisis measures. Governments use privatization or public-private 
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partnership (PPP) mechanisms to cover the budget deficit to be able to deliver public 
services under the tight financial constraints (OECD, 2012). Both privatization and PPP, 
according to the fundamental principles of performance auditing, should be determined as 
high-risk areas (INTOSAI, 1998, 2004, 2007). Thus, SAIs with well-developed 
performance auditing methodology and practices respond to these governmental anti-
crisis measures by carrying out performance audits of PPP programs and projects. 
Beginning in the 2010s, many SAIs have included performance audits of privatization 
and PPP in their audit portfolios (Barrett, 2011a; The Canadian Audit and Accountability 
Foundation (CAAF), 2015; The European Court of Auditors (ECA), 2018). There are 
also other external circumstances that lead to more performance audits in an area of 
public financial administration when ministries of finance or government entities with the 
same powers are core auditees who, in turn, are visited by performance auditors as a 
matter of public policy, law, or statutory regulation. 
Structural problems inherent in different public administration areas also increase 
the number of performance audits. The list of these problems includes imbalances of 
economy, structural flaws in social and health care systems, and low productivity 
(Ahrend, Saia, & Schwellnus, 2017; Hugh-Jones, 2012). Unlike cyclical financial crises, 
structural problems are systematic, and long-running measures including executives’ 
programs are required to address these problems. Executives’ programs are often 
subjected to enhanced performance audits both in content and frequency (INTOSAI, 
2016a). For instance, GAO has issued more than 300 performance audit reports and 
related papers regarding the implementation of the Medicare and Medicaid Programs in 
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the last five years likely in relation to public scrutiny and need for information 
transparency with the implementation of the Affordable Care Act in 2010 (USGAO, 
n.d.). Innovations used to solve the structural problems also trigger new performance 
audits. In particular, utilizing the new information and communication technologies by 
governmental organizations lead to conduction more performance audits in the IT area. 
For instance, NAO issued more than 100 performance audit reports and related papers 
regarding the communications and digital government (UKNAO, n.d.). 
Natural and anthropogenic disasters trigger performance audits as well. In the 
language of the International Standards of Supreme Audit Institutions (ISSAIs), these 
audits are called performance audits with environmental perspectives (INTOSAI, 2016b). 
Environmental performance audits are conducted by SAIs to establish whether the 
executives have functioned with due regard to the economy (i.e., 1st E), efficiency (2nd 
E), and effectiveness (3rd E), as well with due regard to the environment ([4th E]; 
Leeuwen, 2004; Weihrich, 2018). According to INTOSAI’s Working Group on 
Environmental Auditing ([WGEA]; 2015), the number of SAIs that conduct 
environmental performance audits increases almost every year with specific focus on 
topical environmental issues, such as climate change, environmental pollution, and non-
renewable energy use. One of the explanations for the intensive use of performance 
audits is the general public’s concerns about the negative impact of the environmental 
issue on public health. Thus, natural and anthropogenic disasters trigger more 
performance audits in an environmental area when ministries of healthcare and other 
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government entities, such as SAIs and local audit organizations’ clients, realize and fulfil 
their executive functions. 
Further, global environmental challenges may trigger international performance 
audits with environmental perspectives conducted by SAIs collaboratively (WGEA, 
2012, 2015). As for today, the scope of environmental performance audits has been 
expanded to auditing governments’ preparedness to efficiently and effectively implement 
SDG (UN & INTOSAI, 2018). Like SDG, other global initiatives are in the list of 
exogenous circumstances that lead to intensive use of performance auditing. In my 
research, I focused on current triggers for performance audits in areas when the Ministry 
of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Ministry of Healthcare of the Republic 
of Kazakhstan are core executive authorities. 
Targeting Public Administration through Performance Audits 
SAIs conduct performance audits “to promote economical, effective and efficient 
governance. It also contributes to accountability and transparency” (INTOSAI, 2019, p. 
8). In pursuant of this objective, SAIs, as well as local public sector audit organizations, 
impact public administration through their performance audits (Desmedt et al., 2017; 
Morin, 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Vabo, 2017; Torres et al., 2019). Impacting the 
public administration through performance audits implies contribution to positive 
changes in auditees’ activity or an audited area of public administration and improving 
the public sector performance in general (Lonsdale, 2000; Morin, 2001). 
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Instrumental, Conceptual (Cognitive), Interactive, and Strategic Influences 
There are several categories of impacts of performance auditing on public 
administration. These categories differ depending on the use of performance audits and 
levels of impacting the public administration. Performance auditing implies conduction 
of evaluation and, therefore, categories of evaluation use are applicable for performance 
audits (Lonsdale, Wilkins, & Ling, 2011). Lonsdale et al. (2011) identified instrumental, 
conceptual, political-legitimizing, and tactical use of performance audits (pp. 180-181). 
The instrumental use of performance auditing is a linear process converting 
evaluation to knowledge and, then, converting knowledge to policy (Lonsdale et al., 
2011). This type of evaluation use means applying knowledge for actions, such as 
decision-making and problem-solving (Alkin & King, 2016). Based on knowledge 
acquired in the course of an audit, performance auditors provide managers of auditees 
and other concerned parties with recommendation on the elimination of the revealed 
shortcomings and further improvements. Thus, giving recommendations by auditors is 
the central tool of instrumental use of performance audits (Lonsdale et al., 2011; Morin, 
2008). Depending on the context of recommendations performance auditors impact 
decision-making and contribute to problem-solving (Desmedt et al., 2017). 
The conceptual use (impact) of performance audits means embedding knowledge 
through different channels that leads to change in mental or intellectual frames (Lonsdale 
et al., 2011). In the course of evaluations, knowledge is used to influence policymakers’ 
thinking (Alkin & King, 2017). Or, in other words, evaluators (performance auditors) 
have a cognitive impact on auditees’ managers and other officials with power in policy 
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making within the audited area of public administration. The conceptual (cognitive) 
impact is manifested through both visible and invisible changes, challenging the 
identification and measurement of that impact (Desmedt et al., 2017; Lonsdale et al., 
2011). 
Policymakers constructively respond to evaluations when evaluators provide them 
with a new vision regarding the existed problems, or ‘enlighten’ them, and suggest new 
perspectives on solving these problems (Weiss as cited by Alkin & King, 2016). In the 
language of performance auditing, auditees’ managers constructively respond to 
performance audits when performance auditors provide them with new information (or 
previously misunderstood information) about the revealed shortcomings in effectively 
managing the auditee’s affairs. 
The interactive use explained by the fact that performance audits are not the sole 
influence factor since other participants or sources of information join the influence 
process as well (Lonsdale et al., 2011). In that case, knowledge used in conjunction with 
personal insights and experiences of decision makers and communicated information 
(Alkin & King, 2016). Users of evaluation verify the evaluation findings and, therefore, 
the interactive use contribute to the evaluation credibility and informed decision-making 
(Alkin & King, 2016). Auditees have rights to react on performance auditors’ opinions 
and, in turn, performance auditors have obligations on responding to auditees’ reactions 
(Alwardat et al., 2015; INTOSAI, 2019). Other concerned parties, from public officials to 
citizens, may also join this communication process (Lonsdale et al., 2011). 
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According to Lonsdale et al. (2011), the political-legitimizing use of performance 
audits implies the engagement of mass media and parliamentarians in performance 
auditing that contributes to political debates, while the tactical use implies impacting the 
decision making by auditees. The political-legitimizing use relates to using the evaluation 
findings to rationalize earlier decisions and legitimize reforms (Alkin & King, 2016, 
2017; Breidahl, Gjelstrup, Hansen, & Hansen, 2017). This type of use is close to the 
symbolic use of evaluation. According to Alkin and King (2016), the symbolic use means 
using the evaluation findings to support a political position or rationalize previous 
decisions. Further, SAIs may plan and conduct their performance audits with intends to 
legitimize policy; the political-legitimizing use occurs because of the nature of audited 
issues or without SAIs’ political intentions (Funnell, 2015; Morin, 2016). SAIs’ 
performance audits may influence decisions regarding the prolongation, or opposite, 
cancelation of governmental programs. GAO’s practice on annual performance audits 
conducted to reduce fragmentation, overlap, and duplication of federal programs 
(USGAO, n.d.) is one of the examples of the political-legitimizing use of performance 
audits by SAIs. 
In my study, I applied the strategic use of performance audit, which is the 
combination of legitimize, symbolic, and tactical uses, as measuring units of analysis. 
The strategic use of performance auditing means using the audit findings to contribute to 
political debates and, as a result, to promote reforms, which are legitimate and rational 
from the perspectives of good governance (Desmedt et al., 2017, INTOSAI, 2019).  
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Impacting the Micro, Meso, and Macro Levels 
According to Lonsdale et al. (2011), performance auditing impacts the microlevel 
(impacting individual performance audit itself), mesolevel (impacting audit organizations 
and auditees), and macrolevel (impacting the public sector) of government and the wider 
concept of public policy. Methodological aspects explain the impact of performance 
audits at the microlevel. Unlike traditional compliance and financial audits, performance 
audit is not a standardized process and, therefore, it implies frequent exercising 
performance auditors’ judgments (Funnell et al., 2016). Each individual performance 
audit is unique. Unlike compliance and financial auditors, performance auditors more 
frequently are dealing with new knowledge regarding both the audited area of public 
administration and implementation of audit procedures. Therefore, methods and findings 
of a performance audit in tandem with communications between auditors and auditees 
shape the individual performance audit (Lonsdale et al., 2011). 
As SAIs and auditees gain experience on being involved in performance auditing, 
they change and advance their internal policies and processes. These organizational 
changes are examples of impacting the mesolevel related specifically to a performance 
auditors’ interventions (Desmedt et al., 2017). From one side, SAIs’ reputations, powers, 
and accountability, and from other side, auditees’ policy on knowledge management, 
familiarity with performance auditing and attitude toward knowledge facilitate impacts of 
performance audits at the mesolevel (Lonsdale et al., 2011). 
Impacting the macrolevel implies changes of public administration in general. 
Individual performance audits and SAIs’ practice on using the findings from all 
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individual performance audits to present a holistic (comprehensive) view regarding the 
audited issues facilitate changes in the public sector (OECD, 2012). According to 
Lonsdale et al. (2011), obligations to assess policy on a regular base and attitude toward 
knowledge facilitate impacts of performance audits at the macrolevel. 
Performance audits are not the sole factor that influences public administration; it 
is difficult to single out performance audit’s influence among other influential factors 
including changes in public policies initiated by the executes themselves. Unlike 
impacting the micro- and mesolevel, impacting the macrolevel is more complex in terms 
of its identification and measuring (Lonsdale et al., 2011). Integrated application of 
instrumental, conceptual (cognitive), interactive, and strategic uses of performance audits 
facilitates measuring their impact at macrolevel. Today, this approach is fragmentarily 
used by some SAIs and realized by developing SAI’s Performance Evaluation 
Framework (INTOSAI, 2016c). 
Performance Auditing in Kazakhstan 
Historical Perspectives of Kazakhstani Public Administration 
Kazakhstan is a young state located in Central Asia with a unique history of 
nation-building starting in 1991 with the dissolution of USSR. Establishing the public 
administration system of a new sovereign state was complicated by the negative 
consequences of the economic crisis inherited from the Soviet Union (Nazarbayev, 1992, 
1994, 2017). At the initial stage, economic reforms were the highest priority opposite to 
political and public management reforms (Knox, 2008; Nazarbayev, 2017). 
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The economic reforms aimed at implementation of a free market economy and 
supported by abundant natural resources, such as oil, gas, uranium, copper, zinc, and 
other minerals that are in demand on world markets, resulted in positive social changes 
but ones that needed management to avoid exploitation (OECD, 2014, 2017a, 2017b; 
Vakulchuk, 2016). Today, national government has gained experience in economic 
reforms and these strengthened national institutions aid in smoothing any global financial 
crisis impacts in which Kazakhstan now stands alone as a sovereign state. 
As for today, Kazakhstan is categorically identified as a faster-growing economy 
that demonstrates good results in macroeconomic data (Nazarbayev, 2017; OECD, 
2017a; Vakulchuk, 2016). Figure 3 illustrates the growth of the Kazakhstani economy 
resulting expanded capacities of the government to deliver more public services and 
increase citizens’ incomes, thus improving the quality of citizen’s lives (Nazarbayev, 
2017; OECD, 2014, 2017a). 
 
Figure 3. The dynamic of GDP and GDP per capita Kazakhstan in 1991–2019 
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The Declaration of state sovereignty (1990), Law on state independence (1991), 
and adopting the national Constitution (1993) were the first legal acts of the new state 
specific to planned and implemented political changes (Kemel & Shaikenova, 2015; 
Shomanov et al., 2005). Ideas incorporated into the first Constitution were implemented 
partially because of confrontations and resistance to political transformations 
(Nazarbayev, 2017). Constitutional reforms, adopted in 2015, serve as the fundamental 
principles and framework for today’s public government. Accordingly, “Kazakhstan 
proclaims itself as a democratic, secular, legal and social state whose highest values are a 
person, his life, rights, and freedoms” (Constitution, 1995, para. 1). In 1995, Kazakhstan 
declared itself as a unitary state using a presidential form of government (Constitution, 
1995). 
During the early days of Kazakhstan’s political transformations changes in power 
distribution between executive, legislative and judicial bodies, and dividing the expert 
community into supporters and critics were primary political and social activities (Knox, 
2008; Mesquita, 2016; Nazarbayev, 2017; Shomanov et al., 2005). Key Presidential 
milestones occurred: (a) the President was vested with the highest administrative and 
executive powers in 1990; (b) the post of the President became elected beginning in 
1991; (c) till 2017 the Presidents’ powers have been expanded; and (d) part of the 
Presidents’ powers were delegated to the Government in 2017 (ISLARK, 1995a; 
Nazarbayev, 2017; Shomanov et al., 2005). The Presidential Administration is the 
principal state entity with coordination and control functions at both the central and local 
governmental levels (OECD, 2017a). 
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Coupled with Presidential power is the Parliament. The Parliament of Kazakhstan 
is a representative body with legislative functions; it consists of the higher and lower 
houses headed by chairpersons (ISLARK, 1995b). As the new government matured this 
legislative body was gradually granted more power, including control and oversight 
functions in fiscal administration (OECD, 2014, 2017a). The Government of Kazakhstan 
(Cabinet of Ministries) directed by the Premier-Minister (ISLARK, 1995c) serve as the 
supreme executive and administration bodies. The Government is a collegial body 
accountable to the President and Parliament (ISLARK, 1995c). Political reforms between 
1991–2018 resulted in changes in the structure of the Government, its powers and 
functions; its members, i.e., ministries and agencies, have been granted more autonomy 
for the last two decades (OECD, 2014, 2017a). 
The same changes were implemented in terms of distribution powers between 
central and local governments; it was initially prioritized establishing a vertical structure 
of public administration that implies strengthening the central government and, then, 
initiated decentralization that implies gradual delegation central government’s powers to 
local (Bhuiyan, 2010; OECD, 2017b; Shomanov et al., 2005). Today, Kazakhstan is 
divided into 14 oblasts (regions) and three cities with special status (Nur-Sultan, the 
current capital renamed Astana; Almaty, the former capital; Shymkent, the second largest 
city in the country by population). Local governments are directed by Akims (mayors) 
who are appointed by the President and accountable to the President and Maslikhats, i.e., 
local legislative bodies (ISLARK, 2015). 
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Reforming public management was defined as a priority state policy in 
Kazakhstan (Knox, 2008). Applying a state strategy approach and ‘importing’ NPM’s 
ideas are two core aspects of reforming the Kazakhstani public administration. The state 
strategy approach implies the implementation of country-development strategies which 
are the highest priority papers within a hierarchy of strategic documents in Kazakhstan 
(ISLARK, 2017a, 2017b). As for today, the central strategic goal of Kazakhstan is to join 
the rank of the top 30 developed economies by 2050 (ISLARK, 2018). This ambiguous 
and challengeable vision of the country-development outlined long-term plans on further 
achievements in public governance consistent with NPM’s ideas (Linn, 2014; 
Nazarbayev, 2017; Vakulchuk, 2016). NPM’s ideas, such as adopting managerial 
techniques by government organizations, client- and result-oriented public service 
delivery, granting executives with more autonomy, and changing civil servants’ roles and 
responsibilities, shaped the public administration system of Kazakhstan (Janenova & 
Knox, 2017; Oleinik, Yermekov, & Kuatbekov, 2015; Vakulchuk, 2016). According to 
Oleinik et al. (2015), there are some gaps between declared objectives and achieved 
results in improving Kazakhstani public administration system. Generally, the political 
and public administration reforms in Kazakhstan are associated with both disadvantages 
and advantages leading to related changes of the worldwide governance indicators for 
Kazakhstan (OECD, 2017a). 
As demonstrated in Figure 4, despite the linear trend on the Government 
Effectiveness Indicator, improvements in this area of public governance are not stable. 
There are several explanations for this dynamic including changes in the performance and 
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accountability systems. The accountability for the executives’ results were realized 
through (a) new approaches to evaluation of government organizations’ performance; (b) 
parliamentarians’ function on control and oversight the public funds; (c) open 
government initiatives; and (d) the public auditing (OECD, 2014, 2017a, 2017b). 
According to OECD (2014, 2017a), public auditing is one of the weak areas in reforming 
the accountability system in Kazakhstan due to the lack of implementation of 
performance audits. 
Figure 4. Worldwide governance indicators for Kazakhstan in 1996–2018 
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Implementation of Performance Audits 
Performance audits within Kazakhstan’s public sector are carried out by the 
Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions. The Accounts Committee was 
established in 1996 as a collegial body that consists of eight members and a chairman. It 
is accountable to the President. It submits its annual report, which is the conclusion (audit 
opinion) on the Government’s report on execution of the republican budget, to Parliament 
for approval (ISLARK, 2002a). Revision Commissions were created in line with the 
Decree of the President “On Improvement of Bodies of External State Financial Control 
in Regions in 2011” (ISLARK, 2011). New commissions were created to replace the 
Revision Commissions of Maslikhats that implemented local parliamentarians’ tasks 
without the status of an independent body. Revision Commissions are accountable to 
Maslikhats; they also submit their audit reports to SAI for coordination purposes, e.g., to 
eliminate duplications in audits (ISLARK, 2015). 
The starting point for implementation of performance audits was the adoption of 
the 2013 Conception (ISLARK, 2013). The overarching concept aim was to replace the 
system of financial control by the public auditing system consistent with international 
standards and auditing practices (ISLARK, 2013). Following to the 2013 Conception, the 
2015 Public Auditing Act provided the Accounts Committee and Revisions Commissions 
with powers to conduct performance audits (ISLARK, 2015). Beginning in 2016, 
performance auditing, implying analysis and evaluation, conducted by external audit 
bodies to establish whether the executives operate with due regard to 3E, was 
implemented and label as legitimate in Kazakhstan. 
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Like in the cases of developed countries, there were some predecessors of 
performance auditing in Kazakhstan. For instance, the Accounts Committee and Revision 
Commissions of Maslikhats conducted efficiency controls (ISLARK, 2002b); before 
2013, it was not accepted to use the term of audit in laws, regulations, and other official 
documents within the public sector. However, as it is illustrated in Table 2, similarities in 




Interpretations of Predecessors of Performance Auditing in Kazakhstan  
2002 Law on Control 
over Execution of the 
Republican Budget 
2004 Budget Code 2008 Budget Code 
Efficiency control is 
an examination of 
execution of a budget 
program by 
controlled 
(evaluated) entity in 
line with a passport 
of the budget 
program. 
Efficiency control is a 
checking the 
implementation of actions 
within the scheduled 
timeframe and examination 
of achieving the expected 
results and indicators after 
the implementation of a 
budget program applying 
evaluations of economy and 
productivity. 
Efficiency control is an examination 
(conducted based on compliance control 
and control over the financial 
statements) of achieving by government 
organizations outputs and outcomes 
identified in their strategic plans, budget 
programs, as well as a complex 
evaluation of impacts of government 
organizations and enterprises’ activity 
on the economy, social sphere or a 
certain area of public management. 
Note: Developed based on ISLARK (2002b, 2004, 2008). 
 
Use of efficiency controls by the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions 
of Maslikhats were scarce; these functions did not become entrenched as a standard 
government practice since they are carried out within compliance controls (The Accounts 
Committee for Control over Execution of the Republican Budget (ACCERB), 2003, 
2004, 2013, 2014). SAI conducted two pilot efficiency controls in healthcare and 
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educations systems, however these experiences were far from the expectations of 
performance auditing, e.g., SAI did not use 3E categories to make its conclusions 
regarding the evaluated areas of public administration (ACCERB, 2004). 
As for today, both SAI and Revision Commissions conduct performance audits by 
different areas of public administration, including: 
▪ budgeting and tax administration; 
▪ implementing documents of the System of State Planning including state 
strategies, governmental programs, strategies of government entities, and 
development-plans of state-owned companies; 
▪ public debt; 
▪ public procurement; 
▪ environmental protection; 
▪ information technologies (Goryainov, 2015; ISLARK, 2015; Koszhanov, 
2010; Oksikbayev, 2010; Zeinelgabdin, 2015).  
The performance auditing procedural standards and methodological guidelines 
were adopted by SAI to support performance auditing practices (ISLARK, 2016a, 
2016b). 
Literature Review and Gaps 
There is an extensive body of research work aimed at exploring the impact of 
performance auditing on public administration (Alwardat et al., 2015; Desmedt et al., 
2017; Funnell et al., 2016; Morin, 2001, 2004, 2008, 2014; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013b, 
2014a; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Vabo, 2017; 
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Torres et al., 2019). The above cited researches are examples of investigation of the 
impact of performance audits by exploring the experiences of managers of auditees and 
auditors. In the opinion of auditees’, performance audits positively influence their 
organizations subject to good relations with auditors, placing auditors’ recommendations 
among auditees’ priorities, and will of auditees’ leaders for changes (Alwardat et al., 
2015; Morin, 2008; Torres et al., 2019). While auditors perceive performance audits as 
effective in terms of contribution to better governance, managers of auditees may contest 
some auditors’ approaches, including their interventions to policy making, criticize the 
quality and fairness of audit reports, and question auditors’ competencies (Alwardat et 
al., 2015; Desmedt et al., 2017; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013b; Reichborn-Kjennerud & 
Johnsen, 2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Vabo, 2017). 
A few studies were conducted to learn parliamentarians’ views partially exploring 
their attitude toward performance auditing where they are the key users of audit reports 
(Funnell et al., 2016; Morin, 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014b). Funnell et al. (2016) 
argued that parliamentarians may use performance audit reports to enhance their 
positions as elected officials with an enhanced interest in auditors’ findings that 
questioned the effectiveness of executives’ actions. Loke et al. (2016) offered that recent 
studies in the area of public and government audit are focused on countries used 
Westminster or Napoleonic models of SAIs’, with fragmented audit research being 
conducted on developing countries, of which Kazakhstan is classified. 
There were no empirical studies on the demand for and impacts of performance 
auditing on public administration in Kazakhstan. The Accounts Committee’s research 
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center conducted a few applied studies with the primary objective to establish the 
methodological base for performance auditing practice (CFVR, 2014, 2016, 2017). As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the identified gap was not surprising. Unlike developed 
countries, the use of performance auditing in Kazakhstan began as recent as 2002 with 
two pilot audits conducted by the Accounts Committee. More robust use of performance 
auditing by the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions began in 2015 
(ISLARK, 2015). Some research indicates a lack of empirical evidence about the 
usefulness of performance audits, which threatens the credibility of performance 
auditors’ works (Funnell et al., 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018). It, in turn, 
increased risks of missed opportunities of public sector audit organizations in Kazakhstan 
whose purpose is to promote efficient and effective public sector programs and 
operations using validated audit outcomes. 
A practice-related gap, therefore, existed for both scholars and practitioners in 
understanding the reasons and causes of the high demand for performance auditing 
observed in Kazakhstan beginning in 2016; the perceived effects of performance audits 
on Kazakhstani public administration remained unknown. Whereas the impact of and, as 
a consequence, demand for performance audits significantly vary depending on the level 
of nations’ development, traditions, and changes of national public administration 
systems (Desmedt et al., 2017; Loke et al., 2016; Torres et al., 2019), more extensive and 
empirical studies are needed regarding the performance auditing phenomena, demand for 
and usefulness of performance audits from the public sector perspectives (Hay & 
Cordery, 2018). The identified information gap was especially topical for Kazakhstan as 
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a newly emerged country that has been adopting the performance auditing practice at a 
relatively early stage of its nation-building and establishing a sovereign public 
administration system. 
Theoretical Foundation 
New Public Management Theory 
New public management is the 1970s trend of reforming the public sector 
(Barzelay, 2001; Kapucu, 2006) and renovation of the 1830s vision on changing the 
administration of public affairs (Bowrey, Hui, & Smark, 2017). It is established as a self-
sufficient theory in a public administration field by bridging the ideology of new 
institutional economics with ideas on the applicability of business-like managerial 
approaches within the public sector (Hood, 1991). 
Hood (1991) derived the following seven doctrinal components of new public 
management: (a) “hands-on professional management” in the public sector; (b) explicit 
standards and measures of performance; (c) greater emphasis on output controls; (d) shift 
to disaggregation of units in the public sector; (e) shift to greater competition in public 
sector; (f) stress on private sector styles of management practice; and (g) stress on greater 
discipline and parsimony in resource use (pp. 4-5). NPM implies the establishment of 
new standards of performance in the public sector that might be achieved through using 
skills mastered by professional managers within the private sector, who increase the 
effectiveness of public sector organizations because of granting an autonomy, greater 
control over the outputs, and working in competitive environments. Hood’s theory 
stimulated the transformation of public administration systems through replacing process-
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oriented approaches by result-oriented techniques (Bao et al., 2012; Kapucu, 2006). 
Despite the criticism of NPM, Hammerschmid, Van de Walle, Andrews, and Mostafa 
(2018) offered that managerial reforms positively impact public administration 
supporting the actuality of Hood’s theory. 
Hood’s (1991) theoretical elaborations were used to explore the cause of demand 
for performance audits conducted in Kazakhstan to establish whether the executives 
operate with due regard to 3E categories, i.e., economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 
(INTOSAI, 2019). These categories are in line with NPM’s core values including the 
matching of resources to tasks for given goals (Hood, 1991). Further, NPM implies not 
only removing differences between the private and public sector but also emphasizing 
accountability over the results (Hood, 1995). 
Principal-Agent Model 
The principal-agent model theory describes who is accountable to whom 
(Maggetti & Papadopoulos, 2018) and is used to construct various principal-agent models 
(Gerber & Teske, 2000). PAM implies the identification of actors within the 
accountability process who play the role of principals or agents. Since agents operate in 
the interests of principals, principals define and structure incentives for agents (Maggetti 
& Papadopoulos, 2018). 
Waterman and Meier’s PAM is an extension of traditional principal-agent models 
(Waterman & Meier, 1998). Firstly, Waterman and Meier’s model illustrates that goals of 
principals and agents may conflict; secondly, agents may have more information than 
principals creating an information asymmetry between them; thirdly, multiple principals 
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and agents may engage in one relationship chain (Waterman & Meier, 1998). Waterman 
and Meier (1998) stressed that conflict of goals and information asymmetry is one of the 
possible combinations that describe the relations between principals and agents. The 
authors admitted that principals and agents may have the same level of access to 
information or agents may have more information than principals or viсe versa 
(Waterman & Meier, 1998). Similarly, there are various combinations of situations with 
conflict of goals – from full agreements to full contradictions of principals and agents’ 
goals (Waterman & Meier, 1998). 
Figure 5 illustrates the main advantage of Waterman and Meier’s PAM, i.e., a 













Figure 5. Combining information and goal 
Note: Developed based on Waterman & Meier (1998). 
 
NPM and PAM Integration in the Context of Performance Auditing 
Hood (1991, p. 5) interpreted the origin of NPM as “as a marriage of two different 
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public choice, transactions cost theory, principal-agent theory, theory of bureaucracy, 
and (b) “a set of successive waves of business-type ‘managerialism’ in the public sector.” 
Barzelay (2001) strengthened the linkage between the new public management theory 
and the principal-agent theory, arguing that principals and agents have agreements on 
improving public sector performance in a new public management environment. 
According to Morin (2001, 2003), performance auditors try to influence managers 
of auditees or, in the language of PAM, they structure intensives for auditees. 
Conversely, performance auditors conduct their audit work in the interests of citizens 
(The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), 2013); 
they are accountable to elected parliaments or presidents. Thus, referring to the 
performance auditing, PAM is the construction of three-level relations between principal 
and agents, where performance auditors are principals for managers of auditees and 
agents for parliamentarians, parliamentarians are principals for both performance auditors 
and managers of auditees, and managers of auditees are agents for both parliamentarians 
and performance auditors (Barzelay, 2001; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a; Waterman & 
Meier, 1998).  
Further, two key assumptions of PAM, i.e., conflict of goals and information 
asymmetry between principals and agents, are fair to performance auditing chain 
relations. For instance, goals of auditors who are principals and auditees who are agents 
may conflict (Morin 2001, 2003, 2008). Auditees may have more information that 
auditors. Both conflicts of goals and asymmetry information take place in the following 
chains: managers of auditees and parliamentarians, parliamentarians and auditors (see 
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Funnell, 2015; Morin, 2016, for more). Underpinned to the language of PAM, 
performance auditing is a chain of relations between auditors, managers of auditees, and 
parliamentarians, i.e., multiple principals and agents. As demonstrated in Figure 6, 
embedding these relations into PAM implies the fact that one actor (e.g., auditors) play 











Figure 6. Combining information and goal on PAM 
Note: Developed based on Funnell (2015; 2016); Hood (1991), Morin (2001; 2003); Waterman & Meier 
(1998). 
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The key integrators between NPM and PAM are 3Е categories, i.e., economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. They are generally-accepted principles of good governance 
declared by parliamentarians and other elected officials (INTOSAI, 2019; OECD, 2016). 
Performance auditors’ opinion regarding the addressing of 3E’s requirements by auditees 
is important information derived within conflict goals and asymmetry of the information 
environment. Thus, integration of NPM with PAM provided a foundation for the 
interpretations of perceptions of auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians 
regarding the usefulness of performance audits and their impact on public administration 
in Kazakhstan. 
Summary 
The performance auditing became an area of interest for scholar-practitioners 
almost 50 years ago. It is a power of independent public sector audit organizations on 
examination of the effectiveness of executives’ activity; performance auditors’ findings 
(or, more precisely, their opinion regarding the following to principles of economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness by the executives) is publicly available information. Based 
on the literature review, I determined changes in public administration, global financial 
crises, structural problems, environmental issues, other national and global challenges as 
triggers for performance auditing. Herewith, the impacts of performance audits differ by 
means and targeted levels of public administration. 
The perspectives of developed countries in terms of impacting the public 
administration through performance audits have received considerable attention, while 
there is a limited number of studies on exploring the perspectives of developing countries 
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including Kazakhstan. The case of Kazakhstan is unique since, unlike developed 
countries, Kazakhstan has been applying performance audits during the last few years. 
Establishing this practice coincided with modernization of the public administration 
system in Kazakhstan. I described the historical perspectives and current features of the 
Kazakhstani public administration system focusing on the implementation of 
performance audits within the public sector. I concluded that gap existed in 
understanding the factors that might explain the demand for performance auditing in 
Kazakhstan and it was unknown what are the perceived effects of performance audits on 
Kazakhstani public administration. In this Chapter, I also described the approach on the 
combination of the new public management theory and the principal-agent model used as 




Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of my research was to explore the perceived demand for and impacts 
of performance auditing on Kazakhstani public administration. The lived experiences of 
participants of a performance auditing process, i.e., auditors, managers of auditees, and 
parliamentarians, and their associated perceptions were the essential information that I 
used to achieve my research purpose. I applied a qualitative research design with the 
phenomenological approach as the most suitable to explore the studied phenomena 
through learning the perceptions of individuals experienced in performance auditing (see 
Moustakas, 1994). 
I used semistructured phenomenological interviews to collect the primary data 
and documentary reviews to collect the secondary data. I selected interviewees, i.e., the 
research participants, by applying group characteristics sampling and single significant 
case sampling strategies as the most effective to get access to informant rich cases 
(Patton, 2015). I interviewed 14 individuals experienced in performance auditing to 
achieve data saturation. 
My role as the researcher varied depending on the specification of research 
procedures and fieldworks. I was responsible for conducting my study in a way that 
ensured achieving the research purpose efficiently and for compliance with the 
Institutional Review Board’s (IRB) principal and requirements on the conduction of an 
ethical research (IRB, n.d.). I ensured the trustworthiness of my research by establishing 
credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985, 
65 
 
for more). I took both formal and practical measures to manage ethical issues, including 
the protection of research participants. 
Rationalizing the Research Design and Methodology 
Design: Qualitative Study 
To explore the causes of demand for performance audits in Kazakhstan and their 
impact on Kazakhstani public administration, I answered the following question: What 
are the lived experiences and perceptions of performance auditors, managers of auditees, 
and parliamentarians, the key participants and users of performance audits, regarding the 
demand for and impacts of these audits on Kazakhstan’s public administration? 
I answered this question by conducting semistructured interviews through which I 
identified (a) the factors contributed to making decisions on the conduction of more 
performance audits by the key participants of a performance auditing process, namely: 
auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians, and (b) how they perceive the 
impact of performance audits on their perspectives, organizations, and public 
administration in general. 
This qualitative research design was the most suitable for my research because it 
involves learning about peoples’ lives and experiences through their stories (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; Patton, 2015). The qualitative method is especially 
valuable in social sciences, including the public policy and administration discipline, 
because it provides scholars with new perspectives regarding the research problem (Mills 
& Birks, 2017). The selection of qualitative research design was also justified because 
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qualitative inquiries close the gap between scholars and practitioners (see Ospina, Esteve, 
& Lee, 2018, for more). 
Unlike quantitative studies, in which researchers test existing theories and 
determine best practices through the predictable hypotheses about relationships between 
associated variables, qualitative studies produce new patterns and themes based on in-
depth learning of real cases of people’s lives, which are not subject to predictions (Patton, 
2015). The subject of qualitative studies is multiple realities shaped by the lived 
experience of study participants, while the subject of quantitative studies is objective 
realities based on statistical abstractions (Brower, Abolafia, & Carr, 2000). The lack of 
necessary data for developing variables was a barrier to the application of the quantitative 
method in my research. The novelty of performance auditing practice in Kazakhstan is 
the cause of the lack of data, and applying both quantitative and mixed methods to 
explore the performance auditing phenomenon is a viable option for future studies subject 
to further developments in performance auditing practice and accumulating sufficient 
quantifiable database (Baskarada & Koronios, 2018). 
Qualitative research designs may involve a large number of elements of data for 
interpretations of observed changes; these data are accessible through interviews and 
observations made in a naturalistic context (Taguchi, 2018). 
Methodology: Phenomenological Approach 
Moustakas (1994) defined perceptions as the central source of knowledge in 
phenomenology and justified the application of the phenomenological approach as a 
means to portray the essence of individuals’ experience. Applying this approach leads to 
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the generation of new knowledge about a specific phenomenon from learning about the 
world of individuals (Husserl as cited by Moustakas, 1994). Agreeing with these 
arguments of Clark Moustakas and Edmund Husserl, the founders of the phenomenology 
(Patton, 2015), I used the phenomenological approach that is one of the most influential 
approaches of qualitative inquiries (Jamali, 2018). 
The central phenomena of my study were the perceived factors of demand for 
performance audits and the perceived impacts of these audits on public administration. 
The application of phenomenological approach makes possible the transformation of an 
individual or groups’ experience into the meaning; it is achieved through exploring and 
understanding the perceptions, descriptions, judgments, and other means of meaning-
making by the research participants (Patton, 2015). I explored and learned the perceptions 
of three different groups of individuals who are participants of performance audits. 
Participation in performance audits means being experienced in the phenomena under 
study or, in other words, to be in line with the characteristics of the source of information 
in phenomenology (Moustakas, 1994). 
There are other well-tested approaches to qualitative studies, such as ethnography, 
autoethnography, grounded theory, and case studies (Abutabenjeh & Jaradat, 2018; 
Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2015). However, unlike these approaches, phenomenology was 
the most appropriate for my research since portraying the essence of experience of 
auditors (who initiate and conduct performance audits), managers of auditees (who are 
subjects for performance audits), and parliamentarians (who are users of performance 
audits findings) allowed me to understand why performance audits are in demand as for 
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today and whether and how they [performance audits] impact public administration in 
Kazakhstan. 
By exclusion of other methodological approaches because of their limitations, I 
concluded that the phenomenological approach was the best for my study. Unlike 
ethnography, in which activities of a specific group with shared values or cultural 
specifics are explored through extensive fieldwork with prolonged participant 
observation, phenomenology is used to explore the lived experience of diversified groups 
(Moustakas, 1994; Park & Park, 2016). In case studies, the researcher focuses on an 
individual case that is limited by boundaries, narrowing the opportunities to 
comprehensively understand the phenomenon under study, whereas the 
phenomenological approach is not associated with that limitation (Creswell, 2013; Park 
& Park, 2016; Patton 2015). Both ethnography and case studies are focused on particular 
activities or processes, while the phenomenology is focused on the study participants’ 
experiences scoped by the research problem (Creswell, 2013; Moustakas, 1994; Park & 
Park, 2016; Patton 2015). My research goal was not to generate a new theory; therefore, I 
did not use grounded theory. 
Research Participants and Researcher 
Target Population and Selection of Participants 
The population consists of all individuals, organizations, cases, and other units of 
analysis or data used in researching (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
Conceptually, individuals and organizations create the demand for performance audits. 
The impact of performance audits implies influence on the actions of individuals and 
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organizations alike (Hay & Cordery, 2018; Lonsdale et al., 2011; Morin, 2001, 2008; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2014a). Thus, in the context of my research, the general 
population consists of all individuals and organizations that need performance audits and 
are subject to performance audits. 
The target population consists of individuals and organizations depending on their 
relation to the research problem and scope (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). To 
identify the target population of my study, I defined organizations that belong to the 
public sector and are directly associated with the performance auditing. I then determined 
the target groups of individuals who belong to these organizations and participate in 
performance audits. 
Performance auditing is a practice of public sector audit organizations, such as the 
Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions of 17 regions in Kazakhstan (ISLARK, 
2015). Among 17 Revision Commissions I selected Revision Commission on Nir-Sultan 
city since, unlike other commissions, it was a significant case in terms of increasing 
efficiency in using associated budget funds (see INTOSAI, 2019, for more). The 
Accounts Committee and Revision Commission on Nir-Sultan city belong to the first 
cluster of the target population. The target group of individuals consisted of all public 
auditors who belong to both managing and executive staffs of these public sector audit 
organizations. 
Auditees may initiate performance audits, and they are subject to performance 
audits conducted by the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions (ISLARK, 
2015). According to the 2015 Public Auditing Act, government entities, quasi-public 
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organizations (i.e., state-owned companies or organizations with state participation), and 
any other organizations that receive budget funds are subjects for performance audits 
(ISLARK, 2015). In my research, I focused on government entities and, hence, all central 
and local government entities belong to the second cluster of the target population. This 
cluster consisted of government entities responsible for financial and healthcare affairs 
(i.e., the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan and financial departments of 
local governments, and the Ministry of Healthcare of the Republic of Kazakhstan and 
healthcare departments of local governments). I selected these organizations due to their 
significance in terms of increasing efficiency in using associated budget funds and adding 
value through performance audits conducted by the Accounts Committee and Revision 
Commissions. The target group of individuals consisted of all managers of auditees, i.e., 
government officials who are responsible for interaction with external auditors. 
Parliamentarians may also initiate or, more precisely, request conduction of 
performance audits, and they are users of all audit reports (ISLARK, 1995b). The 
legislative bodies may contribute to the implementation of performance auditors’ 
recommendations addressed to auditees (Funnell et al., 2016; Morin, 2016). Therefore, 
the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and 17 Maslikhats, local legislative bodies, 
belong to the third cluster of the target population. Unlike employees of public sector 
audit organizations and managers of auditees, all parliamentarians, i.e., members of the 
Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Maslikhats, belong to the third target 
group of individuals since they empowered with the same mandates. Thereby, as 
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demonstrated in Table 3, the target population consisted of three clusters of organizations 
and three target groups of individuals who are participants of performance audits. 
Table 3 
 
The General and Target Population 
The general 
population 




that need in 
performance 





1st cluster  
Accounts Committee  1st target 
group  
Public auditors  
Revision Commissions  
2nd cluster  
Central  
government entities  2nd target 
group 
Managers of auditees 
Local  
government entities  
3rd cluster 





Based on the identified target population, I determined a sample, i.e., a subset of 
the target population that is subject to further in-depth analysis (see Frankfort-Nachmias 
& Nachmias, 2008, for more). Sampling is an essential procedure of all researches 
regardless of the selected research design because it is impossible or inadvisable to 
analyze the general population to generate new patterns and themes or to test the existing 
theories (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). However, sample design and sample 
size significantly vary depending on research design (Park & Park, 2016; Patton 2015) 
since the sampling implies taking into account research problem, purpose, and nature 
(Blaikie, 2018). 
I used purposeful sampling strategies including group characteristic sampling 
(GCS) and single sufficient case sampling (SSCS) strategies as the most suitable for 
conducting a phenomenological study (see Mills & Birks, 2017; Patton, 2015, for more). 
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“The logic and power of purposeful sampling lies in selection information-rich cases for 
in-depth study” (Patton, 2015, p. 264). The information-rich cases in my research are 
individuals experienced in performance auditing since my research aimed at exploring 
the perceived demand for and impact of performance audits. Patton (2015) stated, 
applying the purposeful sampling means learning information shared by individuals who 
“deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of inquiry” (p. 264). 
I used an algorithm for designing the sample similar to the algorithm of 
identification of the target population. I have defined three groups of the research 
participants applying GCS with a shared characteristic, namely – belonging to a specific 
organization. This strategy allowed me to reveal and illuminate important group patterns 
(see Patton, 2015, for more). This is an important advantage in the context of my 
research. As mentioned in previous chapters, the performance auditing is a process of 
interaction between three groups (i.e., the group of auditors, group of managers of 
auditees, and group of parliamentarians). Therefore, group patterns were critical in 
obtaining a better understanding of the studied phenomena. 
I selected the study participants applying SSCS. According to Patton (2015), a 
single significant case is an individual or another unit of analysis that provides a rich 
understanding of the studied phenomena. So, the single significant cases in my research 
were individuals who met the following characteristics: (a) they are high-impact cases, or 
they may influence policies and practices related to the performance auditing; and (b) 
they are crucial cases or it means that they share information similar to the information 
that might be shared by other representatives of the target population (Patton, 2015). 
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I used the following criteria to select and recruit the research participants: 
1. general criteria for all participants – 
▪ being experienced in performance audits conducted in 2006–2019; 
▪ willingness and consent to participate in the study; 
2. specific criteria for auditors – 
▪ being certified public auditors; 
▪ hold managing position or belong to audit departments of the Accounts 
Committee and Revision Commission on Nur-Sultan city; 
▪ participate in planning and conduction of performance audits; 
▪ being experienced in making strategic decisions related to performance 
auditing practice in their organizations;  
3. specific criteria for managers of auditees – 
▪ hold managing position in auditee and being empowered with 
mandates to coordinate financial, economic or strategic affairs in their 
organizations; 
▪ being experienced in interactions with external auditors; 
▪ empowered with mandates to initiate performance audits; 
4. specific criteria for parliamentarians – 
▪ being a member of parliamentarian committees empowered with 
mandates in area of financial, economic, and budget affairs; 
▪ being experienced in interactions with external auditors; 
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▪ being experienced in participation of parliamentarian committees’ 
meeting on consideration performance audit reports. 
There is no singular formula on defining the sample size for qualitative inquiries 
(Patton, 2015). A researcher may define the sample size methodologically or based on 
previous studies (Dworkin as cited by Sim, Saunders, Waterfield, & Kingstone, 2018). 
Proper sampling leads to data saturation in case of relying on information power 
(Malterud, Siersma, & Guassora, 2016). Malterud et al. (2016) suggested the following 
relationships: “The larger information power the sample holds, the lower N is needed, 
and vice versa” (p. 1754). Well-tested or recommended sample sizes are ranged from 2 
till 60; the most often used sizes are ranged from 10 till 20 (Blaikie, 2018; Guest, Bunce, 
& Johnson, 2006; Guest, Namey, & McKenna, 2017; Sim et al., 2018). According Guest 
et al. (2006), within phenomenological studies, the data saturation achieved in the case of 
conduction 12 interviews, it means that all themes emerge as a result of the interpretation 
of responses of 12 interviewees. Sim et al. (2018) stated that preliminarily defining the 
sample size is problematic, especially in interpretive models of qualitative studies.  
Table 4 illustrates how I defined the sample size as at least 12. 
Table 4 
 
The Sample Design and Size 
Target groups of individuals  Sample: a-priory size 
level of public administration 
Total 
central local 
1 Auditors  2 2 4 
2 Managers of auditees 2 2 4 
3 Parliamentarians 2 2 4 




I conducted interviews with 14 participants of performance auditing selected by applying 
GCS and SSCS and identified 90% of all patterns and themes associated with the studied 
phenomena (see Guest et al., 2017; Malterud et al., 2016; Sim et al., 2018, for more). 
Researcher’s Role and Participants’ Values 
A researcher plays multiple roles shaped by the research problem, purpose, 
setting, and design (Patton, 2015). My key role as the researcher was to project and 
implement my study by applying approaches and techniques that ensure achieving the 
research purpose. Researcher implements a set of consistent and logically linked 
procedures, including a delineation of research focus, development of understandable 
research questions, quiring individuals to gather data, and data analysis (von Eckartsberg 
as cited by Moustakas, 1994). In the course of fieldworks, a qualitative researcher’s roles 
vary from participant-observer to spectator-observer (Patton, 2015). Whereas the purpose 
of my phenomenological study was to explore the perceptions of study participants 
regarding the increasing demand for performance audits and their impact on the national 
system of public administration, I acted as a participant-observer. 
In communications with the study participants and reviewing documents, I 
learned to and implemented the role of both investigator and interpreter. As the 
investigator, I searched for in-depth information constructing relations with the study 
participants in a way that avoids threats and risks of negative consequences that might 
emerge because of my access to their experience in performance auditing (Alase, 2017). 
According to Moustakas (1994), the central objective of a researcher-phenomenologist is 
to interpret the lived experience of individuals; it is achievable through contacting the 
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people experienced in the phenomena (Van Manen, 2014). So, as the interpreter, I made 
meanings associated with the studied phenomena relying on the study participants’ 
stories and maintain an acceptable level of distance from them (Moustakas, 1994). 
As the researcher I also: 
▪ collected data as an instrument (Janesick, 2011; Patton, 2015);  
▪ conducted negotiations with the study participants (Rahiem et al., 2016); 
▪ conducted interviews mastering skills on asking open-ended and probing 
questions (Patton, 2015); 
▪ conducted observations mastering skills on interpretation of body language 
and facial expressions (Bevan, 2014; Patton, 2015); 
▪ implemented analytical procedures arguing the research findings (Patton, 
2015); 
▪ created a phenomenological text as a writer-phenomenologist (Fletcher, 
2017).  
While the researcher is a data collection instrumentation, the study participants 
are co-researchers (Janesick, 2011; Patton, 2015). Unlike researchers, study participants 
are principal owners of information important to the study. The results of 
phenomenological studies based on the lived experience of study participants, their 
values, ideas, and views; they shape their perceptions related to the phenomena under 
study (Moustakas, 1994). Therefore, conduction of quality phenomenological study 
requires understanding and illuminating the participants’ values (Brower et al. 2000; 
Fletcher, 2016). I learned and illuminated the participants’ values to better understand the 
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essence of their lived experience avoiding judgmental attitude toward them (Karagiozis, 
2018). Understanding the participants’ values allowed me, in turn, to make valuable their 
participation in my study building trust with them. As Alase (2017), Janesick (2015), 
Moustakas (1994), and Patton (2015) stated, establishing a trust and rapport with the 
participants contributes to obtaining needed data. 
Data Sources, Collection, and Analysis 
Primary and Secondary Sources 
Using multiple sources contributes to quality qualitative studies (Patton, 2015). I 
used interviews and documentary reviews to collect data needed for my research work. 
The lived experience of study participants is essential information in phenomenological 
studies. The empirical phenomenological approach implies returning to experience 
allowing “the phenomena speak for themselves” (Giorgi as cited by Moustakas, 1994, p. 
11). By conduction of 14 interviews I collected the primary data that describe the 
perceptions of the study participants regarding the (a) causes of demand for performance 
audits within the public sector in Kazakhstan and (b) impact of these audits on 
participants’ perspectives, their organizations, and public administration in general. 
I logically accumulated and structurally organized the interview data, including 
my notes on observations, in compliance with IRB’s requirement. I started to collect 
these primary data after getting IRB’s approval (IRB, n.d.; Janesick, 2011; Patton, 2015). 
To corroborate the interview data, I used the secondary data collected by documentary 
reviews. I did it for data saturation, triangulation and for ensuring the credibility of my 
study (Patton, 2015). 
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The list of documents to be reviewed included: 
▪ annual reports and performance audit reports issued by the Accounts 
Committee and Revision Commissions in 2016–2020; 
▪ press releases on performance audits’ results issued by the Accounts 
Committee and Revision Commissions in 2016–2020; 
▪ orders of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan and Maslikhats related 
to approval of annual reports issued by the Accounts Committee and Revision 
Commissions in 2016–2020;  
▪ press releases on parliamentarians’ meetings on considering annual reports 
issued by the Accounts Committee and Revision Commissions in 2016–2020. 
Permission was not needed to use the secondary data since all these data are 
publicly available. 
Instrumentation for Data Collection 
In the course of my study, I conducted 14 phenomenological interviews to find 
out why, from the point of view of the study participants, performance audits often used 
as for today and whether these audits impact on national system of public administration 
in Kazakhstan. I recruited the study participants by contacting them using the publicly 
available contact information, such as phone numbers and email addresses, and invited 
them to participate in the proposed study by sending them invitation letters (see 
Appendix A). I used a snowball approach, i.e., asking my study participants to 
recommend other persons who meet the selection criteria and may consider the invitation 
to take part in the study. The study participants were not be asked to provide non-public 
79 
 
contact information for their co-workers nor were they be asked to distribute the 
invitation to their co-workers at work. 
The main objective of all planned interviews is to capture the lived experience of 
participants in the performance auditing process (Van Manen as cited by Patton, 2015, p. 
433). I used this approach to shed some light on the research problem and find out 
previously unknown or undisclosed information about the performance auditing practice 
that is a novelty for Kazakhstan. I conducted semistructured face-to-face and phone 
interviews with open-ended questions since they are best suited for phenomenological 
studies (Bevan, 2014; Giorgi, 1997; Merriam, 2009; Mills & Birk, 2017; Moustakas, 
1994; Patton, 2015; Seidman, 2006; Van Manen, 2014). Structuring the interview means 
using a set of shared questions, and it allows to focus on research purpose guaranteeing 
alignment the research questions with the interview questions (Bevan, 2014; Merriam, 
2009; Seidman, 2006). 
Seidman (2006) suggested consequently use questions related to life histories, 
reconstructing the experience, and reflection on the meaning of an experience. Bevan 
(2014) suggested to structure interviews by using questions needed for contextualization 
(e.g., to explore bibliographic data), apprehending (i.e., focusing on the phenomenon 
under study), and clarifying (i.e., clarifications related to specific elements participants’ 
experience). To ensure a correct understanding of the information shared by participants, 
researchers use probing questions (Patton, 2015). Pessoa, Harper, Santos, and Gracino 
(2019) proposed to use a wide range of interview questions, including confirmatory 
questions, questions to organize chronological events, and questions to explain 
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contradictions. I used three sets of questions that consisted of (a) general questions for all 
participants and (b) specific questions for a particular group of participants. I asked two 
types of questions. I used broad and open-ended questions directly related to the research 
questions to gain access to information relevant to the purpose of my research. I then 
used additional questions to ensure accurate interpretation of the essence of participants 
experience in performance auditing. 
I developed the interview questions aligned with the central research question. To 
effectively collect data during the interviews, I developed the Interview Guide, i.e., the 
first instrumentation (Patton, 2015; see Appendix B). My interview questions based on 
the literature, including the works of Desmedt et al. (2017), Funnel (2015), Morin (2001, 
2008, 2014, 2016), Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018). These authors shared the 
view that exploring the impact of performance audits on public administration through 
learning reactions of managers of auditees and parliamentarians and auditors’ perceptions 
is advisable. Since the impact of performance audits manifests at different levels and vary 
depending on organizational specifics (Lonsdale, 2000), I also took into account the 
Supreme Audit Institutions Performance Measurement Framework (SAI PMF) issued by 
INTOSAI (INTOSAI, 2016c). SAI PMF consists of performance measurement 
indicators, including the indicators that measure the effectiveness of performance audits 
(see Appendixes C and D). Finally, since the demand for performance audits have not 
been studied (Hay & Cordery, 2018), I developed a related set of questions relying on my 
experience in developing national performance audit standards and methodological 
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guidelines, in planning and conducting performance audits, and in teaching the 
performance auditing. 
I conducted ten interviews in face-to-face mode and four phone interviews for 8 
weeks. I agreed with all interviewees the mode, place, and duration of the interview in 
advance. To effectively prepare and conduct all interviews and follow-up activities. Table 
5 illustrates how I used the Interview Organization Matrix, i.e., the second 
instrumentation in my interview approach. Along with the matrix, I used the Interview 
Protocol, i.e., the third instrumentation, to conduct all interviews within a scheduled 
timeframe (Janesick, 2011; Patton, 2015; see Appendix E).  
Table 5 
 










Date  Location  Mode  Duration  
plan fact plan fact F O P plan fact 




Auditor-2 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  
Auditor-3 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  
Auditor-4 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  




Manager-2 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  
Manager-3 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  
Manager-4 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  




Parliam-2 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  
Parliam-3 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  
Parliam-4 +  +  TBD TBD + TBD  
 
I also made notes in the Interview Journal, i.e., the fourth instrumentation, to 
accurately interpret body language and facial emotions that might add insight to the 
results of verbal communications (Roulston, 2018). I used this journal to note issues or 
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unexpected situations that may emerge during interviews as well (see Appendix F). I used 
two digital audio recorders and my personal computer with audio-recording function. 
Strategies and Techniques for Data Analysis 
Properly collected and organized raw data are crucial in analyzing qualitative data 
(Patton, 2015). Figure 7 illustrates how I grouped all collected data by sources and in 
chronological sequence; it allowed me to effectively implement further procedures on 






Figure 7. Data collection and organization 
Note: Developed based on Patton (2015). 
 
According to Moustakas (1994) and Van Manen (2014), to properly analyze data 
within phenomenological studies, researchers need to bracket their knowledge about the 
phenomena under study. Bracketing means for researchers being away from their prior 
knowledge and experience and, therefore, it allows them to understand the phenomena 
with a new attitude (Mills & Birks, 2017). I used bracketing to analyze interview data to 
explore perceptions of the study participants about the reasons to use more performance 


















scratch; i.e., by bracketing my experience and prior knowledge about the performance 
auditing phenomena. 
The bracketing approach is associated with limitations (e.g., in specific areas of 
human experiences); it is difficult or even impossible to analyze, examine, and interpret 
gathered information without prior knowledge (Creswell, 2013; Mills & Birks, 2017). To 
manage these limitations of bracketing, I used inductive and deductive methods to 
analyze primary and secondary data. I used these methods depending on each stage of 
working with data to be analyzed. I applied the deductive approach to generate new or 
previously undisclosed explanations about the demand for performance audits and 
whether these audits influence auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians and 
change their organizations. These results were preceded by coding or, in other words, 
identification and labeling pieces of information significant to understand the studied 
phenomena (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). I used two-cycle coding applying the content and 
thematic analyses, as demonstrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Data analysis algorithm 


















During 1st cycle, I used descriptive and concepts codes, and during the 2nd cycle 
I used patterns and themes codes derived from textual and structural descriptions; both 
1st and 2nd cycles codes were aligned with the theoretical framework and the selected 
strategies of sampling (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014; Patton, 2015). I used the 
thematic analysis to identify and group the significant statements derived from the 
interview transcripts to themes, i.e., meaning unites; to compare the themes derived from 
my prior knowledge and previous experience with the themes derived from the 
participants’ experience; to portray the essence of the study participants experience 
through associated themes and patterns (Moustakas, 1994; Van Manen, 2014). 
I derived patterns and themes ensuring their logical consistency with the research 
question (see Miles et al., 2014; Patton, 2015, for more). It allowed me to identify and 
systematize influential factors that might explain the reasons for increasing the number of 
performance audits and shed some light on their impact by the evaluation categories, such 
as positive, negative or neutral impacts. I applied visual tools to demonstrate the results 
of data analyses, including the charts presented in Figure 9. 
Digital tools contribute to qualitative study (Paulus, Jackson, & Davidson, 2017). 
I utilized the software program, NVivo 12 Plus, to organize and analyze qualitative 
information collected in text formats, tables, diagrams, charts, and audio-records. This 
program allows to use of symbolic systems and visualize the results of coding and 
developing patterns (Creswell, 2013; Oliveira, Bitencourt, Santos, & Teixeira, 2016; 
Paulus et al., 2017). I selected NVivo 12 Plus due to also its capabilities on avoiding 







Figure 9. Data Analysis Results 
Note: Developed based on Patton (2015). 
 
Managing Issues of Trustworthiness 
Trustworthiness is critical for phenomenological studies since the findings of 
these studies shaped by researchers’ judgments (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 2015). Unlike quantitative studies, when formulas used to 
ensure the validity and reliability of research findings, the validity and reliability of 
qualitative studies ensured when the credibility, transferability, dependability, and 
confirmability, i.e., criteria of trustworthiness, are established (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  
Credibility and Transferability 
Credibility refers to the internal validity, whereas transferability relates to the 


























credibility means a maximum approximation of research results to reality. In the context 
of my research, I ensured the credibility by interpretation of the study participants’ 
perceptions in a way that leads to exploring the essence of their experience in 
performance auditing. I focused on my research problem, asking the participants clear 
questions that are related to the studied phenomena, avoiding the pressure on them (see 
Lietz et al., 2006; Shenton, 2004, for more). I interpreted the perceptions of auditors, 
managers of auditees, and parliamentarians accurately, and I did not change an “emerging 
picture” because of my perspectives or beliefs. 
Transferability implies possibilities on transferring the research findings and 
results into the reality within different settings (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Shenton, 2004). 
The performance auditing is a novelty for Kazakhstan and it becomes widespread 
practice; for this reason, transferability of my research work is critical. It may contribute 
to reducing the gap in the knowledge about the performance auditing phenomena. The 
research findings and results are transferable when they acceptable for individuals or 
organizations uncovered by research (e.g., 16 local public sector audit organizations in 
Kazakhstan or public sector audit organizations in other countries). I made my research 
useful for scholars and practitioners by applying the comparative techniques and detailed 
documentation of my fieldworks. 
Dependability and Confirmability 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), dependability established when all 
planned and required tasks on doing research completed. As an indicator to measure the 
dependability, I used the following consideration: Repeated data collection and analysis 
87 
 
will lead to results that are similar to the initial results (Shenton, 2004). To ensure the 
dependability, I used an audit trail. It means that I made detailed documentation at each 
stage of my research work – starting from the justification of my research till 
interpretation the research findings and dissemination of the research results. 
Confirmability established in case of maintaining neutrality and being objective 
throughout an entire research process (Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Patton, 2015). To be deal 
with that task, I relied on reliable and tested evidence focusing on my research purpose 
and the study participants’ perspectives. I established trust relationships with the research 
participant and complete checking procedures, including compliance with IRB’s 
requirements on the conduction of ethical research (see Birt et al., 2016; IRB, n.d.; 
Patton, 2015, for more). 
In sum, I used triangulation to address the issues of trustworthiness in general and 
its criterions in particular (see Patton, 2015, for more). One of the well-tested strategies is 
to use multiple sources of information and, therefore, I used interviews and documentary 
reviews (Patton, 2015). I used triangulation of qualitative sources that implies checking 
the compliance of data among different sources (Patton, 2015). In that case, incompliance 
is not a sign of incredible, untransferable, undependable, or unconfirmable research work. 
As Moustakas (1994) argued, phenomenological studies are associated with 
inconsistencies in the collected data. So, my objective was to understand and correctly 
interpret identified inconsistencies (in case of their detection) since they may provide 
opportunities for deeper insights (Patton, 2015). 
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Managing Ethical Issues 
Researcher’s Biases and Protection of Participants 
Unmanaged bias of a researcher may lead to distortion of research results and, as 
a consequence, threaten the reliability of research (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2008). Biases caused because of different reasons, such as previous experience and 
awareness of a researcher about the problem under study or a researcher’s commitment to 
his or her prospects (Patton, 2015). Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2008) argued that 
biases manifest in the course of interviewing through verbal cues and nonverbal 
communications. Thus, it needs to identify risks, sources, and manifestations of biases to 
avoid them. 
My experience in an area of public auditing, i.e., serving in the Accounts 
Committee and working as both independent consultant and trainer, or my involvement 
into the development of national standards and guidelines on performance auditing is a 
possible source of bias. I managed all my actions, ensuring their compliance with IRB’s 
requirement on the conduction of quality and unbiased research work (IRB, n.d.). I 
exercised application judgments without any pressure on my research participants. My 
objective was to interpret the words (stories) of research participants in the meanings that 
are laid in these words (of the story) by the participants (Moustakas, 1994). 
I am committed to the performance auditing ideology, but this commitment did 
not influence the means I used to gather and interpret both the raw and secondary data. I 
maintained an unbiased and neutral attitude throughout an entire process of my study, 
since, as Patton (2015) stated, “the investigator’s commitment is to understand the world 
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as it unfolds, be true to complexities and multiple perspectives as they emerge, and be 
balanced in reporting both confirming and disconfirming evidence with regard to any 
conclusions offered” (p. 58). Unbiased researching allowed me to communicate with the 
research participants effectively; my reciprocal and respectful attitude toward them 
provided the necessary access to information about the phenomenon under my study (see 
Riese, 2018, for more). 
Unbiased and (as a result) ethical researching implies protection of the research 
participants that was my responsibility as the researcher. The protection of research 
participant is important since it is essential in realizing their rights to freedom and self-
determination (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). So, throughout my study 
including the fieldwork stage (i.e., interviewing, documentary reviewing), I took 
measures to prevent undesirable and negative consequences for my participants as a 
result of their participation in my study. 
I started direct communications with the research participants after getting the 
Walden University IRB approval (12-16-19-0425017) on December 16, 2019. I 
completed the National Institutes of Health online training entitled “Protecting Human 
Research Participants”. In addition to these preventive measures, I took appropriate 
measures to protect personal data and identifiers of my research participants. I agreed the 
place of all interviews with the research participants. All potential study participants were 
employees of the public sector organizations including government entities; the identity 
of organizations was masked (i.e., audit organizations, audited government entities, and 
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legislative bodies); participants were de-identified and reported using their assigned 
participant code to ensure confidentiality. 
During documentation of my fieldworks (e.g., interview transcripts and journal 
notes) I deidentified and separately coded personal data and any other identifiers of the 
study participants. Cross-referencing of the participants-to-codes was kept secured. 
Research data are stored on an encrypted thumb drive and will remain stored for a period 
of 5 years and then the drive will be re-formatted. Paper records are stored for a period of 
5 years and will be destroyed by shredding. 
I conducted interviews in Kazakh (the state language in Kazakhstan) and Russian 
(the official language in Kazakhstan), and I translated significant statements of all 
interviews into English. I received an official confirmation regarding the accuracy of 
translation from a translation agency; before providing the interview transcripts, I signed 
nondisclosure agreement with the translation agency. The interview transcripts did not 
include personal data in line with the Interview Protocol (see Appendix E). I started audio 
recording after the introduction section; demographic data were coded. 
Informed Consent 
To protect my research participants, I used informed consent. It is one of the 
essential procedures in researching, and it implies decision-making by the study 
participants regarding their participation in research being aware of the purpose and 
nature of research (Diener & Crandal as cited by Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2008). Timeliness is critical in using informed consent. The informed consent form was 
submitted to my study participants before interviewing (for review and asking questions, 
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in case of need). According to the Interview Protocol (see Appendix E), the study 
participants were asked to sign the informed consent form before or at the time of 
interviews. Signature or verbal verifications took place prior to starting interviews. It 
allowed me to guarantee that the participation in my research is the result of a voluntary 
and informed decision made by the research participants. 
The informed consent consists of information about the research purpose and 
nature, risks and benefits for research participants, and means of ensuring confidentiality 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). One of the key objectives of using informed 
consent is to inform about voluntary participation in the study (Brear, 2018a; Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). It means that the research participants will get information 
about their rights to voluntarily participate in the research and withdraw from the 
research at any time; their decision will not entail sanctions (Brear, 2018b; Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). I developed the informed consent sample that includes all 
these important points. Using the developed sample of the informed consent allowed me 
to build trust with the research participants (see Mockler, 2014, for more). 
Additional Ethical Procedures 
The ethical issues arise from the research problem itself, data collection methods, 
and research participants’ positions (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). So, ethical 
aspects were considered and managed at all stages of my study. 
The research participants who are senior-level public officials may express an 
ambiguous or biased opinion during interviews. For instance, the participants who are 
senior-level managers of auditees may express a vague opinion because of their biased 
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attitude to the identified research problem; or, public auditors who lead SAI’s 
organizational units may express an ambiguous opinion because of potential threats to 
their career. The participants may also experience psychological stress since qualitative 
interviews imply access to detailed information about their lives (Wiles & Boddy, 2013), 
but this sharing was not expected to be of any greater risk than the participant’s normal 
working environment. Along with the mentioned procedural measures, researchers use 
measures on addressing ethical issues in practice (Guillemin & Gillam, 2004). To ensure 
proper managing all ethical issues, I followed IRB’s principles and regulations on the 
conduction of ethical studies (IRB, n.d.). 
Summary 
A qualitative method with the phenomenological approach was the most suitable 
research design to explore the factors that might explain the increasing number of 
performance audits conducted by public sector audits organizations in Kazakhstan and 
the perceived impacts of these audits on Kazakhstani public administration. 
In Chapter 3, I rationalized the selected research design in detail. I described 
strategies, techniques, and algorithms used to identify the general and target population, 
sample design and size, and to select research participants. I described the varied nature 
of my role as the researcher and my responsibilities as well. 
To ensure the validity and reliability of my study, I used multiple sources of 
information. Thus, in Chapter 3, I listed the central sources of information and explained 
instrumentations that I used to collect both primary and secondary data, including 
interviews and documentary reviews. Chapter 3 consists of visualized information about 
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strategies for data analysis (e.g., the deriving of patterns and themes applying the content 
and thematic analyses). 
In this chapter, I also detailed measure on establishing the credibility, 
transferability, dependability, and confirmability of my research work, including the 
triangulation procedures. Risks associated with researcher biases and ethical issues are 
also listed in this chapter. Thus, I detailed measures on protection of my research 
participants (e.g., utilizing the informant content process that I used in the course of 




Chapter 4: Results of the Study 
Introduction 
The purpose of my study was to explore the factors that might explain the demand 
for performance auditing in Kazakhstan and the perceived effects of performance audits 
on Kazakhstani public administration. I used a phenomenological approach to answer the 
following research question: What are the lived experiences and perceptions of 
performance auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians, the key participants 
and users of performance audits, regarding the demand for and impacts of these audits on 
Kazakhstan’s public administration? 
Through using both phenomenological interviews and documentary reviews, I 
figured out some real causes for expanding the performance auditing practice or factors 
that explained why these audits are highly demanded in Kazakhstan. I also tried to 
explore the perceived effects of performance audits on public administration from the 
perspectives of auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians, who are directly 
involved in processes of performance audits and use the results of these audits in their 
professional and legislative activities. Whereas performance auditing is a Western 
practice adopted by Kazakhstani public audit organizations, I tried to understand whether 
the impacts of performance audits on public administrations in Kazakhstan and well-
studied cases of western countries differ. 
This chapter consists of detailed descriptions of implementing the field stage of 





I conducted my research in Nur-Sultan city, the capital of Kazakhstan. As 
planned, I primarily focused on the practice of performance audits conducted in 2016–
2019 by external public audit organizations at central and local levels of public 
administration. During that timeframe, auditors from 18 public audit organizations, 
managers of more than 1,600 government entities, public and quasi-public organizations, 
and parliamentarians from 18 legislative bodies were involved in the process of 
performance auditing. From that target population, as described in Chapter 3, I defined 
the potential study participants by applying group characteristics and single sufficient 
case sampling methods to collect primary data. Fourteen participants and users of 
performance audits, including five performance auditors, five managers of auditees, and 
four parliamentarians participated in my study. 
I interviewed the study participants in January and February 2020. Generally, that 
time was a favorable period for interviews since it did not coincide with the planning or 
reporting period of both public audit organizations and auditees and with the time of 
beginning or finishing parliamentarians’ terms. There were no significant organizational 
changes in public audit organizations, auditees, and legislative bodies as well as 
unscheduled sessions of legislative bodies or large-scale government events during the 
interview time or immediately preceding. However, due to weather conditions in Nur-
Sultan city, a state of emergency was declared starting from January 27, 2020 limiting 
travel. Consequently, and to not endanger my study participants or myself, I conducted 
four interviews by phone. This plan alteration was not a deviation from my original data 
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collection design as I incorporated face-to-face interviews as well as phone or online 
technology modes initially depending on the study participants’ availability. As such, no 
organizational or personal conditions impacted my study participants which may have 
contributed adversely to study interpretation. 
The study participants defined the dates, time, and locations for face-to-face 
interviews and similarly their preferred timing for phone interviews. All 14 participants 
participated voluntarily and consent to participate was obtained. All documents reviewed 
and analyzed during the field stage of my research work were collected from open access 
sources. 
Demographics 
Whereas the lived experiences of auditors, managers of auditees, and 
parliamentarians in the studied phenomena are the key source of meaningful information, 
I defined the experience in performance auditing as the general inclusion criteria for all 
study participants. All participants met that criteria and their professional experience was 
9.6 years per a participant on average, including 55 years of experience in performance 
audits conducted in 2016–2019, or 3.9 years per a participant on average. As 
demonstrated in Table 6, the study participants also met specific inclusion criteria applied 
to them depending on their roles in the process of performance auditing. 
All five auditors are certified external public auditors. Three auditors hold 
leadership positions, i.e., they are senior-level managers in their organizations; two 
auditors are members of public audit organizations’ departments responsible principally 
for conducting the performance audits. All auditors participated in both planning and 
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conducting performance audits as well as making strategic decisions associated with the 
performance auditing practice. For instance, they were responsible for selecting the areas 
of public administration or organizations to be audited. Additionally, they made 
recommendations based on performance audits’ results and developed the performance 
auditing rules and methodologies. 
Table 6 
 
Meeting Inclusion Criteria by the Participants 
Participants’ 
Codes 


















AC01 Auditor  Met 17 4 Met 
AC02 Auditor Met 4 4 Met 
AL03 Auditor Met 15 4 Met 
AL04 Auditor Met 7 4 Met 
AC/L05 Auditor Met 8 4 Met 
PC06 Parliamentarian Met 8 4 Met 
PC07 Parliamentarian Met 16 4 Met 
PL08 Parliamentarian Met 18 4 Met 
PL09 Parliamentarian Met 8 4 Met 
MC10 Manager of auditee Met 8 4 Met 
MC11 Manager of auditee Met 12 4 Met 
ML12 Manager of auditee Met 6 4 Met 
ML13 Manager of auditee Met 3 3 Met 
ML/C14 Manager of auditee Met 4 4 Met 
 
Two parliamentarians are members of the Parliament of the Republic of 
Kazakhstan, and two parliamentarians are members of the Maslikhat of Nur-Sultan city. 
All four parliamentarians are members of committees of the central and local legislative 
bodies principally responsible for coordinating economic, finance, and budget affairs. 
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These four parliamentarians where highly experienced with external auditor interactions 
and legislative body presentations of performance audit results to include public hearings. 
All five managers of auditees are senior-level managers in their organizations. 
They are highly experienced with external auditors. These managers possessed legitimate 
powers to request performance audits; however, none stated that they had ever initiated 
performance audits to be conducted in their organizations. 
To obtain a holistic view of the studied phenomena, I included in the list of 
participants auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians who work in 
organizations that belong to the central and local levels of public administration. As 
illustrated in Figure 10, one auditor and one manager of auditees had experience in both 
levels of public administration, thus providing a good opportunity to explore differences 
in their lived experiences depending on working in central or local organizations. 
My study participant varied by age, gender, ethnicity, and religion; however, I did 
not use these demographic characteristics to evaluate any significance in terms of the 
phenomena under study. The study participants are qualified in their professional areas 
and well-experienced in performance auditing; that fact allowed me to gather rich 
information and met data saturation requirements. 
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Figure 10. The study participants distribution by groups 
 
Data Collection 
I started my data collection stage based on the IRB’s approval dated December 
16, 2019. I conducted 14 phenomenological interviews to collect primary data. 
Additionally, I reviewed more than 200 documents posted on official public sites of 
public audit organizations, government entities, and quasi-public organizations all having 
been subjected to performance audits in 2016–2019. Documents were also reviewed from 
public websites of legislative bodies within the same time frame. For comparative 
Auditors [AC]; 2
Auditors [AC/L]; 1









analysis, I also reviewed reports on 2016–2019 performance audits posted on official 
public web sites of supreme audit institutions of the United States, United Kingdom, 
Australia, and Canada. 
Participants Recruiting 
I prepared the list of potential study participants using organizational charts and 
contact information posted on the public-facing websites of the following organizations: 
the Accounts Committee, Revision Commission on Nur-Sultan city, Ministry of Finance, 
Department of Finance on Nur-Sultan city, Ministry of Healthcare, Department of 
Healthcare on Nur-Sultan city, Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Maslikhat 
on Nur-Sultan city. I recruited the study participants using different strategies. 
I called four auditors for 2 days and invited them to take part in my study. During 
first calls, I explained to them (a) the purpose of my research, (b) conditions on their 
participation such as voluntariness and confidentiality, (c) reasons for their selection, and 
(d) their contributions to the research. Three auditors accepted the invitation, and we 
agreed on the date, time, and place for their interview. One auditor preferred to meet 
firstly. We met the next day after my call and, during our meeting, I explained the 
purpose of my study in detail. The auditor was interested in my study, actively asked 
questions, shared some examples from performance auditing practice, and expressed the 
view in favor of conducting more performance audits. However, I did not use that 
information at the next stages of my study since the potential study participants declined 
my invitation. For those who declined the invitation to participate, I did not solicit 
explanations as to why they declined. Some potential participants explained the reasons 
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for their decision to not participate, while others did not. I called the fifth auditor who 
asked me to call at a later time. To be in line with my data collection plan, I moved on to 
the sixth auditor, who accepted the invitation. The fifth auditor also accepted the 
invitation during my second call. Five auditors ultimately participated in the study. 
I sent invitation letters to four parliamentarians, and I called them as follow-up to 
those letters across two days. Parliamentarians were informed about the purpose of my 
research and their rights as participants. Like in the case of auditors, I explained to 
parliamentarians why I selected them as potential participants and how I will ensure the 
confidentiality of their participation. Two parliamentarians accepted the invitation, and 
we agreed on the date, time, and place for the interview. One parliamentarian did not 
reply, and one parliamentarian declined the invitation due to a busy schedule. Two 
interviewed parliamentarians referred me to their equally qualified colleagues from the 
deputy corps who might accept participation in the study. Through these snowball 
methods, two parliamentarians were recruited. All parliamentarians were contacted using 
publicly available, open-access contact information. In all, four parliamentarians agreed 
to participated in the study. 
Unlike the first and second groups, more time was needed to recruit and complete 
interviews with managers of auditees. To obtain the participation of at least four 
managers of auditees, as described in Chapter 3, I communicated with eight potential 
participants from the third group. The first potential manager of the auditee accepted the 
invitation during my first call. Two managers declined the invitation since they were not 
interested in the topic of my research. Two managers agreed to participation but then 
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asked to reschedule interviews (twice and every time for a week). Due to these 
postponing behaviors of two potential interviewees, I called three additional managers of 
auditees, all of which accepted my participation invitation. One of the two managers who 
postponed interviews ultimately declined study participation without explanation. Five 
managers of auditees ultimately participated in my study. 
Implementing the Interview Matrix 
I conducted 14 interviews from January 8 to February 28, 2020. The total time of 
interviews was approximately 12 hours (51.1 minutes per an interviewee on average), 
segmented as 2.4 hours explaining provisions of the Informed Consent Form and 
collecting demographic data and 9.6 hours for interview questions directly related to the 
studied phenomena, as it is demonstrated in Table 7. 
Table 7 
 




S – signed and 
V – verbal 
acknowledgments 
Date Mode Place Duration 
(minutes) 
AC01 S 01.08.2020 Face-to-face Café  65 
AC02 S 01.08.2020 Face-to-face Café 70 
AL03 S 01.09.2020 Face-to-face Café 50 
AL04 S 01.10.2020 Face-to-face Business center 45 
AC/L05 V 01.15.2020 Face-to-face Café 65 
PC06 V 01.16.2020 Face-to-face Personal office 50 
PC07 V 01.17.2020 Face-to-face Personal office 40 
PL08 V 01.20.2020 Face-to-face Personal office 40 
PL09 V 01.23.2020 Face-to-face Personal office 60 
MC10 V 02.11.2020 Phone  - 40 
MC11 V 02.14.2020 Phone - 45 
ML12 V 02.15.2020 Phone - 55 
ML13 V 02.15.2020 Phone - 40 




As illustrated in Table 7, I conducted ten interviews using a face-to-face 
technique. These interviews were conducted in private offices and private areas of cafes 
and business-centers. Four interviews were required to be conducted by phone. Four 
study participants signed the Informed Consent Form, and ten study participants verbally 
acknowledged that they agreed to the provisions of the Informed Consent Form but 
declined to provide signatures. 
Twelve interviewees did not express objections to be audio recorded. Two 
interviewees declined to be audio recorded but did accept that I could making detailed 
notes that were then member-checked for validity after the interviews were conducted. 
According to the Interview Protocol, I started audio recording after the introduction and 
demographic sections; this strategy contributed to maintaining trust and maintaining 
confidentiality in my communications with each study participant. 
Personal data and other participant identifiers were coded using letters and 
figures. I modified originally planned participants’ codes in order to incorporate needed 
changes regarding additional information collection that was not anticipated with my 
initial study design. For instance, I discovered that a few participants were experienced in 
performance audits conducted by both the central and local public audit organizations. To 
mask participants, I used letters A, P, and M depending on their roles in the process of 
performance auditing, i.e., auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians. The 
letters C and L were applied depending on where the participant and their organizations 
resided in the government’s public administration structure; central (C) or local levels 
(L). I applied the code C/L for masking participants who worked at central and then at 
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local organizations, and the code L/C for masking participants who worked at local and 
then at central organizations. Finally, I used figures from 01 to 14 as the serial number of 
participants. Thus, instead of the originally planned codes, such as Auditor – 1, Parliam – 
1, Manager – 1, I used modified coding, such as AC01, PC06, and MC10. For instance: 
▪ AC01 means that the study participant is an auditor who worked at central 
public audit organization, the first participant; 
▪ PL08 means that the study participant is parliamentarian who worked at the 
local legislative body, the eighth participant;  
▪ ML/C14 means that the study participant is the manager of an auditee who 
worked at local and then at central organization, the 14th participant. 
The study participants selected their preferred language for interviewing. I 
conducted six interviews in the Kazakh and Russian languages combined and eight 
interviews in the Russian language alone. I wrote 12 interview transcripts and two 
interview notes, and I printed them in Microsoft Word. I translated the significant 
statements and results of manual coding into the English language. As described in 
Chapter 3, my translations were verified by a translation agency according to our signed 
confidential agreement. 
I used the Interview Guide and Interview Protocol during all interviews, 
regardless of their mode. To collect rich data, I changed the sequence of interview 
questions and asked additional questions, depending on participants’ responses. I also 
asked some questions with the member checking objectives. 
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The study participants were active and expressed readiness for further 
communications in case of need. I reviewed 12 transcripts and concluded that 
interviewees clearly and exhaustively responded to all questions. Notes from two 
interviews were reviewed and accepted by respective participants during our meetings. 
I made notes in my interview journal using symbols to mark behavioral aspects 
and other results of my observations. Ten interviewees had previous experience in being 
interviewed; for the other four participants, it was the first experience in being 
interviewed. Despite these minor experience differences, all participants were open and 
friendly throughout our interview time. All participants operated on facts and examples 
from their lived experiences. However, parliamentarians often referred to theoretical and 
conceptual things, citing examples from various areas of public administration. Auditors 
mainly referred to applied things, but similar to the parliamentarians they operated on 
examples from various areas of public administration. Managers generally referred to 
legislative aspects and particularities in narrow (specific) areas of public administration. 
Private areas for face-to-face interviews and times of phone interviews, which were out 
of the business day, contributed to completing all 14 interviews effectively. 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
By applying approaches described in Chapter 3, I ensured the trustworthiness of 





Data of 14 semistructured phenomenological interviews were the central sources 
of information used for my study. Therefore, and to properly manage subjectivism issues 
that might lead to risks of gathering misinformation or inaccurate data, I used group 
characteristics and single sufficient case sampling methods to find and recruit the most 
suitable study participants. I checked the compliance of selected participants with both 
general and specific inclusion criteria when I prepared the list of potential participants 
and I verified these inclusion criteria during our first communication. I received 
exhaustive responses to all my questions which are, in turn, logically aligned with the 
research question. 
I carefully listened to all interviewees, made notes in my journal, and applied the 
member checking techniques during interviews by asking clarification and probing 
questions. As a result, 12 transcripts and two interview notes were compiled with rich 
descriptions of my participants’ experience in performance auditing. As such, I created a 
reliable contextual database with which to interpret meanings from their lived 
experiences closely aligned as to how they were shared. I also used prolonged 
engagement tactics to ensure the credibility of research findings. I communicated with 
each participant at least three times to recruit them (providing them with information 
related to my study), interview them (providing detailed explanations related to informed 




Performance auditing practices of internal auditors, private audit companies, 
local-level public audit organizations in other regions of Kazakhstan as well as 
performance auditing practices in other countries were out of the scope of my study. 
Nevertheless, using obtained thick descriptions and audit trails allowed me to illustrate 
for future scholars and practitioners how to use the research results assessing their 
applicability within other situations, other populations, and other timeframes. Instead of 
studying the lived experiences of a specific group of participants, I focused on and 
studied the lived experiences of three groups of participants who each play different roles 
in performance auditing and public administration (i.e., public auditors, parliamentarians, 
and senior-level managers of central ministries and local departments). Thus, the findings 
from my research may be replicable for exploring unstudied phenomena related 
specifically to performance auditing and to the wider public administration discipline. 
Finally, I was able to improve transferability by following critical guidance and 
constructs from the phenomenological approach and interpretive analyses. 
Dependability 
Like credibility and transferability, dependability was supported by using thick 
descriptions and audit trials. I created detailed documentation to make my research work 
transparent. Using the alignment between research stages based on my constructed 
literature review and maintained through the constructs of my theoretical framework, I 
was able to collect, organize, and manage data systematically. For instance, I created 
separate working files for my primary and secondary data and the interview transcripts 
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were saved separately as Microsoft Word and Microsoft Excel working files. I stored all 
the documents as password-protected files on my computer. 
To analyze and interpret data analysis results, I used techniques on the 
visualization of a large amount of complex and multi-sources information, e.g., 
comparative tables, dynamic charts, and cyclic diagrams. Finally, I used both manual and 
computer-based data processing and analyzing methods. 
Confirmability 
To derive the results of my research from the lived experiences of my 
participants, I used bracketing approach to collect and preliminarily analyze collected 
data and, then, ‘unbracketing’ approach. I applied the unbracketing approach to evaluate 
data collected from multiple sources in a neutral and objective approach. Even being 
committed to performance auditing ideology, I recognize that the performance auditing is 
not a panacea. As a researcher, my objective was to collect data from multiple sources 
without bias (see Moustakas, 1994; Patton, 2015, for more). Therefore, I collected data 
from all key participants and users of performance audits including auditors, 
parliamentarians, and managers of auditees. 
I deployed multiple methods to reduce bias during both collecting and analyzing 
data. During my communications with my participants, I remained neutral and did not 
exert pressure on them. Awareness of my participants related to their rights on voluntary 
participation, the possibility to withdraw from the study at any stage, for any reason and 
without explanations, and exclusion of sanctions for withdrawal significantly contributed 
to building a trusting relationship. Using the study participants’ quotes contributed to the 
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confirmability as well (see Lincoln & Guba, 1985, for more). Each participant, along 
with their responses to my questions, was allowed to speak freely regardless of the 
questions asked. 
To ensure the reliability of used resources, truthfulness, and applicability of my 
research results, I used triangulation to investigate related themes and potential 
differences (see Patton, 2015, for more). Together with the interview data, including 
transcripts and my journal entries for observing interviewees, I used peer-reviewed and 
official documents of government organizations that are related to the topic of my 
research. For systematic data collection, I used my created tools to include the Interview 
Guide, Interview Protocol, and Interview Matrix. By monitoring and analyzing the 
similarities and differences between the participants’ data, between the participants’ data 
and secondary data, as well as marking the repeated information and the lack of new 
information, I was able to draw conclusions related to data saturation. 
Data Analysis 
Applied Strategies and Techniques 
I analyzed the collected data by using strategies defined at the initiation stage of 
my study. Firstly, I analyzed participants’ data and secondary data separately; secondly, I 
intergraded the results of these analyses to create a holistic and reliable view on the 
phenomena under study. 
I adopted Moustakas’s (1994) method on analyzing the phenomenological data. 
Moustakas (1994) suggested using a modification of Van Kaam’s or Stevick-Colaizzi-
Keen’s method for data analyses and interpretation (pp. 120-124). These methods differ 
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by application of a researcher’s experience with phenomenological data interpretation. I 
combined these two modified methods in the following way: 
1) I used bracketing to keep a distance from my experience during data 
collection and preliminarily data analysis, i.e., before the interpretation of 
final results; 
2) I incorporated the thematic analysis method to generate and validate themes 
associated with the studied phenomena; 
3) I used the ‘unbracketing’ approach to critically interpret specific results of my 
study, including discrepancies between data from different sources; 
4) I kept to the following algorithm: 
a. To be familiar with the raw data (epoch); 
b. To generate themes based on significant statements 
(phenomenological reduction); 
c. To create textual and structural descriptions related to the phenomena 
under study (imaginative variation); 
d. To consolidate the research findings by the composition of textual and 
structural descriptions. (Moustakas, 1994; Van Manen, 2014) 
For data analysis, I used an inductive approach that implies making analytical 
interpretations based on the collected data and by referencing my personal experience 
(see Moustakas, 1994, for more). While the modification of the Van Kaam’s method 
implies distancing from a researcher’s and, vice versa, the modification of Stevick-
Colaizzi-Keen’s method implies using a researcher’s experience; I did not use my 
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knowledge and experience as a source of information to analyze. It would lead to 
cognitive dissonance between the two methods. So, I modified my data analysis strategy 
by referring to my experience to interpret discrepancies between the data collected from 
different sources. 
I analyzed data manually and by utilizing NVivo 12 Plus for qualitative data 
analyses. I wrote and printed 12 transcripts and two interviews notes in Microsoft Word. 
Before transcribing, I listened each audio records at least two times. Utilizing NVivo 12 
Plus, I translated all significant statements and results of my manual analysis from the 
Kazakh and Russian languages into the English language. Like the primary data, I 
analyzed the secondary data in the original language of the document, i.e., in the Kazakh 
or Russian languages; I then translated all significant statements and results of manual 
coding into the English language. The translation of all data was inadvisable since they 
were voluminous and contained insignificant statements. I reviewed translations multiple 
times to ensure and minimize the risks of loss or alteration of original data due to 
translation errors or contextual misinterpretations between the spoken interview scripts 
and their eventual reduction to English text. 
All codes were assigned based on my collected data thus avoiding a process of 
creating pre-codes for thematic matching. Table 8 illustrates how I assigned both 
descriptive and conceptual codes based on my in vivo coding approach, i.e., codes 





Examples of Assigned Descriptive and Concept Codes  
Participants’ 
Codes 
Raw data (extracts from 
interview transcripts) 
Concept codes Descriptive codes 
AC01 In other words, we decide on 
the conduction of performance 
audits when we develop the list 
of auditees for a planning year. 
performance 
audit 
list of auditees 
planning 
making decision on 
performance audits 
annual planning of 
performance audits 
PC06 Sometimes we request public 
audit organizations to provide 
as with the information about 
the results of their audits. But 
we have right to send our 









procedure on requesting 
audit results  
legislative body’s 
procedure on requesting 
other information; [results 
of audits are in demand: 
parliamentarians’ 
perspective] 
AL03 In 2018 we conducted 
performance audits in response 
to citizens’ complaints… 
increasing their complaints. We 
know about their complaints 







making decision on 
performance audits; 
[performance audits are in 
demand: citizens’ 
perspective] 
using open government 
systems to plan 
performance audits and 
respond to citizens  
ML/C14 Any auditors’ visits are stressful 
for me. The main problem is 
that we have many tasks that 
should be done in any case... I 
mean it doesn’t depend on 







managers of auditees and 
auditors 
stress response to audit 
impact on working order 
 
I used a value coding approach as it helped to evaluate and provide context to 
perceived demand for and effects of performance audits and my participant’s attitude 
toward these phenomena. When assigning codes and generating themes, I considered 
each participants’ statement to be of equal importance, and I then conducted a deeper 
review to identify those statements illustrating more significance to the collective 
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participant group than others. I used alignment with the research question as a landmark 
for confirming the significance of statements and reliability of themes. 
I used Microsoft Word in both cycles of coding, identification of significant 
statements, selection of the study participants’ quotes in order to use them further as my 
evidence base. Color coding, tables, and diagrams were used to assign codes, formulate 
categories, and generate themes. Next, I used Microsoft Excel to evaluate codes, 
categories, and themes in terms of their validity and alignment with the research question. 
I used spreadsheets to identify similarities and differences among codes and categories 
and to create the descriptive statistics of the research results. For instance, I quickly 
calculated the number of codes and identified the dominance of specific themes. At the 
final stage, I utilized NVivo 12 Plus to check the results of manual analytical work and 
provide a visualization of the results analyses. 
Consolidated Statistics of Data Analysis Results 
I assigned 7,494 codes as the result of the 1st cycle of coding and 1,085 concept 
and descriptive codes as the results of the 2nd cycle of coding. I then created 97 
categories focusing on the research question. Based on textual and structural descriptions, 
I generated 11 themes related to the perceived factors of demand for performance audits 
in Kazakhstan and seven themes and two sub-themes related to the perceived impact of 
performance audits on Kazakhstani system of public administration. Eighteen themes and 
two sub-themes were divided into six patterns associated with the studied phenomena in 
general. As demonstrated in Figure 11, I derived six patterns associated with the studied 
phenomena from 7,494 codes, applying the technique of phenomenological reduction. 
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Figure 11. The aggregated results of phenomenological reduction 
 
I created all categories based on significant statements. Whereas participants 
belonged to three different groups, a specific theme might be nonessential for one group 
and essential for the other two groups. Therefore, I generated themes under the following 
conditions: 
(a) the frequency of categories associated with a potential theme is one or more, 
in one group of participants; and  
(b) the frequency of categories associated with a potential theme is nine or more 
in three groups of participants. 
1st cycle codes = 
7494
2nd cycle codes = 
1085
categories = 97




I identified that participants of performance audits and other key participants of 
public administration create the demand for performance audits (the 1st pattern). The 
features of the system of public auditing (the 2nd pattern) and problems in public 
administration (the 3rd pattern) emerged as influential factors helping to explain the 
demand for performance audits in Kazakhstan. According to the lived experience of 
participants, performance audits impact performance auditors, managers of auditees, and 
parliamentarians (the 4th pattern), audit organizations and auditees, i.e., audited 
organizations (the 5th pattern), and these audits have macrolevel impact (the 6th pattern), 
as it is illustrated Figure 12, which has been created by using the initial outline described 




























































































Aggregated Results of Data Analysis  
The research question:  
What are the lived experiences and perceptions of performance auditors, managers of auditees, 
and parliamentarians, the key participants and users of performance audits, regarding the 
demand for and impacts of these audits on Kazakhstan’s public administration? 
 
The perceived factors of demand for 
performance audits in Kazakhstan 
The perceived impact of performance audits on 
Kazakhstani system of public administration 
 
code name code Name 
 
Pattern 1 
Who creates demand for 
audits 
Pattern 1 
Impact on participants of 
audits 
Theme 111 
Auditors prefer performance 
audits 
Theme 211 Impact on auditors  
Theme 112 
Parliamentarians need in 
performance audits 
Theme 212 









Managers of auditees use 
performance audits’ results  
Pattern 2 
Impact on audit 
organizations and auditees 
Theme 115 
Citizens and media shape the 
demand for performance 
audits 
Theme 221 
Changes in audit 
organizations 
Pattern 2 
Features of the system of 
public auditing 
Theme 222 Changes in auditees 
Theme 121 
Legitimization of 
performance audits  
Pattern 3 Macrolevel impact 
Theme 122 
Adaptation of international 
experience  
Theme 231 Improved budget process  
Pattern 3 
Problems in public 
administration 
Theme 232 










Risks of new areas 
 
Sub-theme 234 
Requested changes in 
performance auditors’ 
work Theme 134 







Perceived Central Concepts 
Auditors, when sharing their experiences, most often used the words audit 
(audits) and performance. I found these words were used most in their sense of 
performance audit, and it is explained mainly by auditors’ central role in a performance 
auditing process – starting from initiation and planning audits till submission of audit 
reports to the end users. Next by frequency were the words compliance, auditees, and 
budget. The word compliance was frequently used in the sense of compliance audit. In 
most cases, auditors used this concept to express their preferences between compliance 
and performance audits. The words budget and auditees were often used by auditors in 
the sense object of and subject of performance audits, respectively. Figure 13 illustrates 
how I distilled central concepts related to my studied phenomena from auditors’ 
perspectives based on their [concepts] thematic size (weighted percentage of the words 
audits (audit) was 4.23%, performance – 2.37%, compliance – 0.70%, auditees – 0.65%, 
and budget – 0.58%), applying NVivo Plus analysis techniques. 
Figure 13. Perceived central concepts of auditors 
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Like auditors, parliamentarians often used the words audit (audits) and 
performance in the sense of performance audit. However, within the parliamentarian 
group these descriptive words were mainly explained to be related to the implementation 
of parliamentary oversight functions. Next by frequency was the word budget. 
Parliamentarians often used that concept to share their experiences in using auditors’ 
work to approve budgets of the central and local governments and audit organizations’ 
annual reports submitted to legislative bodies as a monetary measure of performance 
success. Parliamentarians also often used the word result to share their perceptions 
related to the expected effectiveness of government programs and projects. Finally, as 
demonstrated in Figure 14, parliamentarians frequently used the words auditors, 
parliamentarians, and government with the same frequency. 
Figure 14. Perceived central concepts of parliamentarians 
 
As illustrated in Figure 15, the third and final participant group, managers of 
auditees, often used the word auditors. This descriptive word was mainly related to 
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managers’ perceptions associated with their interactions with auditors. Next by frequency 
were the words audit (audits) and performance, and managers used these words in the 
sense of performance audit less often than auditors and parliamentarians. The concept of 
performance audit was used by managers of auditees to share their views about the 
absence of significant differences between performance and compliance audits. Often, 
managers used the concept of performance to tell stories about their organizations’ 
achievements. Managers often used the word budget to share their experiences on 
participation in budget processes, such as planning and implementing the budget 
programs.  
Figure 15. Perceived central concepts of managers of auditees 
 
The concept of performance audit was central for many of the participants, as it is 
demonstrated in Figure 16; that concept was introduced in the course of implementing 
NPM (see Jacobs, 1998; Funnell, 1997; Morin, 2001, for more). Participants’ perceptions 
associated with the budget concepts are also related to NPM; e.g., auditors shared their 
experiences in evaluating the effectiveness of budget programs, parliamentarians – on 
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oversight over the budget process, and managers – on adapting result-oriented budgets. 
Finally, unlike completing the processes, achieving the results is one of the central 
performance indicators introduced by NPM (see Hood, 1991, for more). 
In sharing their lived experiences, 100% of interviewees identified specific 
aspects of auditors, auditees, and parliamentarians’ interactions. Auditors and managers 
mainly focused on their interpersonal interactions, whereas parliamentarians more 
specifically discussed the interaction of government’s role and responsibilities. In all 
cases, participants’ experiences were linked with PAM, i.e., the model of interactions 


















Figure 16. Perceived central concepts of all participants 
 
Perceived Factors of Demand for Performance Audits 
According to experiences of 12 participants (85.7%), the scope of performance 
audits conducted in Kazakhstan in 2016–2019 across the entire public sector was 
increased. Secondary data analysis illustrated this same trend. In 2016–2019, Kazakhstani 
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public audit organizations undertook more than 400 performance audits covering more 
than 1,600 auditees per year. As demonstrated in Table 10, the audited areas of public 
administration included state planning (i.e., performance audits of state programs, 
programs of development of regions, strategic plans of central ministries, and 
development plans of state-owned companies), budget planning, tax administration, 
infrastructure and investment projects in core sectors of the economy (i.e., subsoil use, 
agriculture, construction, transport and communications, healthcare, and education), and 
programs specific to social care for citizens. 
Table 10 
 
Performance Auditing Statistics in Kazakhstan 




weighted (%)  
65 65 55 60 
Areas of public 
administration covered 



























weighted (%)  
40 45 45 60 
Areas of public 
administration covered 






















social care for 
citizens 
Note: ACCERB (n.d.); RCNC (n.d.); RCAR (n.d.); RCAR (n.d.); RCAR (n.d.); RCAR (n.d.); RCWKR (n.d.); RCZR 





Pattern 1: Who creates demand for audits. Themes 111 to 115 illustrated 
evidence that auditors, managers of auditees, parliamentarians, and the key participants of 
public administration, such as the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, citizens, and 
media create demand for performance audits, as it is demonstrated in Figure 17. 
Figure 17. Visualization of themes on Pattern 1 by the frequency of categories 
 
The need of parliamentarians for performance audits is the most influential factor 
of demand for these audits; all five themes emerged in three groups of participants with 





















Theme 113 - President
prioritize performance
audits




Theme 115 - Citizens
and media shape the
demand for performance
audits





Pattern 1: Matrix of Themes and Frequency of Associated Categories 
















Parliamentarians need in 
performance audits 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
4 of 4 
(100%) 
2 of 5 
(40%) 
11 of 14 
(78.6%) 
35.8% 
Theme 111: Auditors 
prefer performance audits 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
4 of 4 
(100%) 
4 of 5 
(80%) 
13 of 14 
(92.9%) 
22.0% 
Theme 113: President 
prioritize performance 
audits 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
2 of 4 
(50%) 
4 of 5 
(80%) 
11 of 14 
(78.6%) 
18.9% 
Theme 114: Managers of 
auditees use performance 
audits’ results 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
2 of 4 
(50%) 
2 of 5 
(40%) 
9 of 14 
(64.3%) 
11.9% 
Theme 115: Citizens and 
media shape the demand 
for performance audits 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
2 of 4 
(50%) 
3 of 5 
(60%) 




Parliamentarians need in performance audits. All auditors stated that 
parliamentarians use performance audits. Two auditors more specifically described that 
parliamentarians, who are members of the central legislative body, do not directly request 
conduction of performance audits; however, they often request information about 
performance audits. In turn, three auditors noted that members of Maslikhat request the 
local audit organization to conduct performance audits and actively participate in the 
meetings of this organization on considering performance audits’ results. AL04 argued 
that parliamentarians are more interested in performance audits rather than in compliance 
audits. “Performance audit provokes intensive discussions, and that’s why it is interesting 
to deputies. We audit areas with unresolved issues, problematic issues that are topical. 
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Then, these problems become high on the agenda of parliamentary hearings” (AL04, 
personal communication, January 10, 2020). All auditors stated that parliamentarians are 
interested in the results of performance audits included in annual reports of audit 
organizations submitted to the Parliament and Maslikhats. According to three of the five 
auditors, parliamentarians are awaiting reports from their organizations longingly. 
Auditors’ perceptions were generally in line with parliamentarians’ views. Three 
of the four parliamentarians send requests to audit organizations in order to provide them 
[parliamentarians] with information about performance audits, and all four 
parliamentarians used the results of performance audits in their policy making activities. 
PC07 shared experiences on using the results of performance audits to lodge deputy 
inquiries and send related requests to the Prime Minister, central ministries, and agencies. 
PL09 shared experiences on using the performance audits’ results in making legislative 
proposals. Three parliamentarians opted for performance audits comparing the 
compliance and financial audits with performance audits. “It is important to conduct 
more and more performance audits… Compliance and financial audits is an area of 
interests for ministers and heads of departments. They all are about routine things. I am 
not very interested in such things” (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020). 
Three parliamentarians reasoned that performance audits will be in demand in the 
future. 
So far, we have not practiced sending the requests on the conduction of 
performance audits to the Accounts Committee… [thinking]… but in the future, 
probably, it will be realized, because we are preparing the package of bills to 
125 
 
strengthen parliamentary oversight. In my point of view, the strengthening of 
parliamentary oversight should also include the practice of requesting audits. 
(PC06, personal communication, January 16, 2020) 
Unlike auditors and parliamentarians, managers of auditees were less active on 
Theme 112. Two of the five managers shared their opinion about using the performance 
audits by parliamentarians. They gained related experiences when they receive deputy 
inquiries and attend the meetings of audit organizations on considering the performance 
audits’ results. 
Auditors prefer performance audits. All auditors are experienced in initiating the 
performance audits, and they emphasized that suggestions on the conduction of 
performance audits, as a rule, are supported by auditors and senior-level managers of 
their organizations. “Since we are a collegial body, all decisions made collectively... 
almost always, proposals on performance audits are accepted unanimously” (AL04, 
personal communication, January 10, 2020). Telling about the conduction of compliance 
and performance audits, auditors noted the advantages of compliance audits in six cases 
and the advantages of performance audits in 14 cases. When I asked them to select their 
preference of compliance or performance audits, all five auditors opted for performance 
audits. 
There were no situations when my colleagues did not support ideas on 
performance audits… I suggested a few topics for the future, for example, 
performance audits on the Sustainable Development Goals. We cannot manage 
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this kind of audits today because of a lack of resources, but we will do them in the 
future. (AC/L05, personal communication, January 15, 2020) 
AC01 and AL04 also noted that a few decisions on postponing the proposed 
performance audits for the midterm were made due to a lack of auditors. Therefore, like 
parliamentarians (Theme 112), auditors might continue to create the demand for 
performance audits (Theme 111). 
The frequency of categories on Theme 111 in the groups of parliamentarians and 
managers was 7 in each group (20.0% out of the frequency of categories associated with 
Theme 111 in all three groups). Unlike auditors, they were less active in discussing the 
auditors’ interests in performance audits. As PL08 noted, auditors conduct more 
performance audits because of the “political motivations of leaders of audit 
organizations” (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020). “A performance audit 
is the most popular trend among auditors; performance audits are mainstream activities of 
all audit organizations in our country” (ML12, personal communication, February 15, 
2020). 
President prioritize performance audits. Eleven interviewees (78.6%) were 
experienced in performance audits conducted by audit organizations in response to the 
instructions of the President. 
AC01 stated that including the performance audits in audit organizations’ plans is 
a priority since “…per the recent message from the Head of State, we need to get away 
from conduction of current controls and we have to conduct more and more and more 
performance audits” (AC01, personal communication, January 8, 2020). Similar 
127 
 
references to prioritizing the performance audits by the President made the other three 
auditors. AL04 emphasized that “if we receive the instruction of the President 
Administration to undertake a performance audit, then we include that audit in our plan 
without fail” (AL04, personal communication, January 10, 2020). All five auditors noted 
that they participated in performance audits requested by the President Administration; 
three auditors shared their experiences on performance audits conducted in response to 
the President’s instructions during the days of our interviews. “Now, I’m participating in 
the audit of quasi-public companies requested by the President. I know that other audit 
organizations in parallel with us work on the same requests” (AC02, personal 
communications, January 8, 2020). 
Influencing the demand for performance audits by the President’s instructions as 
the theme on Pattern 1 emerged in the experiences of two parliamentarians. PC07 stated, 
“multiple times I and my colleagues from deputy corps questioned the effectiveness of 
our national companies, but only now the auditors are stepping up and this, of course, is 
because they received an order from President” (PC07, personal communication, January 
17, 2020). 
Four of the five managers associated conducting the performance audits with the 
President’s instructions. “Audit organizations, no difference, Accounts Committee or 
Revisions Commissions, they all in the case of President’s criticism of the work of 
ministries or state companies or instructions from the President Administration respond 
by their audits” (МL/С14, personal communication, February 28, 2020). Two managers 
shared their experience of working together with auditors on the instructions from the 
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President Administration. In one case, health professionals were included in the team of 
auditors, and internal auditors of the Ministry of Healthcare transferred their reports to 
the Accounts Committee. In another case, several central ministries create the working 
group on the evaluation of state-owned companies. 
Citizens and media shape the demand for performance audits. Based on the 
lived experiences of nine participants (64.3%), I concluded that citizens and media, to a 
certain degree, shape the demand for performance audits in Kazakhstan. 
All five auditors stated that some performance audits were conducted in their 
organizations due to citizens’ constraints and needs. “There are a lot of complaints year 
after year. In 2018 we conducted performance audits in response to citizens’ complaints 
on the provision of urban amenities; they were unhappy with the quality of landscaping 
and so forth” (AL03, personal communication, January 9, 2020). 
We initiated the performance audit on safety-net programs for people with 
disabilities. All supported that suggestion without any objections because it is 
important, and we did it. And, recently, measures on social support for large 
families, pensioners, and children have been very much discussed or even 
criticized in our city. That’s why we conduct our audits. (AL04, personal 
communication, January 10, 2020) 
Three auditors mentioned that they use media publications in making decisions on 
performance audits. 
We study journalists’ articles and monitor media publications. It is required by 
our rules. It helps us to make our decisions on our audits. Today, working with the 
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government’s reports or auditees’ accounting documents is not enough to propose 
a good performance audit. I mean a useful performance audit. (AC/L05, personal 
communication, January 15, 2020) 
Three auditors shared their experiences on interactions with media; according to 
their perceptions, the media actively use their performance audits’ results. As AC02 
noted, journalists accept invitations to the meetings of audit organizations and actively 
use audits’ results in their investigations. 
Two parliamentarians referred to the needs of citizens, including users of public 
services, when they shared their views about the importance of performance audits.  
Citizens’ needs are important. By auditing the effectiveness of the efforts of our 
governments in addressing citizens’ problems, auditors provide us with good 
materials. Auditors should continue to focus their efforts on social problems, 
problems of residents of our city. (PL09, personal communication, January 23, 
2020) 
Two managers shared their opinions on using the performance audits by media; in 
both cases, their experiences were related to publishing resonant articles based on 
auditors’ work. 
Managers of auditees use performance audits’ results. Unlike the previous four 
themes on Pattern 1, Theme 114 is less highlighted; but, 10 participants (71.4%) shared 
views on using the results of performance audits by managers of auditees. 
Four auditors (80%) stated that managers of auditees did not request performance 
audits formally, and two auditors shared their expediencies when managers of central 
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ministries requested audits informally. “I know that they ask for audits, but they did not 
do it by official requests, by sending letters. They ask for audits informally by phone 
calls… [smiling]…” (AC02, personal communication, January 8, 2020). Two auditors 
mentioned that newly appointed ministries request audits to be aware of operations 
completed before their appointment. 
They must minimize the risks of financial violations, but they are interested in all 
things that could be criticized by performance auditors as well. Here, I want to 
add that only new ministries request audits, and they do it informally. (AC/L05, 
personal communication, January 15, 2020) 
All five auditors argued that managers of auditees used the results of their works 
because most of their recommendations were implemented by auditees. AC02 shared the 
experience of using the performance audits’ results by managers of auditees. 
I see that now they perceive our work as a means to achieve their objectives or 
address their problems. It was, let’s say, managers’ poor dealing with their old 
problems, and they were unable to solve these problems themselves, without us. 
(AC02, personal communication, January 8, 2020) 
Two parliamentarians stated that using the results of audits depends on both 
managers and auditors. “Ministries or chairs of central agencies are different. Few 
ministries use the auditors’ work in the right way, I see it because of their reactions to our 
questions, but the others are not so active” (PC06, personal communication, January 16, 
2020). “Some chairs are pro-active, while the others, unfortunately, they represent the 
majority, respond to performance audit results sluggishly. Honestly, I have to say that in 
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some cases auditors’ work caused that kind of reaction” (PL08, personal communication, 
January 20, 2020). 
“About using the audits, it is the right direction. As one of the key players in 
budget processes, our ministry is interested in performance audits ... criticism, of course, 
is unpleasant. But we are interested in an external assessment” (MC10, personal 
communication, February 11, 2020). Other managers’ perceptions, however, mainly 
relate to the requirements of legislation on implementing auditors’ instructions. “For us, it 
is like a functional task because we must review that audit report, we must implement 
instructions. We try to implement auditors’ instructions, but we have more freedom with 
recommendations” (ML12, personal communication, February 15, 2020). 
Pattern 2: Features of the system of public auditing. According to the lived 
experience of participants, features of the system of public auditing in Kazakhstan is 
another factor that explains the demand for performance audits, including the 
legitimization of performance audits (Theme 121) and adapting an international practice 
(Theme 122). As demonstrated in Table 12, the legitimization of performance audit is 
more of an influential factor than demanding the performance audits to be done. 
Legitimization of performance audits. According to the experience of 12 (85.7%) 
participants, demanding performance audits in Kazakhstan is related to the legitimization 
of these audits, i.e., audit organizations conduct more performance audits because they 
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5 of 5 
(100%) 
4 of 4 
(100%) 
3 of 5 
(60%) 
12 of 14 
(85.7%) 
73.2% 
Theme 122: Adaptation of 
international experience 
3 of 5 
(60%) 
3 of 4 
(75%) 
2 of 5 
(40%) 




When I asked auditors about making decisions on performance audits, all five 
auditors started sharing their experiences from the planning audits, making multiple 
references on the Public Auditing Law or on the Rules on Conduction of Public Audits 
by External Public Audit Organizations. As AC/L05 noted, “We have the mandate … to 
express an opinion on the Government’s report over execution of the republican budget 
and, so, we have to annually conduct performance audits on budget revenues…” 
(AC/L05, personal communication, January 15, 2020). Auditors, when answering other 
questions, also referred to mandates of their organizations to conduct performance audits. 
Three auditors claimed that their organizations plan and conduct more performance 
audits because the introduction of these types of audits is a priority state policy spelled 
out in strategies and concepts. Finally, AL04 stated that “to comply with 
recommendations of the Coordinating Council of Public Audit Bodies, established under 
the auspices of the Accounts Committee, audit organizations should strive to ensure that 
more than 70% of their audit activities related to performance audits” (AL04, personal 
communication, January 10, 2020). 
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Like auditors, all parliamentarians connected the increased number of 
performance audits with empowering of audit organizations. In most cases, 
parliamentarians referred to audit organizations’ conclusions on governments’ reports 
detailing execution of the republican and local budgets. All four parliamentarians stated 
that audit organizations’ conclusions are made based on performance audits results; they 
support it. Two parliamentarians reasoned that audit organizations have a wide range of 
mandates, and it allowed those audit organizations to enhance influence in 
parliamentarian decision making. 
In describing the experience of interactions with auditors, three of the five 
managers referred to auditors’ mandates to undertake performance audits. 
They visit our ministry every year. Every year. Before we saw them less often. Of 
course, I understand their objectives. They visit us to gather facts on budget 
execution and to report to Parliament. Auditors also need to report on how they 
cope with their mandates… [smiling]. (MC10, personal communication, February 
11, 2020) 
Adaptation of international experience. The adaptation of audit practices of 
foreign countries, as revealed in the experience of 8 participants (57.1%), also can be 
interpreted as one of the influential factors of demanding the performance audit in 
Kazakhstan. In particular, auditors and parliamentarians shared their perceptions about 
the practices of United Kingdom (three times), the United States and Latvia (two times), 
and Australia and Canada (one time). 
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According to the experiences of three auditors, introducing performance audit 
developments in their organizations are due to adapting international practices. 
I participated in international seminars, and I liked how auditors from various 
countries, for example, Canada and Latvia, presented their achievements in 
studying the environmental issues within their performance audits. We did not 
conduct such audits. So, I suggested to conduct environmental performance 
audits, and all supported my idea. (AC/L05, personal communication, January 15, 
2020) 
However, negative perceptions were shared by auditors in terms of adapting these 
international experiences. As AL04 mentioned, “… we use international practice to 
conduct our performance audits, study different methods, and we try to apply them, but 
we do not succeed in some cases…” (AL04, personal communication, January 10, 2020). 
Three parliamentarians were well aware of the adaptation of international 
practices by audit organizations. As PL08 noted, “I know that auditors travel to foreign 
countries, study international experience, they do it to develop their own rules and 
internal work to improve their performance audits” (PL08, personal communication, 
January 20, 2020). Unlike auditors, all three parliamentarians spoke positively about the 
practice of adapting world experience, and two parliamentarians argued the need to 
continue implementing the best international practice. “In Great Britain, they also have a 
unitary state. Nevertheless, their Parliament reviews the materials of each performance 
audit. The same practice in Latvia. I would also like to have such a practice in our 
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country” (PC06, personal communication, January 16, 2020). Two managers also shared 
their experiences associated with international practice. 
We worked on the draft concept on the introduction of public auditing. The 
implementation of this concept implies using international practice, including the 
benchmarks in performance auditing. But our auditors are still very far from the 
best experiences. It is my, may be very subjective, but my view. (MC 10, personal 
communication, February 11, 2020) 
Secondary data analysis on Theme 121 resulted in the following conclusion. The 
national standards on performance auditing are generally in line with the Performance 
Audit Principles, also known as ISSAI 300. Review of themes illustrated few differences 
between the compared standards. These differences are interpreted to be not significant; 
they are not-matching aspects of ISSAI 300 as regulated by the National standards on 
public auditing or the Rules of conduction of external public audit, as it is illustrated in 
Table 13. 
I also compared the provisions of performance audits reports of the Accounts 
Committee and the Revision Commission on Nur-Sultan city (by two reports from each 
organization) published in January and February 2020 with the provisions of performance 
audits reports of the SAIs of Australia, the United States, and United Kingdom (by two 
reports from each country) published in the same period, and two reports of the SAI of 
Canada published in December 2019. Table 14 illustrates the main results of comparing 





Results of Comparing Performance Auditing Standards 
National standards International standards 
Conclusions 100. Procedural standard – extracts 
and descriptions  
ISSAI 300 - Performance Audit 
Principles – extracts 
Audit objective 
… expression an independent, competent, and 
objective opinion on economy, effectiveness, 
and efficiency in an audited area... 
…constructively to promote 






tax and custom administration, budget 
planning and execution, assets 
management, implementation 
strategic documents, pricing and 
public procurement, public debt 
management, using the grants, 
investments, and loans, environmental 
protection, information technologies, 
auditees’ activities 
… need not be limited to specific 
programmes, entities or funds but can 
include activities… or existing 
situations… Examples might be service 
delivery by the responsible 
parties or the effects of government 
policy and regulations on 
administration, stakeholders, 





Audit team selects result-, problem- 
or system-oriented approaches or a 
combination these approaches. 
… a result-, problem- or system-





Audit team use the basic criteria, 
including the criteria related to the 
principles of economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness, and specific criteria. 
… suitable criteria which correspond to 
the audit questions and are related to 





Audit organizations develop 
perspectives plan for performance 
auditing through identifying potential 
performance audit topics based on the 
study of public management system. 
Auditors should select audit topics 
through the SAI’s strategic planning 
process by analysing potential topics 
and conducting research to identify 




Recommendations and follow-up 
recommendations and 
follow-up related are 
included in the list of 
objectives of performance 
audit 
…provide constructive recommendations that are 
likely to contribute significantly to addressing the 
weaknesses or problems identified by the audit  
Auditors should follow up previous audit findings 




*Provided references to the Rules 
of conduction of external public 
audit. 
Auditors should seek to make their reports 
widely accessible, in accordance with the 









Results of Comparing Performance Audit Reports 





Audit objective is related to evaluation of economical, effective and efficient governance  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes no significant differences 
Auditee scope is not limited specific programmes, entities or funds  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes no significant differences 
Audit criteria is related to evaluation of economical, effective and efficient governance 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes no significant differences 
Recommendations is related to addressing the weaknesses or problems identified by the audit 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes no significant differences 
Follow-up related info incorporated into audit reports 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes no significant differences 
Note: Australia: Audit report 1: Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Participation Targets in Major Procurements, 
National Indigenous Australians Agency (ANAO, 2020a); Audit report 2: Management of Spectrum Reallocation to 
Support the Deployment of 5G Services, Department of Communications and the Arts Australian Communications and 
Media Authority (ANAO, 2020b). Canada: Audit report 1: Call Centres, Department for Employment and Social 
Development Canada (OAG, 2019a); Audit report 2: Departmental Progress in Implementing Sustainable Development 
Strategies, Across Departments (OAG, 2019b). Kazakhstan: Audit report 1: Using the Republic Budget’s Funds and 
Assets Allocated for Exploration and Subsoil Use Sectors, The Ministry of Energy of the Republic of Kazakhstan 
(ACCERB, 2020a); Audit report 2: Using Budget Funds Allocated for the Development of Kostanay Region 
(ACCERB, 2020b); Audit report 3: Implementing the Action Plan for State Program on Development of Education and 
Science in the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2016-2019 and Material and Technical Equipment of Educational 
Organizations in Nur-Sultan city (RCNC, 2020a); Audit report 4: Communal Property and Assets Management of the 
JSC “Social-Entrepreneurial Corporation “Astana” (RCNC, 2020b). The USA: Audit report 1: Enhanced Federal 
Information Sharing on Coordination Could Improve Rural Transit Services, The Federal Transit Administration 
(USGAO, 2020a); Audit report 2: Opportunities Exist to Address Water Quality Problems, International Boundary and 
Water Commission (USGAO, 2020b). UK: Audit report 1: Business support schemes, Department for Business, 
Energy & Industrial Strategy (UKNAO, 2020a); Audit report 2: Local authority investment in commercial property, 
Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government (UKNAO, 2020b). 
 
While performance auditing practices and approaches to write performance audit 
reports vary depending on the features of public administration, powers, and traditions of 
public audit organizations, I made fragmentary analysis using a few core aspects of 
performance auditing outlined in ISSAI 300 (see Barton et al., 2019; Jantz et al., 2015; 
Rosa et al., 2014a; Tillema & Bogt, 2016; Torres et al., 2019, for more). So, as 
demonstrated in Table 14, this content evaluation illuminated some similarities in 
approaches to performance audits of the compared countries. 
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Pattern 3: Problems in public administration. Problems in public 
administration (Pattern 3) is the most influential factor on demanding performance audits 
in Kazakhstan compared to the previous two patterns. According to the lived experience 
of participants, the demand for performance audits is explained by problems in state 
planning (Theme 131), systems problems in various sectors of the economy (Theme 132), 
risks of new areas (Theme 133), and the need in the evaluation of the effectiveness of 
government programs and activities (Theme 134). As demonstrated in Figure 18 and 
Table 15, the most highlighted theme is Theme 132, at the same time, all four themes on 
Pattern 3 emerged in all participant groups with different levels of frequency. 
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Theme 132:  
Systems’ problems 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
4 of 4 
(100%) 
4 of 5 
(80%) 
13 of 14 
(92.8%) 
45.5% 
Theme 131:  
State planning 
4 of 5 
(80%) 
3 of 4 
(75%) 
3 of 5 
(60%) 
10 of 14 
(71.4%) 
25.8% 
Theme 134:  
Needs in evaluating the 
effectiveness 
4 of 5 
(80%) 
3 of 4 
(75%) 
1 of 5 
(20%) 
8 of 14 
(57.1%) 
16.3% 
Theme 133:  
Risks of new areas 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
2 of 4 
(50%) 
1 of 5 
(20%) 




Systems’ problems. When asked about the justification of performance audits and 
their advantages, 13 participants (92.8%) specifically shared their views about problems 
in public administration, such as issues in public financial management, including budget 
deficits and ineffective budget spending, regional problems, and sectoral development 
lags. 
During the interviews, all auditors mentioned that they conducted performance 
audits in response to a specific problem. Often, auditors pointed to ineffective budget 
spending and poor performance of government entities. 
I agree that we have to do it today, have to, because in the case of dealing with 
budget deficits, we often ‘close’ the republican budget with a deficit, we must 
conduct performance audits to know about how efficiently very limited budget 
money is used… (AC01, personal communication, January 8, 2020)  
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Three auditors shared their opinions about the importance of conduction of 
performance audits in quasi-public companies since their activities are not effective, and 
they do not achieve the expected results. AL03 shared in detail experience on a selection 
of auditees to conduct performance audits of their activities. 
To select organizations that should be audited, we assess their risks. I mean, for 
example, if we see that departments did not spend, did not use transfers, received 
from the republican budget, then, we have to visit them with our performance 
audits. These departments as administrators of local budget programs are 
ineffective, and they labeled as auditees with high risks. (AL03, personal 
communication, January 9, 2020) 
Four auditors focused on gaps in regions, including the weak control over the 
budget process and lack of qualified specialists, that increase the risks of ineffective 
budget spending. 
Theme 132 was the most highlighted in parliamentarians’ experiences. All four 
parliamentarians talked about systems problems, sharing their views about the 
importance of performance audits. 
It is… due to fluctuations of demand for oil… tense moments arise on budget 
execution, … money invested to development of non-oil sectors do not lead to 
dynamic and sufficient increases of budget revenues, that’s why we are very 
concerned about how budget funds, that were allocated to government, are being 
used. (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020) 
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Well, the main thing is that performance audit … [thinking] … it provides us with 
a wide vision of whether our government ready to use budget funds… Often, they 
throw money away. In that direction, on that problem performance audits give us 
causes for discussions and making decisions within the Parliament. (PC06, 
personal communication, January 16, 2020) 
Like auditors, parliamentarians shared their views on the importance of 
responding to regional issues. PL09 claimed that auditors took into account social 
problems such as lack of housing, lack of hospitals and schools, and other problems 
caused by the rapid development of the capital. 
Unlike auditors and parliamentarians, managers of auditees shared their 
experiences associated with problems in public administration more carefully. Most of 
the managers confirmed the perceptions of auditors and parliamentarians about the gaps 
in regional development. 
We could probably request performance audits on some problems because we 
cannot manage them ourselves. We are the local executive body, and our 
activities are strictly regulated, from one hand, and we face the lack of qualified 
specialists, from another hand. We are in such a position that we give 
explanations and explanations… (ML13, personal communication, February 15, 
2020) 




State planning. The state planning system in Kazakhstan implies the application 
of a strategic approach to select long-term development goals connected to funding 
budget programs of central ministries, agencies, and local departments that play the role 
of administrators of central or local budget programs (ISLARK, 2017a, 2017b). Ten 
participants (71.4%) shared their perceptions about problems in the state planning, such 
as gaps in policy papers, ineffective implementation of state programs, programs on 
development of regions, development plans of national companies, and budget programs. 
According to auditors’ perceptions, the gaps in budget programs, ineffective 
implementation of state programs, and programs on the development of regions are 
significant reasons for performance auditing. All five auditors, when answering on my 
question about justification of performance audits, shared examples of poor budget 
planning. For instance, AC01 shared two examples of ministries’ approaches to planning 
the budget programs that did not lead to the expected results and caused forgone benefits. 
If, for example, we see that they planned budgets incorrectly, I mean, without 
proper justification, then, we study the related budget programs. It might be the 
budget programs aimed at implementing the state programs or using the transfers 
from central ministries. Then, we conduct related performance audits because we 
saw problems in budget planning. (AL03, personal communication, January 9, 
2020) 
One more example of a performance audit in healthcare… We focused on 
programs on healthy lifestyle programs… Annually, we spend a significant 
amount of budget funds to implement the state program, there is a specific budget 
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program on promoting a healthy lifestyle, but, unfortunately, the morbidity 
indicators do not tend to be improved. (AC/L05, personal communication, 
January 15, 2020) 
Three parliamentarians emphasized problems in the state planning that request 
performance audits. 
More audits should be conducted in terms of planning. Let’s take the Strategic 
plan on the development of our republic till 2025. According to that strategic 
document, 5.4% of economic growth is planned per year, but when our 
government drafts the republican budget, they plan the economic growth at 3.1% 
per year. I don’t see any sense in it, except setting goals that are easy to achieve. 
(PC07, personal communication, January 17, 2020) 
Two parliamentarians reiterated their opinions about the ineffective 
implementation of state programs. In particular, they criticized the quality of construction 
of clinics and schools within the implementation of state programs on healthcare and 
education. 
If we build a hospital with departments divided by street or if we build a new 
school next to the functioning schools, instead of building that school on the other 
side of the river where there are no schools, … [thinking]… it means that we have 
pressing problems with our state planning. (PL08, personal communication, 
January 20, 2020) 
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Two parliamentarians shared their views about problems with the approval of the 
development plans of national companies that lead to the inefficient implementation of 
their investment programs. 
Managers were less critical about problems in state planning. Two of the five 
managers were challenged with problems in developing their budget programs; one 
manager was dealing with problems in preparing budget reports; and three managers 
faced problems in implementing the state programs, programs of development of regions, 
and budget programs. All these problem areas were shared by managers of auditees as 
examples of performance auditors’ findings. “We had problems with performance 
indicators established by the state program and the program of development of our city. 
Auditors showed us these problems, and, of course, we tried to improve our program” 
(ML13, personal communication, February 15, 2020). 
Needs in evaluating the effectiveness. In describing the experience of planning 
performance audits, AL04 noted, “… mostly, we are transferring to the conduction of 
more performance audits to evaluate the effectiveness of our auditees’ performance and 
provide them with recommendations on how to increase their effectiveness” (AL04, 
personal communication, January 10, 2020). Seven participants (50%) expressed similar 
perceptions. According to their experiences, it is existed needs in evaluating the 
effectiveness of government entities, quasi-public companies, and policies in some 
specific areas of public administration. 
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Four of the five auditors specifically noted that decisions on conducting of 
performance audit were made due to contradictory information on the performance of 
government entities or government, in general. 
Or, reports of government. Usually, reports consist of data on positive things, 
their great achievements… however, if we listen to the users of public services, 
they criticize the government and they have reasons for criticism… No access to 
water, no access to centralized gas supply… So, while we have such conflicting 
data, we need to make our evaluations. (AC/L05, personal communication, 
January 15, 2020) 
In discussing the importance of performance auditors’ work, three of the four 
parliamentarians shared their concerns related to the lack of objective evaluation of the 
effectiveness. “Everyone wants to know how efficiently budget funds are spent” (PL08, 
personal communication, January 20, 2020). PC07 more specifically admitted the needs 
to evaluate the effectiveness of all state programs, government’s measures on support for 
entrepreneurship, investment projects of free economic zones, and budget planning.  
We should be provided with a reliable, objective, and competent evaluation of the 
Government’s funding needs… What about the effect of state programs? We 
spent more than 6 trillion tenges to implement these programs… What about 
desired investments that should be attracted by our free zones? (PC07, personal 
communication, January 17, 2020) 
“Well, why are we dealing with ineffective budget spending? Did we make a 
wrong decision on the allocation of budget funds? Maybe, other ministers would do 
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better? And, here, performance auditors have to say their words” (PC06, personal 
communication, January 16, 2020). 
Risks of new areas. Like the previous theme, Theme 133 was less highlighted in 
the participants’ experience compared to the other two themes on Pattern 3. According to 
eight participants (57.1%), the demand for performance audit is explained by the risks of 
new areas, including new projects and unaudited areas of public administration. The 
following new areas were identified as the scope of performance auditors’ work by 
participants: (a) financial funds and institutions, (b) subsoil use, (c) environmental issues, 
(d) public debt, (e) social support for vulnerable groups, (f) public-private partnership 
projects, and (g) large national companies’ activities. 
AC01 shared experiences on the conduction of performance audits of the National 
Fund of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Unified Accumulative Pension Fund.  
We conducted performance audits of these two funds for the first time, that is to 
say, it was unaudited areas... I have to say that we started other performance 
audits in areas or in organizations that were unaudited before as well. (AC01, 
personal communication, January 8, 2020) 
According to AC/L05, new areas in public financial administrations should be 
audited because annual performance audits on tax revenues already contributed to solving 
old problems, and auditors have to find new gaps. 
Relating to revenues of the republican budget… It is better here and now to 
evaluate the effectiveness of tax administration… So, the idea came up to assess 
the tax gap to evaluate and understand the situation with a real performance of tax 
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bodies, and this work was the first of its kind. (AC/L05, personal communication, 
January 15, 2020) 
Two parliamentarians briefly shared their views on the conduction of performance 
audits in new areas, focusing mainly on investment and innovation projects, and national 
companies. One manager added the experience of being deal with risks in new areas 
explained by a lack of qualified specialists. 
Perceived Impact of Performance Audits 
Based on the participants’ verbalized experiences, I concluded that performance 
audits in Kazakhstan impact on participants of a performance auditing process (Pattern 
1), audit organizations and auditees (Pattern 2). Additionally, performance audits have 
specific impacts at the macrolevel (Pattern 3). 
Pattern 1: Impact on participants of performance audits. I generated three 
themes on Pattern 1. Figure 19 illustrates how I identified that performance audits impact 
on managers of auditees to a greater extent compared with auditors and parliamentarians. 










Theme:211 - Impact on auditors Theme:212 - Impact on managers of
auditees
Theme:213 - Impact on
parliamentarians
Auditors' perceptions Parliamentarians' perceptions Managers' perceptions
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As demonstrated in Table 16, three themes on Pattern 1 emerged with different 
frequencies in three groups of participants.  
Table 16 
 
Pattern 1: Matrix of Themes and Frequency of Associated Categories 















Theme 212: Impact on 
managers of auditees 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
4 of 4 
(100%) 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
14 of 14 
(100%) 
43.4% 
Theme 211:  
Impact on auditors 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
3 of 4 
(75%) 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
13 of 14 
(92.3%) 
41.2% 
Theme 213: Impact on 
parliamentarians 
2 of 5 
(40%) 
4 of 4 
(100%) 
2 of 5 
(40%) 




Impact on managers of auditees. According to auditors’ opinions, performance 
audits have both negative and positive impact on managers of auditees. I grouped the 
associated categories in the following way: 
1) perceived positive impact of performance audits on managers of auditees 
associated with better understanding the performance audits objectives, 
receiving new and useful information, learning, and positive reaction on 
auditors’ work; 
2) perceived negative impact of performance audits on managers of auditees 
associated with misunderstanding the performance audits objectives, a 




I identified that the perceived impact of performance audits on managers was 
negative in 28 cases, i.e., the frequency of associated categories, and positive in 23 cases. 
Figure 20 illustrates the distribution of the perceived impacts that performance audits 
have on managers of auditees by related categories. 
According to four of the five auditors, managers in most cases do not understand 
the objectives of performance audits and, as a result, they negatively respond to audits 
and resist performance audits’ results. 
I think that they do not see differences, they don’t care that we conduct 
performance or compliance audits. I mean, they perceive us as before, no changes. 
Now, an audit has come, that is, the inspection. End of the story! Now, they will 
find violations. (AC02, personal communication, January 8, 2020) 
Figure 20. Auditors’ perception on impact of performance audits on managers 
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“They give requested documents with a delay. Honestly, they delayed 
deliberately. But the active resistance begins at the stage of discussion of audit reports. In 
10 out of 10 cases, we receive their objections to our reports” (AC/L05, personal 
communication, January 15, 2020). At the same time, all five auditors admitted that 
performance audits have a positive impact on managers of auditees, allowing them to 
learn and receive new information. For instance, in describing the experience of 
participating in meetings of audit organizations on considering performance audits’ 
results, AC01 argued that managers became aware of shortcomings in their organizations 
because of auditors’ work. 
In principle, the vice-minister positively responded to our audit’s results because 
we allowed them to hear about shortcomings in their local organizations. There 
was even such a phrase, “New. I learned a lot of new things at today’s meeting”. 
It was the vice-minister’s words. (AC01, personal communication, January 8, 
2020) 
Four auditors noted that when they interacted with managers of organizations that 
were audited before, they observed desired changes in managers’ reactions. 
As in the case with auditors, I grouped the perceived impact of performance 
audits on managers (according to their views) by the following associated categories: 
1) perceived positive impact of performance audits on managers of auditees 
associated with better understanding the performance audits objectives, 
receiving new and useful information, learning, and promotion; 
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2) perceived negative impact of performance audits on managers of auditees 
associated with complicating their work, stress, increased distrust of audits, 
the uselessness of audits results (caused by the absence of new information in 
performance audit reports). 
Unlike auditors, managers of auditee shared positive perceptions in 18 cases and 
negative perceptions in 60 cases. Figure 21 illustrates the distribution of these perceptions 
by related categories. 
Figure 21. Managers’ perception on impact of performance audits on them 
 
One of the five managers noted that the previous experience of being audited 
contributed to a better understanding of objectives of audits. Four managers discussed the 
positive impact of performance audits, such as learning and receiving the new 
information used in their practice. As ML13 stated, “We receive some comments from 
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auditors with pleasure, because in 2016, due to the change of the head of our department, 
the continuity in transferring of functions was disappeared. Auditors indicated that fact 
very clearly” (ML13, personal communication, February 15, 2020). One manager 
expressed the view about promotion perspectives. “In case of the absence of violations or 
serious deficiencies in the list of auditors’ findings, you might be promoted. Sure. It 
demonstrates that you are good at your job” (ML/C14, personal communication, 
February 28, 2020). In all cases of sharing the positive perceptions, managers repeated 
that it was rare cases. 
Three managers noted that, in most cases, performance auditors do not provide 
them with new or useful information. In describing the experience of interactions with 
auditors, four of the five managers stated that, because of audits, they are dealing with 
work complications, distractions from their main duties to prepare documents for 
auditors. Most of the managers expressed distrust in performance audits and auditors’ 
contributions. 
In addition to violations, now, auditors identify, as they call it, systematic issues. 
So, now, we are dealing with more problems with the discussion of auditors’ 
opinions. Fewer discussions are needed to object auditors’ opinions related to 
violations, because we follow specific laws, rules, or sectorial regulations. But in 
case of… [laying stress] … systematic issues, it is impossible to make competent 
judgments about our effectiveness without special knowledge and a deeper 
understanding of our business processes. (MC10, personal communication, 
February 11, 2020) 
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I can give you a real example. They said that our public sector is too big, there are 
unprofitable organizations in the quasi-public sector, and they concluded that we 
have to liquidate some quasi-public companies. They are wrong. There are other 
benchmarks for state-owned companies. (MC11, personal communication, 
February 14, 2020) 
Two managers noted that they stressed because of audits, and all five managers 
noted that their subordinates stressed as well. 
I honestly tell you, when auditors come, the first association is about the stress, 
stress for me, stress for all members of our department. Stress… As in Gogol’s 
play ‘The Inspector-General’, we are scared when we know that auditors will visit 
us… [laughing]. I don’t know, maybe, it will change someday, but now 
everywhere and everyone has the same reaction. (ML13, personal 
communication, February 15, 2020) 
In 14 cases parliamentarians shared perceptions on positive impact of 
performance audits on managers, and in 14 cases their perceptions were negative. Three 
parliamentarians, detailing their experiences on interactions with managers of auditees 
within discussions of annual reports of audit organizations, noted that, as a rule, managers 
do not understand the objectives of performance auditors’ work; two parliamentarians 
linked that facts with managers’ incompetence. 
That’s why from the side of both government entities and quasi-public companies, 
often, we face giving the runaround (unsubscribe) or resentment of auditors’ 
work. They have such rhetoric: The auditors came to us and wrote in their report 
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about things, that is not true, the auditors are wrong. (PL08, personal 
communication, January 20, 2020) 
Two parliamentarians shared their observations associated with changes in 
managers’ reaction. “I see that ministers react actively to auditors’ critiques if the 
critiques are based on conceptual and important things” (PC06, personal communication, 
January 16, 2020). 
Impact on auditors. According to auditors, performance audits have both 
negative and positive impact on them. I grouped the associated categories in the 
following way: 
1) perceived positive impact of performance audits on auditors associated with 
mastering new skills, professional development, promotion, and being deal 
with more interesting works; 
2) perceived negative impact of performance audits on auditors associated with 
the increased number of requirements, workload, demotivation, and staff 
turnover. 
I identified that the perceived impact of performance audits on auditors was 
positive in 40 cases and negative in 49 cases. Figure 22 illustrates the distribution of the 
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perceived impacts of performance audits by related family categories.
 
Figure 22. Auditors’ perception on impact of performance audits on them 
 
The positive perceptions of auditors are associated with mastering new skills (five 
of the five auditors) and the fact that their work becomes more interesting (four of the 
five auditors). Three auditors, explaining the advantages of performance audits, admitted 
that auditors have opportunities for professional development since they conduct 
performance audits in different areas. “You better understand how everything works in 
healthcare, education, construction…” (AL03, personal communication, January 9, 
2020). Two auditors shared their experiences on being promoted due to the participation 
in performance audits. Promotion in their cases was associated with a demonstration of 
the abilities of performance auditors to cope with complicated tasks. 
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We can develop our analytical skills. We look deeply and identify the causes of 
violations or shortcomings. Next, we consider and evaluate achieving the desired 
results, and how these results impact the auditee’s performance, specific sector, 
and our economy as a whole. (AC02, personal communication, January 8, 2020)  
What I like now is that our work becomes more interesting. The results of our old 
audits… [smiling]… were of the same type. They violated here; they didn’t fulfill 
their plans here; they didn’t pay here; and so forth. And repeat in a circle. Now, 
our audit reports, not all, some audit reports are very interesting to read. (AC/L05, 
personal communication, January 15, 2020) 
In describing the changes that occurred in audit organizations, all five auditors 
noted that the workload and number of requirements to auditors’ work increased 
significantly. The workload increase was explained as the consequence of lacking 
qualified auditors and the scale of performance audits to be conducted. 
Lack of auditors still exists, but today we feel it stronger. The front of our work is 
constantly increasing. Performance audits require more resources. There are some 
mechanisms for attracting experts, but we cannot use them often, because of a 
lack of resources. (AC/L05, personal communication, January 15, 2020) 
Three of the five auditors more specifically shared their views on increasing the 
number of non-audit functions and tasks and, so, they linked the workload with these 
changes as well. 
For four of the five auditors, the increased number of requirements to auditors 
included keeping financial control mechanisms in place, or more precisely, focusing on 
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finding the violations and sanctioning. According to AC02 and AC/L05, requirements on 
using financial controls coupled with the unfair evaluation of performance auditors’ work 
leads to demotivation. 
Today, to be honest, we are not removed from the requirement of identifying 
violations…, and you spent your time on performance auditing, but you didn’t 
find violations, violations expressed in monetary terms, then you will get a low 
rating. And, vice versa, if others spent their time on finding the violations, then 
they will get a high rating. (AC02, personal communication, January 8, 2020)  
Two auditors shared examples of staff turnover in their organizations. In both 
cases, they linked staff turnover with increased workloads and, to a greater extent, with 
the unfair evaluation of performance auditors’ work. “Sometimes we did too many things 
to come to the endpoint, while we can drive faster instead of walking through a 
windbreak. Walking through a windbreak, we lose qualified auditors” (AC01, personal 
communication, January 8, 2020). 
I revealed that the perceived impact of performance audits on auditors was 
positive in 12 cases and negative in 44 cases; Figure 23 illustrates categories on the 
related perceptions of managers of auditees. 
One of the five managers stated that auditors changed their methods of auditing 




Figure 23. Managers’ perception on impact of performance audits on auditors 
 
Auditors changed. I think that some auditors do their work without punitive 
purposes, they want to help… My first reaction was scary. I was afraid that they 
find violations. But, day after day, I observed..., and they were fair. They 
identified some deficiencies in our work, made recommendations, discussed all 
things, and they were very open. (ML13, personal communication, February 15, 
2020) 
Two managers shared similar experiences; however, they noted multiple times 
that these changes in auditing approaches were rare cases. “I was surprised during the last 
audit because auditors ask such questions as: Can you fulfill our recommendations? How 
long will it take? The pleasant novelty in the work of auditors…” (ML12, personal 
communication, February 15, 2020). 
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Four managers (80%) stated that, in most cases, there were no positive changes in 
auditors’ work, and, as before the introduction of performance auditing, they are dealing 
with incompetent auditors. According to managers’ experience, auditors do not listen to 
auditees and make subjective conclusions about auditees’ performance. 
There are so many specific things in our work, and I know that an auditor cannot 
understand these things without professional training, or if before he worked only 
with accounting papers. So, …. we face auditors, who made incompetent 
conclusions; they do not take into account or don’t understand the numerous 
explanations on our part. (MC 10, personal communication, February 11, 2020)  
“Auditors vigorously criticized us for the state program; it was the State program 
of development of healthcare ‘Healthy Kazakhstan’. But for that program, we were 
highly praised by World Bank experts, experts in the field of health” (MC 11, personal 
communication, February 14, 2020). ML12 argued that there are significant differences 
between declared objectives of performance audits and real work of auditors. 
Even auditors tell you, that they want to find deficiencies or problems, we know 
that, when they find violations or facts for transferring to law enforcement bodies, 
it makes them happy. They believe that they did a good job. (ML12, personal 
communication, February 15, 2020) 
Three of the four parliamentarians shared their perceptions of the positive impact 
of performance audits on auditors. The positive impact included mastering new 
(analytical) skills by auditors and conduction of interesting performance audits. 
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Generally, Theme 211 was less highlighted in the group of parliamentarians; the 
frequency of associated categories is 7 (2.6%). 
Impact on parliamentarians. Unlike the previous two themes, Theme 213 is less 
highlighted; the frequency of associated categories is equal to 15.6% of the frequency of 
categories within all three themes on Pattern 1. This theme emerged in the lived 
experiences of eight participants (57.1%). Two auditors and two managers of auditees 
shared experiences when performance audits allowed the parliamentarian to implement 
their functions, or more precisely, facilitate their task on parliamentary oversight. The 
other two auditors and managers noted that parliamentarians use performance audits in 
their political interests. “I think that deputies use our reports to scold government. No, not 
even government as a whole, but some ministers. Lets’ say, sometimes deputies worked 
on cameras. Probably, they also have PR goals” (AC02, personal communication, 
January 8, 2020). 
Four of the four parliamentarians shared perceptions about the impact of 
performance audits on their perspectives; the frequency of associated categories is equal 
to 78.6% out of the frequency of all categories on Theme 213. Three parliamentarians 
positively perceived the impact of performance audits on their perspectives, while one 
parliamentarian noted that the impact of performance audits is limited. According to the 
lived experience of parliamentarians, performance audits facilitate implementing their 
duties on parliamentary oversight (four of the four interviewees), on ensuring the 
accountability of the government, central and local ministries (four of the four 
161 
 
interviewees), approval of the budget (three of the four interviewees), and making 
legislative proposal (three of the four interviewees). 
We, using our deputy powers and based on audit reports, ask our questions to the 
heads of local departments. Why did they bring the situation to such a state? Why 
was the inefficient use of budget funds allowed? Sure, it helps us. (PC09, personal 
communication, January 23, 2020) 
“We, of course, use the results of performance audits. We need performance 
audits. It helps us to consider the draft budget, as I said. It helps us to make decisions, to 
accomplish our parliamentary functions” (PC06, personal communication, January 16, 
2020). 
I need in more performance audits since, by using the results of these audits, I will 
be aware of macroeconomic issues; I will study regional issues and relations 
between central and local governments. All these conceptual things are about our 
duties and responsibilities. (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020) 
Pattern 2: Impact on audit organizations and auditees. According to the lived 
experience of most of the participants, performance audits impact on audit organizations 
and auditees, as demonstrated in Figure 24 and Table 17; two themes on Pattern 2 
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Theme 221: Changes in 
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Changes in audit organizations. Unlike personal impacts (Themes 211, 212, and 
213), it is impossible to clearly distinguish positive and negative perceptions on 
organizational impacts, since participants shared mixed perceptions related to a specific 
change (e.g., changing the methodology), or participants shared their experiences without 
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Thus, as illustrated in Figure 25, I divided the participants’ perceptions in the 
following way: (a) organizational changes include changes in organizational structure and 
methodology; (b) perceived negative impact includes keeping financial control and 
deterioration of the reputation of audit organizations; (c) perceived positive impact 
includes excepting financial control and improved reputation of audit organizations. 
 
Figure 25. Auditors’ perception on impacting audit organizations 
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Five auditors (100%) shared their experiences on how introducing the 
performance audits impacted their organizations. According to their perceptions, 
changing the methodology is the most influential impact of performance audits on audit 
organizations. 
In our organization… [thinking]… I would not say that I observed obvious 
progress. The number of methodological recommendations, internal rules, and 
regulations increased. Often, the internal rules are changed. Of course, the 
requirements on the application of methodological papers are changed as well. 
(AC02, personal communication, January 8, 2020) 
The other four auditors shared the same view; they more specifically noted that 
the number of methodological papers increased due to performance audits. For instance, 
AL04 argued that many different methodological papers were developed because of 
performance audit introductions and “it is the first time when auditors have 
methodological papers for all occasions” (AL04, personal communication, January 10, 
2020). According to AC/L05, despite the development and approval of methodological 
guidelines on performance auditing, not all auditors in both central and local audit 
organizations apply these guidelines. All five auditors shared their views on 
complications the methods of their organizations on the conduction of performance 
audits. 
In most cases, auditors referred to an increased number of job functions including 
non-audit functions, such as preparing the information for external users, quality control, 
and legal expertise. 
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Unfortunately, our possibilities on changing our organizational structure are 
extremely limited, our structure has not been changed from 2011, while we are 
transferring to performance audits. We were required to introduce many different 
functions, we have quality control functions, we have functions on legal expertise, 
and so on. (AL04, personal communication, January 10, 2020) 
Two auditors directly linked these changes with the increased number of 
performance audits, while others stated that there are also other reasons for these 
changes. In describing the changes that occurred in their organizations’ structure, four of 
the five auditors admitted that there are no desired changes associated with performance 
audits since their organizations did not create separate performance audit departments. 
Four auditors (80%) negatively perceived keeping financial control functions with 
its strengthened requirements for finding financial violations during performance audits. 
Three auditors more specifically noted that tasks on finding violations lead to 
complications of interactions with auditees and, therefore, audit organizations are 
perceived as “controllers from the Soviet Union who are pursuing the goal of punishing” 
(AC02, personal communication, January 8, 2020). Two of the five auditors shared their 
views on the negative impact of performance audits on their organizations’ reputations. 
In both cases, auditors noted that negative reactions on their performance audits took 
place when they received substantiated objections to audit result findings. 
According to all five auditors, there are also some positive changes in audit 
organizations associated with performance audits. In all cases, auditors emphasized that 
these changes are changes from recent days. AC01 noted that both the central and local 
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audit organizations’ approach to performance auditing is changed “little by little… and 
people now understand what does performance auditing mean” (AC01, personal 
communication, January 8, 2020). Two of the five auditors noted that performance audits 
lead to the improved reputation of their organizations. “I think… our commission became 
recognizable, and it is thanks to our performance audits” (AL03, personal 
communication, January 9, 2020). 
In describing the experience of interaction with auditors, five managers of 
auditees listed changes in auditors’ methods. 
There are some other changes. Before auditors interact with our accountants and 
financiers, they didn’t go to our department or other departments. Now they 
interact with all departments. Like our accountants and financiers, we closely 
interact with auditors. I see that their tasks are changed and increased. (ML/C14, 
personal communication, February 28, 2020) 
“Now, we may pay tribute to the auditors, they started to write about our good 
practices in their audit reports. I support it… [smiling]” (ML12, personal communication, 
February 15, 2020). 
Four of the five managers noted that performance audits positively impact on 
audit organizations’ reputation. In three cases, managers commented upon the positive 
impacts with audit organizations’ practice on attracting qualified experts. 
But there were a couple of good points. I do believe that they do a good job 
because it was a strong team of auditors with external experts. Then, and this, 
perhaps, was a one-time case, the audit report was different, it was the better 
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report compared with all previous reports. (MC10, personal communication, 
February 11, 2020) 
Like auditors, managers of auditees shared negative perceptions associated with 
keeping financial control mechanisms. “For us, there are no significant differences 
between old and performance audits. Why? Because the results of all audits are the same. 
All is about violations, and, anyway, violations are important performance indicators for 
audit organizations” (ML/C14, personal communications, February 28, 2020). Three 
managers more specifically noted that, like compliance audit reports, performance audit 
reports consist of facts of financial violations, transferring auditors’ findings to law 
enforcement bodies, and administrative violation protocols. 
In the group of parliamentarians, changes in audit organizations are associated 
with using new methods of audits (two of the four parliamentarians) and keeping 
financial controls (three of the four parliamentarians). As PL09 stated, “I don’t perceive 
our local audit commission as a body of financial control because their reports focused on 
recommendations. Yes, of course, they include identified violations in their reports, but 
they put more effort into recommendations” (PL09, personal communication, January 23, 
2020). Two parliamentarians shared their positive perceptions about audit organizations 
achievements. “I know that today local revision commissions actively conduct 
performance audits. They have good results” (PC06, personal communication, January 
16, 2020). 
Two parliamentarians noted that there are no significant changes in audit 
organizations since, as before, they primary focus is on violations. 
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Each time they report on violations, report on billions of tenges of violations. But 
if you look carefully, you see that these billions of tenges are accounting errors. 
Then, they start their explanations that they classified violations by financial 
violations and procedural violations… Anyway, these kinds of results are results 
of financial or compliance audits. (PC07, personal communication, January 17, 
2020) 
Changes in auditees. The changes in auditees effected by introduction of 
performance audits are more highlighted in the experience of managers and auditors, and 
less highlighted in the experience of parliamentarians. Five auditors (100%) positively 
perceived changes in auditees, whereas managers of auditees shared both positive and 
negative perceptions. In describing their experience in performance audits conducted in 
2016–2019, auditors noted that implementation of their recommendations by auditees led 
to improved performance, better discipline, enhancing the control over the execution of 
budget programs, and changes in organizational structures. In two cases, auditors stated 
that their work contributed to the improved reputation of auditees as well. Figure 26 
illustrates the distribution of the perceived impacts of performance audits by related 
family categories. 
As AC03 shared, performance indicators of local departments that are responsible 




Figure 26. Auditors’ perception on impacting auditees 
 
The chief accountant and public service inspector reported on streamlining 
internal business processes in their organization after our audit. The chief 
accountant said, “Now, we can establish more real deadlines and justified 
requirements for our contractors, and they don’t stamp their feet anymore.” It was 
a good feedback. (AL03, personal communication, January 9, 2020) 
AL04, more specifically, shared the experience of changing the organizational 
structures of auditees. All five auditors stated that auditees’ discipline including financial 
discipline, i.e., compliance with the regulations on the execution of budget programs, is 
significantly improved. Four auditors shared their experience of enhancing controls over 
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budget program execution by audited departments. “Auditees develop. I see that audit by 
audit, they become better. Today, I have to say… violate to reap the fruits of their 
mediocrity or illiteracy… [thinking]… there is no such thing today” (AC01, personal 
communication, January 8, 2020). 
Managers shared their positive perceptions associated with the impact of 
performance audits on their organizations in 33 cases and negative perceptions in 21 
cases. Figure 27 illustrates the distribution of the perceived impacts of performance 
audits by related categories. 
Figure 27. Managers’ perception on impacting auditees 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 27, for most managers, changes in auditees included 
improved performance, better discipline, and enhanced control. Additionally, five 
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managers of auditees (100%) noted that performance audits contributed to the readiness 
of their organizations to new audits.  
I believe that year to year we complicate the task of auditors because we are 
improving… If we will see violations, they will be eliminated. It will be 
monitored. And if somebody commits the same violation repeatedly, then more 
severe measures will be applied to him. (ML12, personal communication, 
February 15, 2020) 
“If auditors’ comments were addressed to other administrators of budget 
programs, even to other administrators, we ‘have our finger on the pulse’ to receive less 
or no comments from auditors in the future” (MC10, personal communication, February 
11, 2020). “I’m sure that we will have audits again and again… [smiling]… for example, 
they may decide to audit our obligatory health insurance system. Well, we will be ready” 
(MC11, personal communication, February 14, 2020). 
Answering my question about changes that occurred in auditees as a result of 
performance audits, managers shared negative perceptions associated with workloads, 
demotivation, staff turnover, and financial consequences, such as budget cuts and 
penalties. Managers of auditees admitted that workloads are a direct result of 
performance audits since, unlike compliance auditors, performance auditors request more 
information and have more questions. For instance, MC10 stated that during the 
performance audits “all our organization work for auditors preparing the requested 
documents, a huge amount of information, a huge amount of analytical data, and we 
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provide them with multiple explanations” (MC10, personal communication, February 11, 
2020). Similar views were shared by other managers as well. 
In turn, managers connected staff demotivation and turnover, and financial 
consequences with financial control measures undertaken within performance audits. 
ML12 shared in detail experiences of auditors applying financial control mechanisms. “It 
is critical and sensitive things for us, for any others who under audits because if our staff 
received the administrative violation protocol, auditors’ decisions on penalties, it leads to 
negative consequences. It demotivates our staff” (ML12, personal communication, 
February 15, 2020). Two managers shared stories about the dismissals of qualified 
specialists following the results of audits. “It was a case when that qualified specialists 
did not agree with the measures taken to them, and there are other organizations in 
regions which are in similar ‘deplorable’ situations” (ML/C14, personal communication, 
January 28, 2020). 
In sharing the views related to changes in auditees, parliamentarians referred to 
improved financial discipline. However, three of the four parliamentarians mentioned that 
there are no significant changes in audit organizations that could be defined as “a net 
result of audit organizations” (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020). 
Pattern 3: Macrolevel impact. For most of the participants, the macrolevel 
impact of performance audits included improved budget process (Theme 231) and 
changes in laws and regulations (Theme 232). After completion of data analyses, I also 
identified that improved budget processes and changes in laws and regulations, viewed 
by the majority of participants, are not attributed solely to the impact of performance 
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audits (Sub-theme 233). Fourteen participants (100%) shared their views relating to 
changes in auditors’ work needing to facilitate a more positive impact of performance 
audits on public administration in Kazakhstan (Sub-theme 234), as it is demonstrated in 
Figure 28. 
Figure 28. Visualization of themes on Pattern 3 by the frequency of categories 
 
Table 18 illustrates the themes and sub-themes on Pattern 3 emerging with 
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Improved budget process 
5 of 5 
(100%) 
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13 of 14 
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5 of 5 
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3 of 5 
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Improved budget process. Thirteen participants (92.9%) shared their experiences 
of improved budget processes as a result of performance auditing. That perceived effect 
included changes for better planning and execution of budgets, preparing reports by 
administrators of budget programs, and enhancing controls over execution of the central 
and local governments’ budgets. 
Four parliamentarians (100%) emphasized that using the performance audits by 
legislative bodies significantly contributed to enhancing controls over government 
entities, more precisely over the spending of budget funds by the central ministries and 
local executive departments. Three parliamentarians argued that auditors’ work facilitated 




All deputies, all ministers and other top-managers from central ministries, heads 
of akimats, and even chairs of big national companies, all take part these 
meetings, all become more aware of the performance audits results, on the one 
hand, and about the effectiveness in using the budget funds, on the other hand. 
(PC06, personal communication, January 16, 2020) 
“It contributes to discipline not only in audited ministries or agencies, in all other 
organizations as well” (PL09, personal communication, January 23, 2020). 
Three of the four parliamentarians noted that performance audits contributed to 
changes in budget planning by facilitating correct redistribution of funds between 
administrators of budget programs. PC06 and PL09 shared their experiences on making 
decisions on reallocations of budget funds between ministries and departments that used 
budget funds ineffectively or were unprepared for implementation of investment projects. 
There were such situations when we used the facts of violations and ineffective 
budget spending as a rationale to make decisions on cutting the allocated budget 
funds of related administrators. We redistribute these funds between other 
ministries, we allocate them to other priority sectors of the economy, to the social 
needs of the state. (PC06, personal communication, January 16, 2020) 
We use the performance audit as a tool to understand and to find the right ways on 
how we can prevent ineffective spending. By using the results of audits, we can 
prevent ineffective spending; we can do it when we consider and approve budget 
programs, proposals on investment projects, and so on. I think, that there were 
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many examples when …[thinking]…, we saved budget funds by making our 
decisions on budget approval. (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020) 
Like parliamentarians, auditors positively perceived the impact of their 
performance audits on budgeting processes. However, they mainly referred to improved 
quality within budget program execution. Five auditors (100%) noted that their efforts 
contributed to prevention or minimizing the risks of negative consequences of ineffective 
spending. 
For example, after our audits the budgets are replenished with unpaid taxes, 
service providers carry out restoration work. They did something poorly, we 
pointed them out, they fixed it. Of course, let’s say so, we are not the only ones to 
do it. Anyway, our audit is very beneficial for our state. (AC02, personal 
communication, January 8, 2020) 
Four of the five auditors mentioned the improved quality of budget programs as a 
result of their performance audits. 
There are many, too many, situations when ministries plan to spend huge budget 
funds that could lead to ineffective spending or even to negative results. We 
indicated this problem, they corrected their documents, and the others learn. Then, 
all can prepare good budget programs and budget applications. (AC01, personal 
communication, January 8, 2020) 
AL03 shared, in detail, examples of saving budget funds as a result of 
performance audits and using central budget transfers by local departments. In describing 
their experiences on monitoring implementation of auditors’ recommendations, all five 
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auditors argued that these results contributed to better budget planning when 
recommendations were implemented. 
Two auditors shared their experiences on contribution to addressing systems’ 
issues, such as lack of financing or inefficient financial management. In two cases, 
auditors emphasized that their work is beneficial as governments and parliaments use 
these audit results to promote reforms in areas of public financial administration. “Thanks 
to our audit reports, they have new opportunities to address big problems or find new 
ways – increase funding, reduce funding, or apply a public-private partnership. I have to 
say that they do it” (AL04, personal communication, January 10, 2020). 
On my question about the changes that occurred in areas of public administration 
supervised by their organizations (i.e., public finances and healthcare) after the 
implementation of performance audits, managers of auditees often described these 
measures as positively impacting budget reimbursement of unused or misappropriated 
funds or elimination of work defects by service providers. Three managers noted, after 
auditors’ work, their organizations strengthened control over all administrators of local 
budget programs. Two managers shared their experience of changing performance and 
budget reports. “We prepare and submit our performance and budget reports to the 
Ministry of Healthcare. After audits, we improved our reports” (ML13, personal 
communication, February 15, 2020). ML/C14 shared an example of improved 
interdepartmental cooperation in using state loan funds at the local level. 
Changes in laws and regulations. In relation to perceived changes in laws and 
regulations, I interpreted participants’ perceptions on providing auditees and authorized 
178 
 
bodies with recommendations on changing the laws and regulations as (a) agreed by 
auditees and authorized bodies or (b) implemented by auditees and authorized bodies, as 
well as (c) perceptions of participants on using performance audit results by 
parliamentarians or governments in making their legislative proposals. 
According to five auditors (100%), performance audits are useful since they 
contributed to improved laws and regulations. Three auditors shared their experience of 
making recommendations related to changes in the Budget Code, the Tax Code, and the 
Environmental Code. “We recommended changes in rules, regulations, laws, and codes… 
Our recommendations were related to the budget process, related to public procurement... 
Some recommendations were supported and agreed by the Ministry of Justice and the 
Prime Minister’s Office” (AC01, personal communication, January 8, 2020). AC/L05 
more specifically shared examples of making the amendments to the Budget Code, the 
strategic plan of the Ministry of Finance, and regulations of the Ministry of National 
Economy. 
Our recommendations on using the tax gap as the performance indicator by tax 
body and related changes to the Budget code were agreed by the auditee. Of 
course, at the first stage of our discussions, they objected, but then they 
understand and agreed with us. Moreover, our recommendations were supported 
by parliamentarians. (AC/L05, personal communication, January 15, 2020)  
Two auditors shared their experiences in making recommendations in the 
following areas: (a) state programs on healthcare, (b) programs concerning regional 
development, and (c) programs for waste management. 
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In sharing their experiences in using auditors’ work, four parliamentarians (100%) 
referred to changes in laws and regulations. In particular, they listed the Budget Code, 
laws on public procurements and republican budgets, and local legislative body’s 
decisions on approval of local budgets. PC06 shared experiences of making amendments 
to the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan about the Republican Budget; parliamentarians 
in detail shared their views on changes within budget parameters and costs of ministries 
and agencies. PL08 referred to similar experience and noted that “performance audit 
results should continue to motivate us to change laws or write new laws, we need to do it 
to eliminate all risks of violations, deficiencies, and mainly – ineffective spending of 
taxpayers’ money” (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020). 
Three parliamentarians described how they make legislative proposals based on 
auditors’ work; two parliamentarians, however, mentioned that it was a rare case. “As 
part of the promotion of legislative initiatives, I can also rely on their materials. But to be 
honest, I don’t do it often. I work with the government directly. Why? Because we 
receive audit materials after the fact” (PC07, personal communication, January 17, 2020). 
Four managers (80%) shared their experiences on implementation activities of 
auditors’ recommendations. Their perceptions are mainly associated with changing of 
rules and regulations. “There were internal local documents of our ministry, which were 
aligned and improved… Yes, we work on the bugs” (MC10, personal communication, 
February 11, 2020). MC11 mentioned that some regulations, including rules for 
purchasing of medical equipment, were changed because of auditors’ recommendations. 
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Generally, themes associated with changes in laws and regulations were less 
highlighted in parliamentarians and managers experiences, which was opposite to 
auditors’ experiences. I concluded these differences to be associated with 
parliamentarians and managers often referring to their contributions to improvements 
whereas auditors were focused on direct observations and compliance experiences. 
Therefore, two trends emerged as subthemes on Pattern 3, including sub-theme 233 
“Self-contribution to 3E” and sub-theme 234 “Requested changes in performance 
auditors’ work”. 
Self-contribution to 3E. I entitled sub-theme 233 as self-contribution to 3E since 
perceptions of all parliamentarians and managers about their contributions might be 
interpreted as contributions to the implementation of principles of 3E (i.e., economy, 
effectiveness, and efficiency). Four auditors (80%) referred to contributions of the 
parliament and government. 
All parliamentarians explicitly described their activities on changing the laws and 
regulations without references to auditors’ work. “In some cases, we, the deputy corps, 
reveal shortcomings in our legislation... We make recommendations on improving the 
legislation” (PC06, personal communication, January 16, 2020). PL09 shared examples 
of helping veteran policymakers to put forth legislative proposals. The following 
statement encapsulated the parliamentarians’ perceptions: “If the parliamentary institute 
is not oriented on real improvements focusing on the electorate, then discussions of the 
audit results become a small-scale game. To avoid playing to the gallery, we have not to 
rely only on performance auditors” (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020). 
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Like parliamentarians, all managers shared their views on their organization’s 
achievements. “We introduced the result-oriented budget, strategic planning, and we 
improved the budget reports, the transparency of our performance results is significantly 
increased” (ML12, personal communication, February 15, 2020). “We were the first who 
introduced many innovations… We open departments for premature babies… We 
transferred our new practices to other regions” (ML13, personal communications, 
February 15, 2020). Four managers shared examples of changing regulations by their 
organizations. Managers of auditees did not connect all these cases with the performance 
audits. 
Requested changes in performance auditors’ work. Eleven participants (78.6%), 
based on their experiences in performance auditing, reasoned that changes are needed in 
performance auditors’ work. Five auditors (100%) admitted that changing their approach 
to performance auditing will contribute to the usefulness of their audits. Four auditors 
emphasized the need for changing audit methodology, making it more flexible. Most of 
the auditors suggested changes in using financial control mechanisms since “it is 
impossible to undertake an ideal performance audit with keeping the financial control 
measures inherited from the Soviet Union” (AC02, personal communication, January 8, 
2020). All auditors highlighted that the amount of identified violations should not be used 
as auditors’ performance indicators. 
Three parliamentarians (75%) also called for changes. Like auditors, 
parliamentarians discussed needed changes in financial control mechanisms. 
“Performance audit should not be carried out to identify violations of 20 billion tenges… 
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But it often happens to us” (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020). 
Parliamentarians suggested changes in submitting the performance audit reports to 
legislative bodies. 
I would like to bring the process of reviewing audit results by the deputies’ corps 
closer to the completion of audits. Today, we need to wait for annual reports, we 
consider the results of all audits completed a year or several months ago. We have 
to change it. (PC06, personal communication, January 16, 2020) 
Three managers of auditees (60%) discussed needed changes in audit methods 
and reports, and they called for competent recommendations and objective audit 
opinions. “We face auditors who evaluate us solely based on identified violations, they 
don’t pay attention to our achievements. Making the audit conclusions based on negative 
points is unfair” (MC11, personal communication, February 14, 2020). 
Summary 
Chapter 4 consists of detailed descriptions of implementing the field stage of my 
study, beginning from participant recruiting through synthesizing research findings to 
address my posed research problem and research question. I generated 18 themes 
associated with my research question through data analyses of 14 phenomenological 
interviews and examination of secondary data. As highlighted in the lived experiences of 
participants, the demand for performance audits in Kazakhstan is explained through 
preferences, interests, and needs of performance audit users, as well as through 
legitimization of performance audits and adoption of international audit best practices. 
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The most influential factors on demanding performance audits were found to be directly 
associated with problems in public administration in Kazakhstan. 
According to participants’ perceptions, performance audits have personal, 
organizational, and macrolevel impacts. In describing changes resulting from 
performance audits, participants shared both positive and negative perceptions. 
Nonetheless, there were no significant discrepancies found between analyzed data. 
Overall, mixed perceptions are explained by features found through transitioning from 
old financial control systems to new public auditing systems in Kazakhstan. Generally, 
auditors and parliamentarians shared positive perceptions associated with performance 
audits’ influence, while managers of auditees often noted negative aspects associated 
with performance auditors’ work. More specifically, all parliamentarians and managers 
shared their views about their organizations’ contribution to changes without references 
to performance auditors’ work (the first sub-theme). The majority of participants were 
unanimous in requesting changes on the application of financial control mechanisms by 
performance auditors (the second sub-theme). Further interpretation of these research 
findings, considerations about positive social change impact, future research, suggested 




Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
To explore factors that might explain the demand for performance auditing in 
Kazakhstan and the perceived effects of performance audits on Kazakhstani public 
administration, I studied the lived experiences of 14 participants of a performance 
auditing process. Additionally, I reviewed and analyzed more than 200 official 
documents related to the studied phenomena, including audit reports issued by the 
Accounts Committee and local public audit organizations in 2016–2020, as well as audit 
reports issued by SAIs of Australia, Canada, the United States, and United Kingdom 
within the same timeframe. Guided by a combination of NPM and PAM theoretical 
frameworks, I addressed a gap in understanding the reasons for demanded performance 
audits and perceived impacts that these audits have on public administration in 
Kazakhstan. 
I determined problems in public administration, needs and interests of 
parliamentarians, public auditors, the President, citizens, and media as the most 
influential factors of highly requested performance audits in Kazakhstan. To a lesser 
extent, increasing the number of performance audits is explained by interests of managers 
of auditees and features of Kazakhstani public auditing system, such as legitimization of 
performance auditing practice and adaptation of international experience. 
Despite their novelty, performance audits already had instrumental, conceptual, 
tactical, and strategic impacts; these impacts manifested at micro-, meso-, and 
macrolevels. Conclusively, I found that performance audits led to changes in public 
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administration, impacting positively and negatively (a) those involved in these audits, (b) 
audit organizations and auditees, and (c) contributing to improved budget process and 
changes in laws and regulations. 
Comparing my research findings with the reviewed literature results, I concluded 
that they [findings] are consistent, partially consistent, or inconsistent with previous 
studies’ findings and conclusions. There are a few relatively new findings that actualize 
further theoretical and practical considerations. Chapter 5 consists of a detailed 
interpretation of my research findings, descriptions of limitations of the study, 
recommendations, and study implications. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
Empirical Context and Evidence 
Factors of highly demanded performance audits. Like many developed and 
developing countries, Kazakhstan is within a megatrend on expanding their performance 
audits (see Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017; Bunn, Pilcher, & Gilchrist, 2018; Flesher & 
Zarzeski, 2002; Funnell, 2004a; Glynn, 1985; Levy, 1996; Loke et al., 2016; Pollitt, 
2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018; Torres et al., 2019; Yamamoto & 
Waranabe, 1989, for more). According to the perceptions of the 14 (100%) participants, 
more performance audits are being conducted in various areas of public administration by 
both the central and local public sector audit organizations. In the last 18 years, audit 
organizations increased their share of performance audits starting from 0 to more than 
60% of their audit portfolios, as it is illustrated in see Table 10, and, thus, performance 
auditing practice flourished in Kazakhstan as well (see Pollitt, 2018, p. 167, for more). 
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Answering questions regarding the reasons behind performance audit requests, I 
identified that these audits are in high demand in Kazakhstan due to the needs and 
interests of parliamentarians, auditors, the President, citizens, and media. Previously, 
participants or users of performance audits within public administrations were not 
defined as influential factors of demand for performance audits and at such a ranking. 
However, these findings are consistent or partially consistent with previous studies’ 
results. 
Parliamentarians need and use performance audits to implement their duties, such 
as ensuring the accountability of governments, making budgetary decisions, and 
promoting legislative proposals. This finding is consistent with results of studies on using 
performance audit results (Arthur, Rydland, & Amundsen, 2012; Funnell, 2004a, 2011, 
2015; Funnell & Wade, 2012; Funnell et al., 2016; Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Morin, 2001, 
2008, 2016; Pollitt & Summa, 1997; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2011; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Vabo, 2017). For 
instance, one parliamentarian stated that reports of audit organizations are the only 
sources about the quality of implementing the budget process and ministries’ 
effectiveness that allow a deputy corps of parliamentarians to make informed decisions 
about budgets and laws (PL06, personal communication, January 16, 2020). This 
perception is in line with considerations of Reichborn-Kjennerud (2014a, 2014b) related 
to providing elected officials with information about using public money through 
auditing the performance of executives. Arthur et al. (2012) similarly opinioned that 
performance audit results are necessary to making parliamentary decisions. Funnell 
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(2015) argued that parliamentarians use performance audits to legitimize their decisions, 
and that argument was confirmed by the experience of study participants, who shared 
views on pursuing political interests by members of the Parliament of Kazakhstan via 
performance audit results (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020; AC02, 
personal communication, January 8, 2020; AC/L05, personal communication, January 15, 
2020). 
In Australia, increasing the number of performance audits was motivated by 
representatives of parliamentary committees for public accounts who “complement and 
enhance the role of performance auditors primarily by providing the public forum for 
further investigations into government practice and performance” (Hoque and Sharma as 
cited by Parker, Jacobs, & Schmitz, 2019, p. 284). In Kazakhstan, parliamentarians praise 
the work of auditors as well. However, they use different tactics to shape the demand for 
performance audits depending on levels of public administration. Members of the central 
legislative body request information about performance audits results, while local 
parliamentarians, like legislators in western public administrations, directly request 
conduction of performance audits and actively participate in meetings considering 
performance audits results. Despite these differences, my conclusion on the demand for 
performance audits due to parliamentarians’ needs is consistent with definitions of 
parliamentarians as motivators of performance audits in Australia (Parker et al., 2019) 




Further, both the central and local public audit organizations, in most cases (i.e., 
except requesting audits by parliamentarians and the President), select themes, areas, and 
auditees for conducted audits at their sole discretion. Of those interviewed, all auditors 
opted for performance audits, shared their experience in proposing performance audits, 
and predominantly supported proposals to conduction more performance audits by their 
colleagues. These findings were consistent with recent considerations of Nath et al. 
(2019), who defined audit organizations and audit teams as the main internal initiators of 
performance audit ideas. Then, auditors’ preferences as the influential factor of demand 
for performance audits are due to their active positions (see Norton & Smith, 2008, for 
more). Performance auditors are ready to initiate important audits and issue audit reports 
even when these audits are not requested by governmental or any other organizations 
(Wheat as cited by Norton & Smith, 2008). 
In turn, an active position of Kazakhstani performance auditors might be defined 
as a manifestation of a responsive approach to performance auditing (see Arthur et al., 
2012; Knaap, 2011; Rosa et al., 2014a; Rosa, Morote, & Prowle, 2014, for more). 
Applying that approach means that performance audits are initiated and conducted in the 
interests of users, e.g., crime victims, employers, and disabled people (Arthur et al., 
2012). In the lived experience of auditors, the needs of citizens were highlighted as 
reasons for increasing performance audits, opposite to the lived experience of 
parliamentarians or managers of auditees. Particularly, auditors claimed that performance 
audits are needed because of citizen complaints and the existence of social problems, 
including the unaddressed needs of people who are most in need of governments’ 
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support, such as pensioners, large families, and disabled people (AC01, personal 
communication, January 8, 2020; AL03, personal communication, January 9, 2020; 
AL04, personal communication, January 10, 2020; ACL05, personal communication, 
January 15, 2020). According to the lived experience of 7 (50%) participants, the media, 
to a certain degree, shape the demand for performance audits as well. 
The generated theme “Citizens and media shape the demand for performance 
audits” is consistent with defining the public (the public complaints) and media as 
external initiators or motivators of performance audits (see Nath et al., 2019; Parker et al., 
2019, for more). At the same time, cases from Australia and New Zealand studied by 
Parker et al. (2019) and Nath et al. (2019), respectively, differ from the case of 
Kazakhstan. For instance, auditors in Kazakhstan consider citizens’ complaints posted in 
i-komek, i.e., the information system of local authorities in planning performance audits 
(AL03, personal communication, January 9, 2020), while auditors in New Zealand 
respond to citizens’ complaints submitted directly to their organizations by conduction of 
performance audits (Nath et al., 2019). Regarding the media, auditors in Australia do not 
use the media to disseminate performance audit reports, while audit organizations in 
Kazakhstan invite the media to share the results of performance audit results (AC02, 
personal communication, January 8, 2020). In the end, the media shape the demand for 
performance audits in Kazakhstan, like in other countries (see Justesen & Skaerbaek, 




Nath et al. (2019) analyzed situations when themes of performance audits in 
healthcare were defined by SAI of New Zealand, taking into account views of 
representatives of the Ministry of Health and the District Health Boards. The authors 
concluded that it was a useful experience. My study participants, i.e., managers of 
auditees and auditors, shared opposite positions regarding the agreements or joint 
initiations of performance audits in Kazakhstan. All managers and all auditors stated that 
they did not experience any performance audit initiations or took part in planning 
performance audits by auditees’ managers. It was explained by (a) frequent visits of 
auditors caused by increasing number of audits or annually repeated performance audits 
(MC10, personal communication, February 11, 2020; MC11, personal communication, 
February 14, 2020; ML12, personal communication, February 15, 2020; ML13, personal 
communication, February 15, 2020; ML/C14, personal communication, February 28, 
2020); (b) requesting audits by newly appointed ministries to check financial violations, 
in rare cases (AC02, personal communication, January 8, 2020; ACL05, personal 
communication, January 15, 2020). Therefore, Kazakhstani practice on performance 
auditing differs and are a far contrast from the experiences of western countries where 
performance audits are requested not only by parliamentarians, but also by auditees or 
governments (see Funnell 2015; Knaap, 2011; Nath et al., 2019; Parker et al., 2019, for 
more). A few managers shared their experience on interactions with external public 
auditors when they execute the President Administration’s order (MC10, personal 
communication, February 11, 2020; ML12, personal communication, February 15, 2020). 
Participants did not perceive that experience as a voluntary action, but, in their opinion, it 
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was a positive experience. Thus, the statements about conduction of useful performance 
audits through agreed actions between governments, auditees, and auditors made by Nath 
et al. (2019) and almost 20 years ago by Morin (2001) are to some extent, relevant to the 
Kazakhstani case. 
Finally, I defined the President’s policy on prioritizing performance audits as one 
of the more influential demand factors for these audits in Kazakhstan. This finding is 
relatively new since as my literature review offered no studies that explored the influence 
of presidents (head of the states) on performance auditing, and presidents were not 
defined as initiators or motivators of performance audits before. This strong presidential 
power, which implies using mandates of both legislative and executive bodies 
(Nazarbayev, 2017; OECD, 2017a), explains why, in the lived experience of 11 (78.6%) 
participants, the President’s order emerged as high priority demand factor for 
performance audits in Kazakhstan. Additionally, based on my literature and documentary 
review results, I concluded that heads of states request performance audits in other post-
Soviet republics including Russia (The Accounts Chamber of the Russian Federation 
(ACRF), 2020), but their influences on demand for performance audits were not studied. 
There are other influential factors that explain the phenomenon of highly 
requested performance audits in Kazakhstan. As described in Chapter 2, based on 
linkages between the emergence and developments of new public management and 
performance auditing, I defined NPM as a classical trigger for performance audits. Due to 
changes in principles of the public sector functioning (Hood, 1991; Hood, 1995), public 
auditors started to focus on evaluations and results in order to assess achievements 
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(Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Levy, 1996; Pollitt & Summa, 1997), and by pursuing 
objectives related to promotion of improvements and enhanced accountability in audited 
areas (Alwardat et al., 2015; Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017; Barrett, 2012; Flesher & 
Zarzeski, 2002; Funnell et al., 2016; Funnell & Wade, 2012; Funnell, 2015; Morin & 
Hazgui, 2016; Morin, 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018; Reichborn-
Kjennerud & Vabo, 2017). Similar to other countries, highly demanded performance 
audits in Kazakhstan are due to NPM (see Linn, 2014; Nazarbayev, 2017; Vakulchuk, 
2016, for more). 
Firstly, in response to reforms in public management, audit organizations 
extended their mandates and added performance audits into their audit portfolios 
(English, 2003; Free, Radcliffe, & White, 2013; Funnell, 2015; Glynn, 1985; Hossain, 
2010; Morin, 2003; Morin & Hazgui, 2016; Torres et al., 2019; Yamamoto & Waranabe, 
1989). Different countries empowered their audit organizations with mandates to 
undertake performance audits differently. In Canada, performance audits evolved steadily 
(Free et al., 2013), whereas, in Australia, mandates on performance auditing of SAI were 
expanded, reduced, and expanded again (Hossain, 2010). Governments resisted 
expanding public auditors’ mandates (Aucoin as cited by Morin & Hazgui, 2016) and, 
therefore, public auditors undertook performance audits de facto, i.e., they exceeded their 
de jure mandates (Hossain, 2010; Parker et al., 2019). Despite these differences, 
increasing the number of performance audits, as a rule, was preceded by empowering 
audit organizations with mandates to conduct performance audits. According to the lived 
experiences and perceptions of all parliamentarians, all auditors, and three managers in 
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my participant group, the number of performance audits increased in Kazakhstan due to 
empowering audit organizations with a mandate to conduct that type of audit. 
For all countries, except for pioneers in performance auditing, like Canada, the 
United States, and United Kingdom, performance auditing is an adapted practice 
(Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017; Flesher et al., 2003; Glynn, 1985; Grönlund et al., 2011; 
Levy, 1996; Loke et al., 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a; Weihrich, 2018). Many 
countries increased the number of performance audits as a result of using the practice of 
pioneers or leaders in performance auditing. Three auditors in the participant group 
shared examples of using an international practice in their planning and conducting of 
performance audits; three parliamentarians also referred to international practice, 
including two parliamentarians who argued that adapting an international practice on 
performance audits should be continued (PC06, personal communication, January 16, 
2020; PC07, personal communication, January 17, 2020). 
Trends on adapting international practice are still topical. As described in Chapter 
2, INTOSAI contributes to sharing experiences among country-members. Pierre and 
Licht (2019) argued that proving the professionalism of SAI’s staff and quality of 
auditors’ work “urged SAIs to conform to the INTOSAI’s norms and rulings” (p. 228), 
that includes recommended standards and guidelines on performance auditing (INTOSAI, 
2019). Thus, my research findings related to Pattern 2 “Features of public auditing 
system” includes themes on the legitimization of performance audits and adapting an 
international practice being consistent with previous research findings. 
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Secondly, problems in public administration also shape the demand for 
performance audits. Moreover, unlike the needs and interests of participants and users of 
performance audits (themes on Pattern 1) and legitimization of performance audits and 
adapting the international practice (themes on Pattern 2), problems in public 
administration are the most influential factors of highly demanded performance audits in 
Kazakhstan (themes on Pattern 3). Systems problems, shortcomings in state planning, 
needs in evaluating the effectiveness, and risks of new areas are the main explanations of 
demand for performance audits in Kazakhstan. Comparing these findings with the 
reviewed literature, I concluded that they are related to both classical and specific 
triggers, described in Chapter 2, including global financial crises, governments’ 
initiatives on addressing lack of financial resources, structural problems, and 
environmental issues. 
The factors of demanded performance audits associated with a classical trigger 
include systems problems and shortcomings in state planning. Conceptually, these 
findings are consistent with Jacobs’ (1998) argument that performance auditing emerged 
and developed to solve problems. When justifying the conduction of more performance 
audits, auditors and parliamentarians indicated deficits of the republican budget and tax 
revenue reduction caused by global financial crises as reasons that support their positions 
(AC01, personal communication, January 8, 2020; PL08, personal communication, 
January 20, 2020). Worsening financial conditions and fiscal stress caused by global 
financial crises were identified as reasons to conduct performance audits earlier (Athmay, 
2008; Free et al., 2013; Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Rosa et al., 2014b; 
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Yamamoto & Waranabe, 1989). Particularly, analyzing correlations between sizes of 
public sectors, tax revenues, and expenses, Yamamoto and Waranabe (1989) concluded 
that performance auditing widely spread when public administrators were challenged by 
lack of financial resources. 
In my research, I found that performance auditing in Kazakhstan supported the 
relevance of Yamamoto and Waranabe’s previous findings despite their research being 
conducted over 30 years ago. For Kazakhstan, triggering performance audits due to 
financial stresses is consistent with the most recent considerations made by Torres et al. 
(2019) and Parker et al. (2019). As Parker et al. (2019) stated, “the growth of PA 
[performance auditing] has been the product of a ritualistic response to a broader social 
demand for financial assurance driven by cycles of financial crisis and associated 
governmental budgetary constraints” (p. 281). 
For my study participants, systems problems also included ineffective budget 
spending, poor performance of government organizations, social problems, and lags in 
regional development. The same explanations for emerging and faster performance audit 
developments were provided by scholars in the 1990s and in more recent studies. For 
instance, Jacobs (1998) argued that, in the public administration of New Zealand, 
performance auditing emerged in response to problems in government financial 
management. Free et al. (2013), based on cases from Canada, shared the same view. The 
inferior performance of public sector organizations of both developed and developing 
countries was also defined as reasons for performance audits (Common and Minogue, as 
cited by Athmay, 2008). In continuation of these views, Alwardat et al. (2015), based on 
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the case of United Kingdom, concluded that the development of performance auditing 
was stimulated by intensions to maximize outcomes in terms of reducing governments’ 
spending. 
Shortcomings in state planning, identified as an influential factor of demand for 
performance audits, are also related to NPM, or, more precisely, to post-NPM, since 
Kazakhstani state planning system was established within NPM’s initiatives and it 
implies using the strategic planning approaches (ISLARK, 2017a, 2017b). These findings 
are consistent with Knaap’s (2011) view about undertaking performance audits due to 
disappointing agency or program performance. As shared by my study participants, 
documents of state planning (i.e., strategies, state programs, programs on regional 
development, development plans of national state-owned companies, and budget 
programs) and the quality of their implementation are reasons to conduct more 
performance audits. In turn, responding to problems on state programs implementation by 
performance audits are in line with the well-established practice of SAI of the United 
States on performance auditing of state programs (USGAO, 2019). 
Nine (64.3%) participants shared their views and perceptions about needs in 
evaluating the effectiveness of government entities, quasi-public companies, and 
programs’ implementation. All five auditors justified their organizations’ practice on 
planning and conducting more performance audits by the necessity to provide users with 
reliable evaluations, especially in terms of existing controversial information (ACL/05, 
personal communication, January 15, 2020). In most cases, the perceptions of my 
participants were related to ensuring the government’ accountability for budget planning 
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and program implementation, and auditees for using budget funds as well. For instance, 
one parliamentarian listed a few programs of the central government, including programs 
on providing benefits to small and medium-sized businesses, that should be objectively 
and independently evaluated by performance auditors (PC07, personal communication, 
January 17, 2020). Thus, the generated theme “Needs in evaluating the effectiveness” is 
directly related to realizing the accountability principle and, therefore, consistent with 
some associated studies (Barrett, 2012; Funnell, 2004a, 2004b, 2015; Kells, 2011; Morin 
2014, 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2011b, 2014b). 
Theme “Risks of new areas” was generated based on two family categories. The 
first family categories included unaudited organizations (e.g., the National Fund and the 
Pension Fund) or unaudited areas of public administration (e.g., regional waste 
management programs) in Kazakhstan. This finding is in line with Lapsley and Pong’s 
study (2000) that resulted in a conclusion about expanding performance auditing 
coverage within the public sector. Auditors’ views and experiences on the conduction of 
performance audits in organizations that do not receive budget funds (AC01, personal 
communication, January 8, 2020) are matched with Bini’s (2019) considerations related 
to managing the scope of performance audits to avoid limitations, such as controlling 
budget money. The second family categories included new areas in public administration, 
defined in Chapter 2 as specific triggers. Particularly, public-private partnership projects, 
national companies, and financial institutions were listed as subjects for performance 
audits by my participants. According to auditors and parliamentarians’ perceptions, these 
areas should be audited due to risks of negative consequences or even losses in budget 
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funds. These findings are consistent with Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen’s (2011) 
conclusions about selecting performance auditing themes by auditors depending on the 
risks for public funds. In sum, regarding the identified factors that explain the highly 
demanded performance audits in Kazakhstan, I concluded that some research findings are 
consistent or partially consistent with views and conclusions of authors of the reviewed 
studies, while others are relatively new, as it is demonstrated in Table 19. 
Impacts of performance audits. Despite the novelty, performance audits already 
had made impacts on public administration in Kazakhstan in line with Lonsdale’s et al. 
(2011) classifications, as described in Chapter 2. Performance audits had instrumental 
impact; e.g., all auditors discussed their tasks within performance audits, such as 
evaluation of achieving the expected outcomes in implementing budget programs, and, in 
turn, managers shared their experiences on changing reports on budget program 
implementation in their organizations as effects of auditors’ work (see Lonsdale et al., 
2011, for more). Tactical (e.g., managers shared their experience on implementation of 
auditors’ instructions on restoration works) and strategic (e.g., both auditors and 
managers shared examples of changing budget programs and programs on regional 
development as results of an implementation of auditor’s recommendations) impacts also 
emerged in the lived experience of study participants (see Desmedt et al., 2017; Lonsdale 
et al., 2011, for more). Most of the participants shared their views about auditors’ 
methods, demonstrating an understanding of performance audit objectives and changes in 
requirements to auditees’ performance, i.e., examples of conceptual impact (see Lonsdale 





Aggregated Data on Empirical Context and Evidence: Demand for Performance Audits 
Patterns and themes Authors of previous studies 
Conclusions related 
to consistency the 
research findings 
Who creates demand for audits 
Auditors prefer 
performance audits 
Nath et al., 2019; Norton & Smith, 2008 consistent 
Parliamentarians 
need in performance 
audits 
Arthur et al., 2012; Funnell, 2004a, 2011, 2015; 
Funnell & Wade, 2012; Funnell et al., 2016; 
Guthrie & Parker, 1999; Morin, 2001, 2008, 
2016; Pollitt & Summa, 1997; Reichborn-
Kjennerud, 2011, 2013a, 2013b; 2014a, 2014b; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud & Vabo, 2017 










There are no studies related to presidents’ influence on demand for 
performance audits. 
Managers of auditees 
use performance 
audits’ results 
Funnell 2015; Knaap, 2011; Morin (2001); Nath 
et al., 2019; Parker et al., 2019 
partially consistent 
Citizens and media 
shape the demand for 
performance audits 
Arthur et al., 2012; Knaap, 2011; Nath et al., 
2019; Parker et al., 2019; Rosa et al., 2014a; 
Rosa et al., 2014b 
Justesen & Skaerbaek, 2010; Morin, 2008; 





Features of the system of public auditing 
Legitimization of 
performance audits 
English, 2003; Free et al., 2013; Funnell, 2015; 
Glynn, 1985; Hossain, 2010; Morin, 2003; 
Morin & Hazgui, 2016; Torres et al., 2019; 





Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017; Flesher et al., 
2003; Glynn, 1985; Grönlund et al., 2011; Levy, 
1996; Loke et al., 2016; Pierre & Licht, 2019; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a; Weihrich, 2018 
consistent 
Problems of the system of public administration 
State planning Knaap, 2011; USGAO, 2019 consistent 
Systems’ problems Alwardat et al., 2015; Free et al., 2013; Guthrie 
& Parker, 1999; Jacobs, 1998; Parker et al., 
2019; Rosa et al., 2014b; Athmay, 2008; Torres 
et al., 2019; Yamamoto & Waranabe, 1989 
consistent 
Risks of new areas Lapsley & Pong, 2000; Bini, 2019; Reichborn-
Kjennerud, 2011 
consistent 
Needs in evaluating 
the effectiveness 
Barrett, 2012; Funnell, 2004a, 2004b, 2015; 
Kells, 2011; Morin 2014, 2016; Reichborn-




Political-legitimizing impact was also manifested in the lived experience of 
participants; they did not refer to exact examples of using the performance audits to 
legitimize adopted policies or previous political decisions (see Funnell, 2015; Lonsdale et 
al., 2011, for more). However, some managers shared examples including points about 
good practices of their organizations in performance audit reports, supporting that 
approach; parliamentarians shared their experience of using the performance audits for 
making legislative proposals. 
Performance audits impacted at micro-, meso-, and macrolevels (see Lonsdale et 
al., 2011, for more). I defined generated Themes 211, 212, and 213 as examples of 
impact at microlevel, Themes 221 and 222 as examples of impact at mesolevel, and 
Themes 231 and 232 as examples of impact at macrolevel (see Desmedt et al., 2017; 
Lonsdale et al., 2011, for more). 
According to participants’ perceptions, performance audits impacted auditors 
(100% participants), managers of auditees (92.9%), and parliamentarians (57.1%), and 
the impact on managers of auditees was more highlighted compared to impacts on 
auditors and parliamentarians. Based on evidence-based findings from my literature 
review, I concluded that this specific research finding is relatively new given that 
previous studies did not show evidence related to identifying personal impacts of 
performance audits based on simultaneously exploring the perceptions of auditors, 
managers of auditees, and parliamentarians. Particularly, influences of performance 
audits on managers were explored based on perceptions of managers (Desmedt et al., 
2017; Morin, 2008, 2014), and partially by Alwardat and Basheikh (2017) and Justesen 
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and Skaerbaek (2010). Some aspects of personal impact on managers were fragmentarily 
analyzed by scholars who studied reactions of auditees on performance audits (Funnell & 
Wade, 2012; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013b, 2014a) and perceptions of auditors and 
managers about usefulness of performance audits at meso- and macrolevels (Alwardat et 
al., 2015; Funnell et al., 2016; Morin 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a, 2014b, 
Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Vabo, 2017). 
One of my key findings related to microlevel impacts is that participant’s 
perceptions about the impact of performance audits on managers of auditees vary. All 
three groups of participants shared examples of both negative and positive impacts. 
Firstly, according to the lived experience and perceptions of managers of auditees, 
in most cases, performance audits negatively impact on their perspectives. Wherein, 
negative perceptions were related to work complication and negative emotions, such as 
stress, increased distrust of auditors’ work, and perceived performance audit results as 
uselessness. Other scholars (see Pollitt as cited by Morin, 2008, for more) discussed work 
complications as a result of auditor visits. Justesen and Skaerbaek (2010) identified stress 
and discomfort as negative emotional consequences of performance audits for both 
managers and employees of audited organizations. Distrust to auditors’ work due to their 
technical competencies (Alwardat et al., 2015; Funnell et al., 2016; Morin 2001; 
Pendlebury and Shreim as cited by Loke et al., 2016), usefulness and problematic nature 
of performance audits (Bawole & Ibrahim, 2016; Kells, 2011; Lapsley & Pong, 2000) are 
inherent aspects of interactions between managers and auditors and serve as examples of 
negative impacts. For instance, Alwardat et al. (2015) stated, “auditors’ competence, 
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skills, experience and knowledge of the public bodies’ activities… had negative effects 
on the ability of the external VFM [value-for-money] auditors to influence the audited 
bodies” (p. 213). All five managers’ stories about situations when they may experience 
fear, non-acceptance, recognition, and gratitude are consistent with observations made by 
Funnell and Wade (2012), who concluded that fear and animosity are emotional 
perceptions of performance audits by auditees, while some auditees may experience 
understanding and appreciation as well. 
Positive perceptions of managers regarding the impact of performance audits were 
related to learning, receiving new information, and, in fewer cases, promotion and 
understanding performance audits’ objectives. These findings are also consistent with 
previous studies. For instance, Reichborn-Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018), by testing their 
hypotheses related to positive impacts of performance audits in Norway, concluded, “An 
audit might reveal new facts that trigger debates and lead to a shift in paradigms. It might 
also provide new information that will lead auditees to see solutions in a new light” (p. 
1430). Alwardat and Basheikh (2017), Desmedt et al. (2017), and Morin (2008, 2014) 
also identified some positive personal impacts on managers and employees of audited 
organizations, including career development opportunities. However, analyzing 
components of positive personal impacts in detail, I concluded that my findings are only 
partially consistent with these author’s results. Particularly, unlike the Belgian case 
studied by Desmedt et al. (2017) and the Canadian case studied by Morin (2008, 2014), 
negative perceptions of managers prevailed in the Kazakhstani. 
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Like managers of auditees, auditors perceived the impact of performance audits 
on managers as mainly negative; wherein, negative perceptions were related to objections 
concerning performance audits results, a negative reaction on conducting a performance 
audit itself, and misunderstanding performance audits’ objectives. Auditors’ perceptions 
about personal impacts that performance audits have on managers of auditees were not 
studied previously. However, there are few consistencies and inconsistences between my 
findings and results from Funnell and Wade (2012) and Morin and Hazgui (2016). For 
example, Funnell and Wade (2012) discussed auditors’ perceptions about auditees 
reactions, which may include personal attacks, to their performance audits. In contrast to 
Funnell and Wade (2012), I concluded that auditors faced less aggressive reactions of 
managers, especially if the latter [managers] gained more experience in performance 
audits. For instance, some auditors shared their experience when managers of auditees 
positively reacted to their audits and demonstrated an understanding of performance 
audits objectives (AC01, personal communication, January 8, 2020; AL03, personal 
communication, January 9, 2020; AL04, personal communication, January 10, 2020). 
Morin and Hazgui (2016) explained confrontations between auditors and auditees 
through an expectation gap, i.e., auditors and auditees do not gain desired results from 
each other in the course of their interactions (e.g., managers doubt auditors’ contribution, 
while auditors want to be perceived as assistants). These considerations are relevant to 
the Kazakhstani. 
Secondly, in auditors’ opinions concerning performance audits’ impact on their 
perspectives, negative perceptions outweigh positive perceptions. The negative impacts 
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include increased requirements, workload, and, in fewer cases, demotivation, and staff 
turnover. Auditors directly related increased requirements and workload with the 
introduction of performance audits in their organizations, while demotivation and staff 
turnover were mainly associated with requirements on financial control and applied 
(unfair) methods of evaluation of performance auditors’ work. The positive impacts 
include mastering new skills, finding interesting work, and, to a lesser degree, 
professional development, and promotion. This finding is relatively new. Alwardat et al. 
(2015), Funnell and Wade (2012), and Loke et al. (2016) explored auditors’ perceptions 
about usefulness of their work, Morin (2001, 2003) and Morin and Hazgui (2016) 
analyzed roles that they [performance auditors] play in public administration. These 
studies resulted in predominantly positive rhetoric about performance auditors’ 
contributions. 
Managers of auditees, in most cases, expressed negative perceptions about how 
performance audits impact on auditors. Particularly, managers claimed that auditors did 
not change their methods of auditing, preferred to find financial violations; they 
[auditors] are still perceived as controllers or auditors who, as before, make unfair and 
subjective conclusions. These findings are consistent with related discussions and 
explanations provided in previous studies (Funnell & Wade, 2012; Funnell et al., 2016; 
Morin 2003, 2008, 2014, 2016; Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013b, 2014a). Stereotypical 
perceptions are manifested in relation to performance auditors who operate in western 
public administrations (Funnell & Wade, 2012; Pollitt, 2003) and in Kazakhstan as well. 
But, in the first case, performance auditors were perceived as “characterless men in grey 
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suits” (Pollitt, 2003, p. 168), while, in the second case, they perceived as inspectors who 
return from the Soviet Union (ML/C14, personal communication, February 28, 2020). 
Thirdly, unlike auditors and managers of auditees, parliamentarians were less 
active in sharing their experience and perceptions about the personal impacts of 
performance audits. In their lived experience, negative and positive influence on 
managers highlighted equally, whereas impacts on auditors were perceived as positive 
mainly. These findings are generally consistent with some previous studies. For instance, 
Morin (2016), and most recently Parker et al. (2019), argued that legislatives praise the 
work of auditors. Both positive and negative perceptions of parliamentarians associated 
with personal impacts on managers are partially consistent with discussions shared by 
Funnell (2015), Morin (2016), and Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a, 2014b). Impacts of 
performance audits on perspectives of parliamentarians from their viewpoints were not 
studied before. 
Next, according to the lived experiences of study participants, performance audits 
impacted audit organizations (100% of participants) and auditees (85.7% of participants). 
Wherein, audit organizations were impacted more significantly compared with auditees. 
In turn, organizational impacts on legislative bodies did not emerged as major themes in 
the lived experience of my participants, actualizing the need for further studies in order to 
explore mesolevel impacts of performance audits. 
In auditors’ opinions, the most influential impacts of performance audits on their 
organizations are associated with changes in audit methodology and organizational 
consequences. While changes in audit methodology were solely related to the 
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introduction of performance audits, organizational consequences were due to other 
factors. Some managers of auditee and parliamentarians also referred to changes in 
methods of auditors’ work, e.g., auditors’ focus expanded from accounting departments’ 
performance to other core departments in ministries (ML13, personal communication, 
February 15, 2020; ML/C14, personal communication, February 28, 2020; PL09, 
personal communication, January 23, 2020). Changes in methods and organizational 
structures of SAIs and local audit organizations as results of performance audits were 
discussed by Barrett (2010, 2011a), English (2003), Grönlund et al., (2011), Hossain 
(2010), Jacobs (1998), Keen (1999), Kells and Hodge (2011), Lonsdale (2000), Pollitt 
and Summa (1997), Pollitt (2003), Rosa et al. (2014a), and Tillema and Bogt (2010). 
However, these authors’ conclusions are results of reviewing practices of audit 
organizations, i.e., they [conclusions] were not derived through studying perceptions of 
participants of performance audits. 
Further, auditors shared (a) positive perceptions associated with the introduction 
of performance audits, such as the improved reputation of their organizations and 
changes in approach to auditing in general, and (b) negative perceptions, including the 
keeping of financial control that leads to deterioration of their organizations’ reputation. 
The negative attitude toward using mechanisms of financial control in performance audits 
was shared by managers of auditees and parliamentarians; it is almost the only case of 




On one hand, my research findings are partially in line with Lonsdale’s (2000, 
2008), who argued that performance audits influence audit organizations’ reputation. 
However, the negative impact of performance audit on audit organizations were related to 
using financial control in Kazakhstan, while in United Kingdom it was due to political 
risks associated with close links between audit organizations, governments, and 
parliaments (Lonsdale, 2000, 2008). 
On the other hand, my research findings are also partially consistent with 
considerations of dual roles of audit organizations, i.e., watchdogs or controllers and 
modernizers or catalysts for change and improvement (Morin 2003, 2008, 2010, 2016; 
Morin & Hazgui, 2016). Like Lonsdale (2000, 2008), these authors also did not consider 
audit organizations’ roles in the context of financial control, i.e., sanctioning for 
violations and deficiencies; they analyzed the roles of auditors as controllers, i.e., 
compliance auditors, and change agents, i.e., advisers who help by providing auditees 
with recommendations (Morin 2003, 2008, 2010, 2016; Morin & Hazgui, 2016). Despite 
these different aspects in exploring performance audits’ impacts, my research findings 
about auditors’ desire to be welcomed and perceived as advisors (AC02, personal 
communication, January 8, 2020; AL03, personal communication, January 9, 2020) and 
managers’ distrust to auditors’ new roles and perceptions of interactions with compliance 
auditors as easier opposite to interactions with performance auditors (MC10, personal 
communication, February 11, 2020; ML12, personal communication, February 15, 2020) 
are consistent with research findings of Morin (2003) and Morin and Hazgui (2016). Both 
managers and parliamentarians wait for audit organizations’ recommendations before 
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addressing problems, rather than acting on facts of identified violations (PC07, personal 
communication, January 17, 2020; PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020; 
ML13, personal communication, February 15, 2020; ML/C14, personal communication, 
February 28, 2020). 
All auditors claimed that performance audits positively impacted auditees, and 
positive impacts included improvements in performance and financial discipline, 
enhanced internal control, and, in fewer cases, improved reputation and organizational 
changes. Auditors emphasized that virtually every audit event led to improved prospects 
for audited organizations. These positive auditors’ perceptions are consistent with the 
results of studies by Alwardat et al (2015), Funnell and Wade (2012), Loke et al. (2016), 
Morin and Hazgui (2016), and most recent publications of Jeppesen et al. (2017) and 
Johnsen et al. (2019). 
Unlike auditors, managers of auditees shared both positive (readiness to new 
audits, better discipline, improved performance, and enhanced control) and negative 
(workload, demotivation, staff turnover, and financial consequences) perceptions 
associated with impacts that performance audits had on their organizations. Managers’ 
perceptions related to impacting financial discipline within their organizations are in line 
with Pollitt and Summa’s (1997) conclusions and are related to changes in internal 
business processes in concert with Lapsley and Pong’s (2000) arguments. Workload and 
demotivation are also earlier identified as consequences of performance audits; “the 
presence of auditors added considerably to auditees usual workload” and lead to “a drop 
in motivation” (Pollitt et al. as cited by Morin, 2008, p. 703). 
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Morin (2004, 2008, 2014) argued that performance audits contribute to changes in 
audited public administrations. To a greater extent, performance auditors impacted 
administrations through making attention to problems, preparing useful audit reports, 
providing relevant recommendations, and, to a lesser extent, through preventive effects, 
changing in management practices, taking actions, contributing to better relations with 
stakeholders, organizational and personal consequences (Morin, 2014). In the lived 
experience of managers of auditees, ‘controversial’ pictures emerged aligned with 
Morin’s (2014) categories. For instance, in managers’ opinions, the positive impact of 
performance audits, in most cases, manifested as preventive effects (i.e., the improved 
financial discipline and readiness to future audits) and, in fewer cases, by useful reports 
or relevant recommendations being offered as a useful audit outcome. However, some 
managers shared examples of only rarely receiving quality reports with applicable 
recommendations (ML13, personal communication, February 15, 2020; ML13, personal 
communication, February 15, 2020). 
Further, Morin (2008, 2014) and Desmedt et al. (2017) argued that performance 
audits do not lead to deteriorations in public administrations. In contrast to these 
conclusions, managers of auditees frequently listed negative consequences of 
performance audits, such as workload, demotivation, staff turnover, and financial 
consequences. That consideration is based on comparing research results achieved by 
applying different research designs, i.e., qualitative and quantitative, and, therefore, 
drawing any conclusion should be cautiously done. Further research is needed. Morin’s 
(2008) found that “the visits of auditors are not guaranteed to produce the desired 
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changes in the management of government organizations” but generally performance 
audits “seem to have done more good than harm to audited organizations” (p. 712), 
similar to Desmedt et al. (2017), and are relevant to Kazakhstani. 
Based on the Saudi Arabia SAI’s case and though application of Morin’s (2014) 
research instrument, Alwardat and Basheikh (2017) concluded that public administrators 
make more efforts to comply with laws, enhance control, establish acceptable indicators, 
improve the quality of performance reports, change strategic and operational plans, and 
maintain effective relations with their superiors and subordinates, as a result of 
performance audits. Similar examples of the positive impact of performance audits on 
audited organizations were shared by managers of auditees and auditors; however, unlike 
public administrators in Saudi Arabia, managers emphasized that these positive examples 
were rare cases in Kazakhstan. 
Reichborn-Kjennerud and Vabo (2017) stated that, in Norway, the positive 
impacts of performance audits, in managers’ opinions, include increased documentation 
and reporting, changes in approaches to internal control and risk management, improved 
strategies, and planning. These findings are partially relevant to Kazakhstan, with 
similarities including changes in reporting, internal control, strategies, and budget 
planning. 
My findings related to impacting auditees are also partially consistent with 
considerations of scholars who argued that the positive (or negative) impact of 
performance audits on auditees is achievable subject to specific conditions. In particular, 
all managers emphasized that if they agree with the recommendations of the auditors and 
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find them useful, they are interested in their implementation, i.e., it is consistent with the 
results of testing related hypotheses of Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013а) and Reichborn-
Kjennerud and Johnsen (2018). 
Finally, at macrolevel, performance audits impacted budget processes at both 
central and local levels of public administration in Kazakhstan and contributed to changes 
in laws and regulations. Unlike impacts that performance audits had at micro- or meso-
levels, macro-impacts were not associated with negative perceptions of my study 
participants. Auditors and parliamentarians mainly shared examples on positive impacts, 
while managers of auditees shared their opinions on impacting performance audits on 
public administration neutrally. Most of the participants emphasized that judging about 
performance audits’ impact is difficult, and that point was discussed by Funnell and 
Wade (2012), Morin (2008), and Pollitt (2003). At the same time, nine (64.3%) 
participants, when asked my question related to impacts of performance audits on public 
administration in general, stated that these audits are useful. 
Specifically, according to the perceptions and opinions of most participants, 
performance audits impacted budget planning, administration of budget programs, and 
budget reports. Focusing participants’ perceptions on budget affairs is explained by 
features of the accountability system and practices on using performance audits. Audit 
organizations use their performance audits to prepare annual reports, i.e., conclusions 
about the execution of central and local budgets by governments; their reports are 
considered and approved by parliamentarians. Wide use of performance audits begins 
from discussions of audit organizations’ annual reports in parliaments with both 
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governments and media participation. That approach is in line with western systems on 
accountability when “the presentation of reports is merely one stage in a cycle of 
accountability that begins with the budget process and ends with the presentation of 
reports to parliament” (English, 2003, p. 56). My research findings are also consistent 
with views about performance audits’ impacts through stimulating public hearings 
(Morin 2001, Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013a). As Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a) argued, 
performance audits might effectively impact public administration, enhancing the 
accountability subject to the involvement of parliament, media, and other users of audit 
reports. 
As my literature review offered, the identified impact of performance audits on 
budget processes was not explored or explained before as a self-sufficient impact. 
However, impacts that performance audits have on public financial management and 
specific chains of a budget process, e.g., making budgetary decisions, were discussed by 
Johnsen et al. (2001), Lonsdale (2000), and most recently by Olaoye and Adedeji (2019). 
In contrast to Olaoye and Adedeji (2019), who noted that performance audits lead to 
budget efficiency, I concluded that impacts of performance audits on budget processes 
are more procedural rather than result-oriented. In turn, Lonsdale’s (2000) considerations 
about the adaptation of budget bills as a result of using performance auditors’ work are in 
line with the experiences of the Kazakhstani parliamentarians (PC06, personal 
communication, January 16, 2020; PL09, personal communication, January 23, 2020). 
Alwardat and Basheikh (2017), Thompson and John (2019), and Torres et al. (2019) 
explored impact of performance audits on public sector organizations’ financial 
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behaviors, which inherently linked with a budget process. Their results are also consistent 
with my research findings.  
All participants discussed changes in laws and regulations as positive 
consequences of performance audits. This research finding is consentient with the 
research of Morin (2008, 2014), Alwardat and Basheikh (2017), and Desmedt et al. 
(2017). These authors interpreted changes in laws and regulations as mesolevel impacts, 
i.e., as a variable of concrete actions undertaken by auditees after performance audits. 
However, their findings are not conflicting with my findings since the impacts of 
performance audits at different levels are interrelated, e.g., impacts at mesolevel lead to 
or imply changes at macrolevel (see Desmedt et al., 2017, for more). My research-based 
findings related to impacting improvements of laws and regulations as a result of 
auditors’ interventions are also consistent with well-tested multiyear practices of some 
SAIs. For instance, GAO uses data on changes in laws and regulations made based on 
their recommendations as non-financial benefits, i.e., as a performance indicator of its 
audits (Bawole & Ibrahim, 2016; USGAO, 2019). 
Reviewing the literature on impacts of performance audits in different countries 
and at different stages of development of performance auditing practice, I concluded that 
most recent studies are focused on or revealed impacts on accountability, political and 
democratic processes, whereas impacts on policies and programs were explored within 
more pioneering studies (Glynn, 1995; Johnsen et al., 2019; Levy, 1996; Morin, 2016; 
Pollitt & Summa, 1997; Torres et al., 2019). A few ideas associated with the 
accountability and political developments were shared by my study participants, but the 
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frequency of associated categories was not enough to generate relevant themes. These 
differences in comparable research findings are due to the novelty of performance 
auditing in Kazakhstan, and identified impacts on budget processes, laws, and regulations 
are predominantly related to changes in policies and programs. Thus, impacting political 
and democratic processes and accountability by performance auditors’ interventions 
might be proposed as perceptive areas for future studies. 
Further, the novelty of performance audits or, more precisely, beginning 
performance auditing practice is the main explanation of why a sub-theme on needs in 
changes in performance auditors’ work emerged in the lived experience of the 14 (100%) 
participants. One example is that parliamentarians expressed their opinions on expanding 
the scope of performance audits and focusing on making recommendations, supporting 
Barrett’s (2011) statement that, “A major issue for performance auditing is the 
maintenance of parliamentary and public confidence in the coverage, timeliness and 
outcomes of such audits, as well as effective action to ensure proper implementation of 
any recommendations and conclusions” (p. 130). Another example is that all auditors 
called for changes in audit methodology, pointing to overregulated methods on doing 
performance audits today. Auditors’ concerns are consistent with a generally accepted 
views that, “Streamlined procedures, methods and standards may in fact hamper the 
functioning and the progress of performance audit... standards – as well as quality 
assurance systems – that are too detailed should be avoided. Progress and practices must 
be built on learning from experience” (INTOSAI as cited by Knaap, 2011, p. 355). In 
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turn, views about changes in the use of financial control within a performance audit 
shared by all participants required responses from policymakers. 
Finally, the generated sub-theme regarding contributions to public sector 
performance by parliamentarians and managers of auditees without using the 
performance audits, i.e., their self-contributions to the economy, effectiveness, and 
efficiency, are consistent with previous studies’ results about using performance auditing 
as one of the NPM’s tools on improving the public sector performance (Alwardat et al., 
2015; Azuma 2003, 2005; English, 2003; Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Funnell, 2015; 
Funnell et al., 2016; Funnell & Wade, 2012; Lapsley, 1999; Lonsdale et al., 2011; Morin, 
2016; Morin & Hazgui, 2016; Power, 1996; Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018).  
Thus, as demonstrated in Table 20, findings on the impact of performance audits 
on Kazakhstani public administration are consistent or partially consistent with 
conclusions of authors of some previous studies, while others are relatively new. 
Theoretical Context and Alignment 
As outlined in Chapter 1 and particularly described in Chapter 2, I used a 
combination of Hood’s NPM and Waterman and Meier’s PAM as theoretical frameworks 
to explore the phenomena of demanded performance audits in Kazakhstan and their 
impact on national public administration system (see Hood, 1991; Waterman & Meier, 
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themes 
Authors of previous studies Conclusions on 
consistency 
Impact on participants of audits 
Impact on 
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Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017; Alwardat et al., 2015; 
Desmedt et al., 2017; Funnell et al., 2016; Funnell & 
Wade, 2012; Justesen & Skaerbaek, 2010; Loke et al., 
2016; Morin, 2001, 2008, 2014; Morin & Hazgui, 





There are no studies related personal impacts of performance audits on 
parliamentarians. 
Impact on audit organizations and auditees 
Changes in audit 
organizations 
English, 2003; Grönlund et al., 2011; Hossain, 2010; 
Jacobs, 1998; Keen, 1999; Lonsdale, 2000, 2008; 
Morin 2003, 2008, 2010, 2016; Morin & Hazgui, 2016; 






Alwardat et al., 2015; Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017; 
Bawole & Ibrahim, 2016; Desmedt et al., 2017; Funnell 
& Wade, 2012; Jeppesen et al., 2017;  
Johnsen et al., 2019; Kells, 2011; Lapsley & Pong, 
2000; Loke et al., 2016; Morin, 2004, 2008, 2014; 
Morin & Hazgui, 2016; Pollitt & Summa,1997; 
Reichborn-Kjennerud, 2013а; Reichborn-Kjennerud & 








Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017; Johnsen et al., 2011; 
Lonsdale, 2000; Olaoye & Adedeji, 2019; Thompson et 
al., 2019; Torres et al., 2019 
partially 
consistent 
Changes in laws 
and regulations 
Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017; Bawole & Ibrahim, 2016; 





Alwardat et al., 2015; Azuma 2003, 2005; English, 
2003; Flesher & Zarzeski, 2002; Funnell, 2015; Funnell 
et al., 2016; Funnell & Wade, 2012; Lapsley, 1999; 
Lonsdale et al., 2011; Morin, 2016; Funnell, 2015; 
Morin & Hazgui, 2016; Morin, 2016; Power, 1996; 






Barrett, 2011; Knaap, 2011 consistent 
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To address problems on ineffective public management, public administrators 
apply approaches and means encapsulated by Hood in his seven doctrines, and it explains 
why NPM becomes a widely using public management reform: “From Denmark to New 
Zealand, from education to health care, from central to local government and quangos, 
from rich North to poor South…” (Hood, 1991, p. 8). In turn, performance auditing is one 
of the tools used to address problems in ineffective public management (Barrett, 2012; 
English, 2003; Funnell, 2015).Thus, identified factors of highly demanded performance 
audit in Kazakhstan, including problems in public administration, confirm the 
reasonableness of Hood’s idea on labeling NPM as ‘public management for all seasons’ 
since local and other variations do not change the essence of NPM and NPM is an 
‘apolitical’ framework (Hood, 1991, p. 8).  
Auditors and parliamentarians, when justifying increased number of performance 
audits, referred to shortcomings in state planning, systems’ problems, and risks in new 
areas of public administration at both central and local governments levels in Kazakhstan 
(Themes 131, 132, and 133). In particular, the study participants explained the needs in 
performance audits by ineffective budget spending and weak control over the execution 
of budget programs. These views are in line with Hood’s doctrines including explicit 
standards and measures of performance and greater emphasis on output controls (Hood, 
1991, 1995). Needs in evaluating the effectiveness (Theme 134) are important in making 
decisions related to effective and efficient allocation and using the budget funds, or, in 
“cutting costs and doing more for less as a result of better-quality management” (Hood, 
1991, p. 15). 
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The arguments of study participants associated with budget deficits (AC01, 
personal communication, January 8, 2020), reduction in tax revenues caused by fall in oil 
prices (PL08, personal communication, January 20, 2020), and complaining of a drop in 
investment (PC07, personal communication, January 17, 2020) are in line with Hood’s 
consideration about the development of NPM and its tools in response to fiscal stress and 
poor macroeconomic performance (Hood, 1995). According to most of the participants, 
enhanced financial discipline and better implementation of budget programs are examples 
of positive impact of performance audits. These views are consistent with the seventh 
doctrine of Hood – “stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use” (Hood, 
1991, p. 5). Like Hood’s (1991, 1995) study of cases of OECD countries in the 1990s, 
and more recently studied cases of OECD countries, including countries of Eastern 
Europe experienced in building national systems of public administration following the 
fall of the Soviet Union, China, and Vietnam (Bao et al., 2012; Esposito et al., 2018; 
Hammerschmid et al., 2018; Reiter & Klenk, 2019; Verbeeten & Spekle, 2015), using 
performance audits in Kazakhstan offered legitimization (Theme 121) and importing 
international experiences in the course of NPM adaptation (Theme 122; see Barrett, 
2012; English, 2003; Funnell, 2015, for more). 
The needs and interests of auditor, parliamentarians, and managers of auditees 
(Themes 111, 112, and 114), who play the roles of principals and agents within a 
performance auditing process, also explain the demand for performance audits (see 
Waterman & Meier, 1998, for more). When sharing the experience of interactions with 
managers, auditors demonstrated specific features of roles of principals to managers, e.g., 
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setting accountability requirements, such as preparing and providing information about 
performance results, or requirements on implementing auditors’ instructions, such as 
carrying out restoration works. Then, unlike parliamentarians or managers of auditees, 
auditors play both principal and agent’s roles, and it explains their perceptions about 
using the performance audits results and alignment their explanations with Waterman and 
Meier’s (1998) considerations. 
As Waterman and Meier (1998) argued, in some cases, legislators as principals 
through oversight processes may have more access to information opposite to agents. Or, 
managers as agents may have more access to information opposite to principals, and, 
therefore, “they will almost always have a better understanding of how their agencies 
operate than will outside principals” (Waterman & Meier, 1998, p. 184). Thus, PAM was 
a good framework for understanding parliamentarians’ references to using their mandates 
on request of information from different sources, and their positions on being not limited 
to performance audits result in implementing their duties as elected officials. 
Analogically, auditors shared their experience of using auditees’ data as well as media 
publications, citizens’ complaint tracking information systems, and other sources to make 
decisions related to performance audits. In turn, all managers argued that they are better 
aware of the functioning of their ministries or departments, criticizing auditors for their 
biased or unfair conclusions or explaining parliamentarians’ critics as a way of using 
auditors’ work in their political objectives. 
The lived experiences of 13 (92.9%) participants, including four parliamentarians, 
five auditors, and four managers, demonstrated how information asymmetry works within 
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conflicting interests of principals and agents (see Waterman & Meier, 1998, for more). 
For instance, different level of access to information and conflicting goals explains 
variations in the reaction of principals and agents toward performance audits (see 
Maggetti & Papadopoulos, 2018; Waterman & Meier, 1998, for more). Four managers of 
auditees perceived interactions with auditors as a functional, but not voluntary, duty, 
while auditors shared experiences on managers’ resistance to performance audits and 
their experiences were confirmed by both managers and parliamentarians. 
Further, like participants of performance audits, President (Theme 113), citizens, 
and media (Theme 115) influence the demand for performance audits in Kazakhstan. Or, 
in the language of PAM, there are multiple principals and agents in a chain of interactions 
within the performance auditing process (see Waterman & Meier, 1998, for more).  
Like other interaction processes (e.g., interactions between elected politicians and 
public officials with the involvement of other parties such as state legislatures, governors, 
regulated interest groups or regulated independent agencies, consumers, and citizens), 
President, citizens, and media are influential participants in PAM, as demonstrated in 
Figure 29 (see Gerber & Teske, 2000; Maggetti & Papadopoulos, 2018, for more). Thus, 
according to my research findings, performance auditing in particular and public auditing 
system, in general, are suitable political domains for the implication of dynamic and 
multilevel PAM (see Gerber & Teske, 2000; Maggetti & Papadopoulos, 2018; Waterman 












Figure 29. Updates on PAM based on the research findings 
Note: Developed based on Barzelay (2001), Reichborn-Kjennerud (2013a), and Waterman and Meier 
(1998). 
 
Coupled with information asymmetry, conflicting goals, and involvement of 
multiple principals and agents, dynamics (i.e., changes in access to information) and 
accountability are other aspects of PAM (Gerber & Teske, 2000; Maggetti & 
Papadopoulos, 2018; Waterman & Meier, 1998). It explains the experience of managers 
on their constructive cooperation with public auditors in implementing the President’s 
order (MC10, personal communication, February 11, 2020; ML12, personal 
communication, February 15, 2020) because the same level of access to information leads 
to constructive cooperation even within conflicting goals and interests. Accountability 
principles incorporated into PAM emerged in stories of all participants, and most of the 
cases were associated with the experience of parliamentarians who argued that 
governments should be accountable for results in implementing programs and auditors 
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A central point of interactions between principals and agents in the context of 
NPM is the agreed objective on improving public sector performance that is both 
achievable and provable and subject to accountability (Barzelay, 2001; Hood, 1991, 
1995; Kapucu, 2006). My research findings are also in line with these considerations. The 
lived experiences of all participants demonstrated that there are no significant differences 
in perceptions related to achieving better (desired) results in terms of implementing 
budget processes and policy programs through performance audits. Therefore, the 
combination of NPM and PAM provided deep insights on perceptions of participants 
related to performance audits’ impacts depending on their [participants] roles, mandates, 
and responsibilities of their organizations (Themes 211, 212, 213, 221, and 222). Last but 
not least, features of interactions between participants of the performance auditing 
process and other users of performance audits, e.g., variations in levels of their influence, 
explain macrolevel impacts of performance audits in Kazakhstan (Themes 231 and 232). 
Limitations of the Study 
My research findings on the causes of highly demanded performance audits and 
perceived impacts of these audits on public administration in Kazakhstan are results of 
analyzing the data of 14 phenomenological interviews and documentary reviews. Thence, 
there are some limitations on using the results of my study to other target groups (e.g., 
internal auditors of government entities or managers of quasi-public companies) or 
general populations (e.g., users of public services or leaders of non-governmental 
organizations) due to sample size. 
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Exploring the perceptions of managers was limited to two areas of public 
administration, i.e., public finance and healthcare, whereas perceptions of managers from 
other areas (e.g., agriculture, education, transport, and information technology) may 
differ from perceptions of managers who work in ministries and departments for finance 
and healthcare. I interviewed auditors, parliamentarians, and managers of auditees, as the 
key participants of performance audits conducted at both central and local government 
levels. However, the lived experience and perceptions of other those involved in auditing 
from other government and public sectors were not studied. Despite recruiting 
participants who are highly experienced in performance auditing and who openly and 
impartially expressed their position, it would be interesting and useful to study the lived 
experience of other participants of performance auditing who do not represent rich-cases. 
As it was revealed, besides the key participants of performance audits, the President’s 
policy, needs of citizens, and interests of media create the demand for performance audits 
in Kazakhstan. Since the roles of the President, citizens, and media significantly differ 
from the roles of auditors, managers, and parliamentarians, exploring their lived 
experience and perceptions may add insights to the studied phenomena. 
Localization is a limitation of the study as well. The local level perspectives were 
studied based on the case of Nur-Sultan city. Despite functioning within similar political 
domains, there are some regional features and traditions in public administration and 
performance auditing, in particular, that may influence the perceptions and lived 
experiences of auditors, parliamentarians, and managers who live and work in the other 
16 regions of Kazakhstan. 
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As described in Chapters 1 and 2, in my research, I focused on performance audits 
conducted in 2016–2019; for documentary review purposes, I extended that timeframe. 
So, like sample size, scope, and localization, the timeframe presents one more limitation 
of the study, since (a) despite to changes in audit approaches, performance auditing 
practice started in Kazakhstan in 2002, and (b) performance auditing practice continued 
during and after interviews affected by the normal course of business and unforeseen 
circumstances. 
I used group characteristic and single sufficient case sampling methods and other 
strategies, as it was assumed at the initial stage of my study and described in Chapter 3, 
to minimize risks associated with the listed limitations, i.e., gathering incorrect and 
biased information. I managed all listed limitations and risks of both researcher and 
participants’ biases, and they did not impact the research findings’ reliability. Limitations 
associated with small sample size, scope, location, and timeframe are manageable 
through recommendations provided in the next section of this chapter. 
Recommendations and Implications 
Theoretical Implications 
My study is the first research attempt on exploring factors of demanding 
performance audits in Kazakhstan and the impacts of these audits on public 
administration. Further research is still needed to obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of phenomena under study addressing the described study limitations in 
hopes to further expand upon the findings of my research. More specifically, the research 
findings related to involvement of the President, citizens, and media into a performance 
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auditing process, who were identified as principals in PAM, actualize exploring their 
lived experiences and perceptions about performance auditing because they shape 
demand for performance audits in Kazakhstan. It is also advisable to expand the target 
population by adding other principals and agents. Studying the lived experience of 
auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians from other regions in Kazakhstan 
may add a deeper understanding of factors of demand for and impact of performance 
audits, taking into account regional specifics. Studying the lived experience and 
perceptions of managers from other areas of public administration, i.e., other than public 
finance and healthcare that were covered by my research, may obtain additional 
information, taking into account sectoral specifics. 
As described in Chapter 2, in addition to external auditors, internal auditors are 
also empowered to undertake performance audits in the public and quasi-public sectors in 
Kazakhstan (ISLARK, 2015). Including internal auditors as participants of future studies 
may shed additional light on my research findings from a relatively passive position of 
managers of auditees in terms of requesting or initiating performance audits. In particular, 
explaining their opinions about no real need for a request for external performance audits, 
managers of auditees referred to mandates of internal auditors of ministries and local 
executives on conduction of performance audits. 
In the lived experience of parliamentarians, i.e., elected public officials, and 
managers of auditees, i.e., implementers of public officials’ policy, the needs and 
interests of citizens emerged as factors of demanded performance audits in fewer cases 
opposite to the lived experience of auditors. To a certain degree, it is a contradictory 
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(resonant) fact, given that the NPM approach on achieving results associated with 
citizens’ satisfaction on the quality of public services, is actively declared and 
implemented in Kazakhstan. Therefore, exploring the perceptions of both 
parliamentarians and managers of auditees about a responsive approach to performance 
audits (i.e., initiating and undertaking performance audits in the interests of citizens) will 
provide additional information in relation to research and practice gaps between 
perceptions of parliamentarians and managers of auditees and perceptions of auditors. 
My research findings also may be used to identify to what extent demand for 
performance audits and their impacts on public administration are interrelated. The 
generated themes and family categories related to factors of demand for and impacts of 
performance audits may be used as variables to test hypotheses within future quantitative 
studies, e.g., to what extent increased demand for performance audits contribute to 
positive (or negative) impacts on public administration. Or, vice versa, to what extent 
positive (or negative) impacts of performance audits on public administration lead to 
changes in demand for performance audits. 
Further, based on my literature review results, I concluded that personal impacts 
of performance audits are understudied, especially impacts on auditors and 
parliamentarians. My study resulted in conclusions with both negative and positive 
impacts that performance audits have on auditors’ perspectives, according to perceptions 
of auditors, as well as managers of auditees and parliamentarians. It is unknown how 
performance audits in both developed and other developing countries impact auditors and 
parliamentarians from the perceptions of all participants of performance audits. Thus, 
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new studies on exploring perceptions of users of performance audits about personal 
influences of performance audits will provide additional information and learning 
opportunities related to microlevel impacts of these audits. 
As described in the previous section, I also identified perspective areas for 
scholarly works on exploring meso- and macro-impacts of performance audits. While 
negative perceptions of my study participants about performance audits’ impact on 
auditees were related to using financial controls and sanctions by audit organizations in 
the course of their performance audits, it will be useful to explore to what extent these 
controls and measures contribute to changes in audited organizations and whether these 
changes are positive in terms of achieving better organizational performance. 
Additionally, it will be beneficial to explore impacts that performance audits have on 
legislative bodies and their organizational performance. At macrolevel, it will be useful to 
explore whether performance audits contribute to the political and democratic processes 
in Kazakhstan, using my research instrumentations and findings (e.g., exploring the 
perceptions of influential users of performance audits). 
Finally, both quantitative and mixed methods may be used to measure the impact 
of performance audits on public administration in Kazakhstan. Specifically, it is possible 
to quantitatively measure the impact of performance audits that they have at micro-, 
meso-, and macrolevels in Kazakhstan, applying research instrumentation of Morin 
(2008, 2014) tested in the cases of developed (Desmedt et al., 2017) and developing 
(Alwardat & Basheikh, 2017) countries, or by a modification of that instrumentation 
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though incorporating my research findings. Mixed method research approaches provide 
added insights through data triangulation as a foundation for increasing study validity. 
Public Policy Implication 
Performance auditing is one of the prioritized directions of public policy in 
Kazakhstan (ISLARK, 2013); it was confirmed by studying the lived experience and 
perceptions of my study participants. However, further considerations and responses from 
the side of policymakers are needed specifically in identified areas for further 
improvements. 
Firstly, the current practice of considering and using the results of performance 
audits by parliamentarians as integrated parts of annual reports of audit organizations 
(i.e., once a year) reduces opportunities for receiving more benefits from performance 
audits. Views of three parliamentarians (75% of interviewed representatives of a deputy 
corps) on considering the performance audits results right after audits completion are 
consistent with previous empirical evidence on parliamentarians’ contribution to making 
performance audits more useful (Funnell, 2004a; Morin 2001, 2003, 2004, 2008, 2016; 
Morin & Hazgui, 2016, Reichborn-Kjennerud & Johnsen, 2018; Reichborn-Kjennerud & 
Vado, 2017). 
Secondly, I revealed situational discrepancies on responding to performance 
audits by auditees through exploring perceptions of auditors, managers, and 
parliamentarians. All auditors and most of the parliamentarians believed that managers of 
auditees resist performance auditors’ work mainly due to misunderstanding of 
performance audits objectives. Whereas, all interviewed managers of auditees 
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demonstrated right understanding of performance audits objectives; their reactions, such 
as resistance or objections to auditors’ work, were due to the facts that auditors did not 
change their approaches regardless of introduction of performance audits. A key 
observation brought to light in my research is a legacy stereotypical attitude, 
predominantly kept, and more precisely translated to performance audits (i.e., from 
revisions of controllers from the Soviet Union to newly adapted practice of performance 
auditors) due to auditors defaulting their auditing practices to financial control measures. 
This is evidence of ineffective or unconstructive communications in reality because the 
14 (100%) participants unanimously expressed doubts regarding the reasonableness of 
applying financial control mechanisms in performance audits. Therefore, I recommend to 
the key policymakers in public auditing system to make agreed political decisions on 
changes in approaches to performance auditing in terms of applying sanctions as 
measures on addressing deficiencies in audited areas and organizations. 
Thirdly, this Kazakhstani case is at the beginning stage of the transformation of 
auditors’ classical role that implies focusing on problems into an advocate role that 
contributes to changes in political reforms and developments (see Morin & Hazgui, 2016; 
Pierre & Licht, 2019, for more). There are research-based pieces of evidence sources that 
agreed on actions of auditors (audit organizations), managers of auditees (governments 
and their executive entities) in terms of identifying priorities in performance audits and 
evaluation criteria ultimately lead to useful performance audits (Morin, 2003; Nath et al., 
2019). In this regard, and based on my research findings, I recommend to concerned 
public administrators and, in particular, to leaderships of audit organizations to start these 
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tested actions, maintaining adherence to the principles of independence and excluding 
any possible corruption-related risks. I believe that it will allow moving to a new level 
performance audit impact – from solving local or specific problems to the desired 
political transformations and further democracy developments in Kazakhstan. 
Fourthly, predominantly negative views of my study participants related to 
measuring the audit organizations performance by facts of identified violations or 
measures on sanctioning may be used as further justifications to change performance 
indicators of audit organizations. Audit organizations’ performance should be measured 
by their real contributions to positive changes in public administration; generated themes 
“Improved budget process” and “Changes in laws and regulations” indicated the 
manifestation of such positive effects of performance audits in Kazakhstan. 
In sum, all mentioned public policy implications are doable through making 
amendments or updating the concept on the introduction of public auditing in Kazakhstan 
adopted in 2013 (ISLARK, 2013) and not changed regardless of the results of its 
implementation. 
Methodological and Practical Recommendations 
According to my study participants’ perceptions, introduction of performance 
audits in their organizations was associated with methodological changes and increased 
regulations (requirements) on audit methods. From a theoretical perspective, it is a not 
new or unique finding (see Knaap, 2011; Lonsdale, 2000, for more); however, it requires 
both methodological and practical changes. I recommend to the key decision-makers in 
the public auditing system in Kazakhstan, including methodologists, to change 
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approaches to methodological support of performance audits, based on my study 
findings. Methodological problems emerged in the lived experience of all auditors and 
the frequency of associated categories was 14. Whereas performance audits are perceived 
as an opportunity for professional development by three auditors and the frequency of 
associated categories was only five. So, I propose to be guided by the following 
consideration – opposite to strictly regulated methods (in all interviewed auditors’ 
opinion, it takes place), professional development of performance auditors will facilitate 
the initiation and conduction of better and more useful performance audits. Performance 
audits should not be perceived as a daunting methodological task. It should be perceived 
as an opportunity to develop professionally to provide users with competent and reliable 
conclusions regarding the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of an auditee or audited 
area of public administration. 
Next, perceptions on negative impacts of performance audits, such as 
demotivation and staff-turnover caused by unfair evaluation of performance auditors’ 
works, are also required changes in methods and practices. Evaluation of auditors’ 
performance should be incorporated into practical objectives of performance audits. A 
main objective should be that performance evaluations motivate auditors to achieve 
results that are valuable in the context of an ideology of performance audits, for example, 
facilitating public hearings on important social issues instead of writing more 
administrative violation protocols. 
Despite to empirical evidence about auditors’ capacities to conduct useful 
performance audits (Loke et al., 2016; Morin & Hazgui, 2016), performance auditing 
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implies attraction of highly qualified experts (Loke et al., 2016; Mathur, 2018), for 
example, public debt management experts or health experts. This objective need is due to 
the fact that it is highly improbable to have auditors with sufficient level of qualifications 
in dissimilar areas of public administration that are subject to performance audits. 
However, only one auditor referred to attracting experts as a necessary addition to 
auditing processes, but emphasized that frequent involvement of experts is not possible 
due to resource constraints. At the same time, positive perceptions of managers of 
auditees of performance audits were explained by cases of conduction of performance 
audits by audit teams consisted of experts. 
Positive Social Implications 
As evidenced by my research, the introduction and expanding performance audits 
in the public sector of Kazakhstan is mainly due to intentions on achieving positive 
changes. More specifically, it was the intention to solve problems, minimize risks of 
ineffective actions and budget spending, as well as ensuring accountability in terms of 
using public funds, and implementing government programs that drove performance 
audit adoption. Performance audits are highly demanded not only due to auditors’ 
preferences, needs of parliamentarians, and auditees’ behaviors, but also due to the needs 
of public administration with and through the interests of the President, citizens, and 
media. These key findings of my research work are perceptive from positive social 
change implications. 
The positive social change implications include raising awareness about who and 
what demand performance audits, and how. Public politicians may use my research-based 
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data to assess reasoning for highly requested performance audits in Kazakhstan in making 
decisions in the area of public auditing (e.g., legitimize responsive approach to 
performance audits), as well as in general public administration (e.g., enhance 
parliamentary oversight powers through integrated performance audits). 
Shared deep insights about the key motivators and initiators of performance audits 
in Kazakhstan and identified differences by compared countries (see Nath et al., 2019; 
Parker et al., 2019, for more) may help in planning needed performance audits; identified 
problems that triggered performance audits may help in planning and undertaking useful 
performance audits. Newly added knowledge about performance audits’ macro-impacts 
will contribute to the development of more effective strategies and tactics on public 
budgeting, modernizing laws and regulations. I also hope that the results of my study will 
inform public policy leaders about existing reserves for expanding a spectrum for 
performance audits’ positive influences at the macrolevel through using these audits as a 
tool for improvements in the interests of citizens and improving their well-being. 
My research findings also might be applied by public administrations to ensure 
and enhance the positive impacts of performance audits at organizational and personal 
levels. The leadership of audit organizations and auditees, as well as executives and 
legislatures, may use the study findings related to impacting performance audits on public 
sector organizations’ performance to identify future effective and efficient strategies on 
organizational developments. In particular, through learning the perceptions of auditors 
and managers, I identified that performance audits lead to challenges in human resource 
management in both audit organizations and auditees (i.e., staff-turnover and 
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demotivation). Therefore, the results of my study might be used to improve policies on 
human resource management through better understanding the personal impacts of 
performance audits and maintaining a proper level of employee motivation. 
A contribution to the development of a new profession in Kazakhstan, i.e., the 
profession of performance auditor, is one more positive social implication of my study. 
Identified aspects of performance auditing, including interactions between all participants 
in the course of audits, may help to identify future training tactics of both audit and 
educational organizations. In turn, parliamentarians and managers of auditees may use 
my research findings to effectively manage their perspectives associated with their future 
experiences in performance auditing. 
Conclusions 
The central findings of my research work are explanations for highly demanded 
performance audits in Kazakhstan and the perceived impacts that these audits have on 
auditors, managers of auditees, and parliamentarians, on audit and audited organizations, 
and on budget process, laws, and regulations. The significance of my study was related to 
the investigation of unknown reasons for demanded performance audits in Kazakhstan 
and the impacts that these audits have on national public administration. That information 
gap increased risks of missed opportunities for better public sector governance through 
using performance audits and understanding their impacts. 
The study results illustrated that highly requested performance audits in 
Kazakhstan were not due to isomorphism phenomena, however, an adaptation of popular 
and widely used practice, to a certain degree, explained why performance audits are in 
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demand in Kazakhstan. The main explanation and reason for increasing the number and 
expanding the scope of performance audits are problems in public administration. It was 
also revealed that performance audits had both positive and negative impacts at micro- 
and mesolevel, and positive impact at macrolevel in Kazakhstan. These findings are 
consistent, partially consistent, or inconsistent with previous studies’ findings associated 
with the case of developed and developing countries. The inconsistencies or, more 
precisely, differences in reasons for and impacts of performance audits explained by 
public administration styles, i.e., western and emerged after the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, and maturity of performance auditing practice, i.e., active use during more than 50 
years in western countries and less than 10 years in Kazakhstan. 
Triggers, initiators, and motivators of performance audits were found to be very 
similar regardless of public administration styles, but ways and levels of their influence 
differed. There are also significant differences in the perceived usefulness of performance 
audits depending on the roles that participants play in performance auditing. Overall my 
research illustrated theoretical interpretations, useful public policy change opportunities, 
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Appendix A: Invitation Letter 
[The letter in Kazakh Language] 
ШАҚЫРУ ХАТ 
Күні:  ________ 
Зерттеу қатысушысының байланыс деректері:  ________ 
 
Құрметті (зерттеу қатысушысының аты-жөні), 
 
Сізді менің зерттеуіме қатысуға шақыруға рұқсат етіңіз, зерттеуімнің 
мақсаты Қазақстандағы тиімділік аудитке деген сұраныс факторларын және 
мемлекеттік әкімшілендірудің қазақстандық жүйесіне тиімділік аудиттердің 
қабылданатын әсерлерін зерделеу болып табылады. Тиімділік аудиттегі Сіздің 
тәжірибеңіз туралы ақпаратты беру менің зерттеуім үшін пайдалы болады. 
Менің зерттеуіме қатысу сұхбат беруді талап етеді. Сұхбаттың ұзақтығы – 
40-60 минут. Сіз сұхбат беруге келіскен жағдайда мен сұхбатты Сіз үшін неғұрлым 
қолайлы жерде және уақытта өткіземін. Сұхбаттасудың алдында мен Сізге сұхбат 
сұрақтарының тізімін жіберемін. 
Менің зерттеуіме қатысу ерікті болып табылады. Бұл зерттеудің кез-келген 
кезеңінде қатысудан бас тартуға болатындығын білдіреді. Егер Сіз зерттеуге 
қатысудан бас тартсаңыз, ешқандай ықпалшаралар қолданбайтынын есте сақтаңыз. 
Менің зерттеуіме қатысу құпия болып табылады. Бұл Сіздің дербес 
деректеріңіз және кез-келген сәйкестендіру ақпараты жария етілмейтінін білдіреді. 
Мен сұхбат деректерін сұхбат алынатын адамдардың дербес деректеріне сілтеме 
жасамай тек біріктірілген түрде және тек зерттеу мақсаттары үшін пайдаланамын.  
Егер менің зерттеуім немесе сұхбаттасуға қатысты кез-келген сұрақтарыңыз 
болса, Сіз маған телефон (телефон нөмірі) немесе электронды пошта арқылы 
(электрондық пошта мекенжайы) хабарласа аласыз. 
Жауап бергеніңіз үшін алдын ала алғысымды білдіріп, Сіздің менің 
шақыруыма деген жауабыңызды төрт жұмыс күні ішінде күте алатымдығын 
туралы хабарландыруды рұқсат етіңіз. 
 
Құрметпен, 






[The letter in Russian Language] 
ПИСЬМО-ПРИГЛАШЕНИЕ 
Дата:  ________ 
Контактные данные участника исследования:  ________ 
 
Уважаемый (имя и отчество участника исследования), 
 
Позвольте пригласить Вас принять участие в моем исследовании, целью 
которого является изучение факторов востребованности аудита эффективности в 
Казахстане и воспринимаемые эффекты аудитов эффективности на казахстанскую 
систему государственного администрирования. Предоставление информации о 
Вашем опыте в аудите эффективности будет полезным для моего исследования. 
Участие в моем исследовании предполагает участие в интервью. 
Длительность интервью – 40-60 минут. При согласии с Вашей стороны, я проведу с 
Вами интервью в наиболее удобных для Вас месте и время. До интервью я вышлю 
Вам перечень вопросов интервью. 
Участие в моем исследовании является добровольным. Это означает, что Вы 
можете отказаться от участия на любом этапе исследования. Пожалуйста, имейте в 
виду, что никакие санкции не будут предприняты в случае Вашего решения 
отказаться от участия в исследовании. 
Участие в моем исследовании является конфиденциальным. Это означает, 
что Ваши персональные данные и любая идентификационная информация не 
являются предметом разглашения. Я буду использовать данные интервью в 
агрегированном виде без ссылок на персональные данные интервьюируемых и 
исключительно для исследовательских целей. 
При возникновении любых вопросов касательно моего исследования или 
интервью, Вы можете обратиться ко мне по телефону (номер телефона) или по 
электронной почте (адрес электронной почты). 
Я буду крайне признательна за Ваш отклик на мое приглашение, и 
получение Вашего ответа в течение четырех рабочих дней.  
 
С уважением, 









Date:  ________ 
Research Participant Contact Information:  ________ 
 
Dear (Research Participant Name), 
 
I would like to invite you to participate in my research aimed at exploring factors 
that might explain the demand for performance auditing in Kazakhstan and the perceived 
effects of performance audits on Kazakhstani public administration. Sharing information 
about your experience in performance auditing will be helpful and useful for my research. 
Participation in my research means taking part in an interview. The interview 
duration is 40-60 minutes. In case of your acceptance, I will interview you at place and 
time that most convenient to you. Before interviewing, I will send you the list of 
interview questions. 
Participation in my research is voluntary. It means that you may withdraw from 
participation at any stage of my research. Please kindly note that no sanctions will follow 
because of your decision to withdraw.  
Participation in my research is confidential. It means that your data and any 
identifiers are not subject to disclosure. I will use the interview information in an 
aggregate form without referring to personal data of interviewees and only for research 
purposes. 
Should you have any questions related to my research or interviewing, I can be 
reached at (phone number) or via email (email address). 
Your feedback on my invitation is highly appreciated, and I will be grateful to 
receive your reply in four business days. 
 
Sincerely yours, 






Appendix B: Interview Guide 




The following questions will be asked to the research participants to identify and 




Questions for Group 1: Auditors 
1. How many years have you been working in your organization? 
2. When did you get the public auditor certificate? 
3. Are you empowered to take part in performance audits (according to your 
official duties)? 
4. Did you take part in the performance audits conducted by your organization in 
2016-2019? 
Questions for Group 2: Managers of Auditees 
1. How many years have you been working in your organization? 
2. Are you empowered to interact with external auditors and make a decision 
related to requesting the performance audits (according to your official 
duties)? 
3. Are you experienced in performance audits conducted by the public sector 
audits organizations, such as the Accounts Committee or Revision 
Commissions, in 2016-2019? 
Questions for Group 3: Parliamentarians 
1. How many years have you been working as a member of your committee? 
2. Have you experienced in performance audits conducted by the public sector 
audits organizations, such as the Accounts Committee or Revision 
Commissions, in 2016-2019? 
 
Semistructured Questions   
 
RQ: What are the lived experiences and perceptions of performance auditors, managers 
of auditees, and parliamentarians, the key participants and users of performance audits, 
regarding the demand for and impacts of these audits on Kazakhstan’s public 
administration? 
Sub-Question 1: Which factors (both external and internal conditions or reasons) 
contributed to the audit organizations’ decisions to conduct more performance audits? 
A. Questions for Group 1: Auditors 
A1. How are decisions about the conduction of performance audits made in your 
organization? What is your role in this decision-making process? 
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▪ Tell me please about the most memorable example of deciding the conduction of 
a performance audit. 
A2. Based on your experience, how were decisions on the conduction of performance 
audits (instead of traditional audits) justified? 
A3. To what extent and how decisions on the conduction of performance audit influenced 
by auditees and parliamentarians? 
▪ Tell me please about the examples of receiving the requests to conduct 
performance audits from auditees and parliamentarians (if any). How did your 
organization respond to those requests? 
A4. Would you like to add something else? 
 
Sub-Question 2: Which factors or causes (if any) contributed to the decisions of your 
organization to request more performance audits? 
B. Questions for Group 2 and Group 3: Managers of Auditees and Parliamentarians  
B1. What is your role in your organization? 
▪ Tell me please about your duties and whether you are empowered to initiate or 
request on the conduction of performance audits by the Accounts Committee or 
Revision Commissions. 
B2. As experienced in the performance auditing, what reasons do you use to justify your 
requests on the conduction of more performance audits? 
▪ Tell me please about the most memorable example of initiating a request on the 
conduction of the performance audit.  
B3. Would you like to add something else? 
 
Sub-Question 3: What are the perceptions, experiences, opinions, and beliefs of 
performance auditors related to the impact of performance audits on public 
administration in Kazakhstan? 
C. Questions for Group 1: Auditors 
C1. How and in what extent the performance audits influence your organization? 
▪ Tell me please about changes (if any) occurred in your organizations because of 
the introduction of performance auditing (from 2016). 
C2. What are the advantages and disadvantages of performance audits (compared to 
traditional audits)? 
C3. How and in what extent performance audits influence auditees? 
▪ Tell me please about the most memorable reactions of auditees on performance 
audits conducted by your organization in 2016-2019.  
C4. How and in what extent performance audits influence your perspectives? 
▪ Tell me please about the most memorable example of your experience in 
performance auditing. How do you use your experience?  
C5. Would you like to add something else? 
 
Sub-Question 4: What are the perceptions, experiences, opinions, and beliefs of 
managers of auditees and parliamentarians related to the impact of performance audits 
on public administration in Kazakhstan? 
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D. Questions for Group 2: Managers of Auditees 
D1. How do your organization use the performance audits? 
D2. How and in what extent the performance audits influence your organization? 
▪ Tell me please about changes (if any) occurred in your organizations because of 
conduction of performance audits by the Accounts Committee or Revision 
Commissions (from 2016).  
D3. What were your expectations from performance audits? Based on your experience, 
whether performance audits are more useful compared to traditional audits? 
D4. How and in what extent performance audits influence your perspectives? 
▪ Tell me please about the most memorable example of your experience in 
performance auditing. How do you use your experience?  
D5. Would you like to add something else? 
 
E. Questions for Group 3: Parliamentarians 
E1. How do your organization use the performance audits? 
E2. How and in what extent the performance audits influence your organization? 
▪ Tell me please about changes (if any) occurred in your organization because of 
empowering the Accounts Committee or Revision Commissions with mandates to 
conduct performance audits (from 2016).  
E3. What were your expectations from performance audits? Based on your experience, 
whether performance audits are more useful compared to traditional audits? 
E4. How and in what extent the performance audits contribute to changes in laws and 
regulations? How do performance audits change the public sector audits organizations 
and auditees? 
E5. How and in what extent performance audits influence your perspectives? 
▪ Tell me please about the most memorable example of your experience in 
performance auditing. How do you use your experience?  
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Appendix E: Interview Protocol 






Time (started at):  
Duration (planned): 40-60 minutes  
Interviewee (code):  
For the 1st group code for participant 1  AC01 
 code for participant 2  AC02 __ 
 code for participant 3  AL03 __ 
 code for participant 4  AL04 
 code for participant 5 AC/L05 
   
For the 2nd group code for participant 6  PC06 
 code for participant 7  PC07 __ 
 code for participant 8 PL08 __ 
 code for participant 9 PL09 __ 
   
   
For the 3rd group code for participant 10 MC10 __ 
 code for participant 11  MC11 
 code for participant 12 ML12 __ 
 code for participant 13 ML13 __ 
 code for participant 14 ML/C14 
   
Interviewer: Almagul Mukhamediyeva  
 
I. Introduction (5 minutes) 
▪ Purpose of the Study 
▪ Objectives of the Interview 
▪ Clarifications related to: 
 participants selection 
 voluntary participation 
 confidentiality 
 using the interview data 
▪ Signing the Informed Consent Form 
II. Technical Preparations (2 minutes) 
▪ Testing Equipment 
▪ Preparing Interview Journal, Paper, Pen, and Water 
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(Start Audio Recording) 
III. Interviewing (30-50 minutes) 
▪ Demographics 
▪ Interview Questions (see the Interview Guide) 
IV. Conclusion Statement (3 minutes) 
▪ Comments, Questions, and Suggestions  
▪ Thanks for Participating  
(End Audio Recording) 
 
Time (finished at):  Duration (actual):  
Interviewer Signature:  
Interviewee provided with the 
Interview Protocol Copy: 





Appendix F: Interview Journal 
Research theme: Demand for and impact of performance audits on public administration 
in Kazakhstan 
Walden University 
Interview Number: Int# [1, 2, …, 12] 
Date:  
Location:  
Interviewee (code):  
For the 1st group code for participant 1  AC01 
 code for participant 2  AC02 
 code for participant 3  AL03 
 code for participant 4  AL04 
 code for participant 5 AC/L05 
   
For the 2nd group code for participant 6  PC06 
 code for participant 7  PC07_ 
 code for participant 8 PL08 
 code for participant 9 PL09 
   
   
For the 3rd group code for participant 10  MC10 
 code for participant 11  MC11 
 code for participant 12 ML12 
 code for participant 13 ML13 
 code for participant 14 ML/C14 
   
Interviewer: Almagul Mukhamediyeva  
 
Interview Protocol Compliance  Completed [+] 
I. Introduction  
II. Technical Preparations   
III. Interviewing   
IV. Conclusion Statements  
Interviewing Notes 
Demographics -  
Interview Questions -  
IQ#1:  
IQ#2:  
…  
 
